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ABSTRACT
EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND JACQUES MARITAIN ON THE STUDENT-TEACHER
RELATIONSHIP IN CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

Timothy W. Rothhaar
Marquette University, 2022

The purpose of this dissertation is to serve as a stepping stone to a larger
philosophy of the Catholic university. Its thesis argues that Catholic universities have
lost their way by means of faith, identity, and ethical crises, and in order to recover these
we must return to the primordial student-teacher relationship embedded in a Catholic
philosophical anthropology. Beginning in the mid-20th century, with roots at the turn of
the century, Catholic universities took a decided secular move away from their
theological roots beginning with Fr. Theodore Hesburgh’s reimagining of the Catholic
university as a corporate entity. As a result, they began to embrace competition with nonCatholic schools in the areas of power and prestige, instead of forming citizens of good
character and faith. This idea directly contrasts with Pope St. John Paul II’s Ex Corde
Ecclesiae wherein Catholic universities are centers of faith and reason whilst encouraging
the building up of laity in the Christian life. Contra both, I argue for a third way between
them in order to break up the limiting dichotomy.
To do this, I borrow the base intersubjective ethic from Jewish philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas and pair it with the theocentric humanistic pedagogy of French
Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain. I argue Levinas gets at what is central to a
Catholic philosophical anthropology in treating the Other, the one who is not me, as one
with dignity and so initiated into dialogue. This may sound like a plea to welcome antiCatholic sentiment simply because it is different, but it is actually a step in recovery
towards authentic Catholic education because of the need to re-welcome its own
intellectual tradition. To that end, Maritain’s understanding of the student-teacher
relationship embodies this ethic such that students are able to voice whatever they please
—including Catholic theology—without fear of reprisal and learn wherever their souls
lead. So, too, Catholic professors are able to teach virtually anything they please whilst,
ultimately, leading students to forming their minds. I conclude by placing my project in
the context of all higher education.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a prolegomenon to a larger philosophy of the Catholic
university which encompasses all of the various aspects of its existence.1 It does not
concern itself to raise questions about why universities exist or whether they should exist.
Its concern is the structure and function of Catholic universities in 21st century America.
It does not endeavor to answer every single question posed about the dimensions of the
Catholic university. Primarily, I want to investigate the student-teacher relationship as
the foundation of all universities with special emphasis on Catholic universities in light of
human dignity. Insofar as relationship pertains to ethics, and ethics pertains to
institutions, there is a unique conception of the Catholic university. This dissertation
intends to expound on that conception. For these reasons, its intended audience, aside
from philosophers, theologians, and educationists, is the academic administrator in charge
of running a Catholic university. Here presented are the chapters, their contents, and
argumentation.
My argument is the student-teacher relationship is the foundation of all universities,
Catholic and secular. Catholic universities, however, have “lost their way” (identity,
faith, etc.) because of the adoption of secular principles in their runnings and structures.
So, to recover these things (faith, etc.), we must return to the roots of the university as

1

The term “university” is a broad and complex term, varying in definition over the past 800 years since its
inception. Contemporary theoreticians on the university, such as Ronald Barnett, will argue there are at
least forty or so versions of the university from “entrepreneurial” to “environmental”. I do not go to that
specific of a definition. All I mean in this dissertation by “university” is a tertiary level of education
(“higher education”) terminating in a college degree with/without graduate-level credentials. It includes
“college” as well because the enterprise to teach, learn, and research as professors and students are all
coherent goals of this level.
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such and start over.2 The principle characteristic of Catholic education is a classical
liberal arts curriculum (of various kinds)3 for the formation of human character, the
promotion of the well-rounded citizen to better serve one's neighbor, and the knowledge
necessary for salvation.
Chapter one details a select history of American Catholic higher education
beginning with Pope Leo XIII and the debate over the “heresy” of “Americanism”
leading into the landmark 1967 document the Land O’Lakes Statement wherein American
Catholic higher education shifts from Vatican-based influence to lay control. The chapter
also offers a compare/contrast of this document with Pope St. John Paul II’s Ex Corde
Ecclesiae, his apostolic constitution on the nature of Catholic universities. Chapter two
lays out Emmanuel Levinas’s ethical phenomenology. Levinas is crucial for this project
because, as demonstrated above, relationship is a crucial component to Catholic
universities and Levinas’s ethics is relational. This feature distinguishes him from the
rest of philosophy, and his Jewish roots offer a dialogue with Catholicism. Chapter three
presents the philosophy of education of Jacques Maritain, which I use to form the basis of
the concrete interaction of the student-teacher relationship, modifying Levinas’s ethics
with content to fit the classroom. Chapter four unites the concepts of the previous three
chapters into one argument, explaining the convictions of all the contents culminating in
what I call “neo-restorationism,” the mediating step to returning the Catholic university

2

Some Catholic schools are already practicing things like promoting Catholic teaching because they did
not adopt certain secular paradigms in their operations (organization, mission, etc.) in the first place.
3

Not necessarily something akin to the Great Books program, as the Jesuits historically use their own
Ratio Studiorum.
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to its proper roots. This chapter is the heart of the dissertation as it is the core argument
for the movement of the Catholic university moving forward. Chapter five takes the
space to respond to several major objections, notably the business model of the university
and how the ethical-relationship combats it.
What is important to note is where this project is going a la Edmund Husserl,
Martin Heidegger, and Levinas considering Levinas’s work is lesser known than his
counterpart Maritain. Catholic higher education has a “continental” feel beneath it, the
style out of which these philosophers philosophize. Catholic higher education mirrors the
philosophies of these three thinkers in ways that play out in the actual philosophies.
Husserl, for instance, has a phenomenology stating it can make sense of all things
relevant to (i.e., contained in) consciousness, whereas Heidegger’s phenomenology
pertains strictly to the life of the individual on earth as oriented towards his/her own
projects. Levinas’s philosophy challenges both, especially Heidegger, to the primacy of
intentional consciousness and the individual’s self-interested ends by placing Otherness,
that which is outside the self, first in the order of being.
In essence, Catholic higher education has a Husserlian intentionality towards the
power, prestige, and pleasures of high academic rank. It seeks to achieve these ends via a
Heideggerian obsession with self-interested projects directed solely towards its own ends.
Levinas, however, reminds us that life is not about us, that other people exist and impose
responsibilities on us in ways similar to a child towards a parent. I am not free to do as I
please because other people “precede” me, that is, they come before my own wants and
wishes. He, along with Maritain, reminds us Catholic higher education exists to serve

4
God and neighbor, not the interests of a select few. Select few Catholic schools actually
do not need Levinas’s insight for they are already living and teaching godly Catholicism
in their schools. As for the rest, they need a reset button. They need to return to their
roots in service towards others, namely students (and faculty), which the foregoing
schools already embody.4 I argue this service, and the root of all universities both secular
and religious, is found in the student-teacher relationship.
Freedom, in Maritain’s educational philosophy, concerns liberation of the mind,
another way of saying to strengthen one’s mental acuity. The mind is much like a
muscle: it must be worked regularly to maintain its tone, strength, and virility or it
weakens. One must consistently work at intellectual exercises to “build” the perspicacity
of one’s intellect. This exercise is important because the mind is used all of one’s life: in
labor, love, and leisure. To simply go along with what society teaches is antithetical to
the life of the mind and the free individual. Countries need capable citizens to think on
their feet, not just in governmental matters (e.g., free elections), but also for the
promotion of a free population. In this way, Maritain links his notion of the freedom of
the free citizen with freedom in the classroom. Just as the free citizen has the freedom to
pursue her own ends, so too, the liberal arts enables the student space for freedom of
thought.5

4

Here is how I am “separating the sheep from goats”. Other than a sincere attempt to live out the tenets of
the Catholic faith as laid out in the Catholic catechism, there are no other qualifications. I will differentiate
certain understandings of Church teaching in this regard throughout the dissertation.
5

I do not wish anyone to think I am taking a political stance on either side of the spectrum here.
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On this note, Maritain argues the experience of freedom in learning is more internal
than external. My environment is always conditioning me in some fashion, but I do have
the freedom to act towards my situation according to my own free will, including how
one responds to the teacher and the texts offered. Learning in the classroom allows me to
act in accord with my better nature by ordering my passions. In this way, one grows in
character when studying the liberal arts because the mind aligns itself with higher things,
compared to the mechanism of scientistic types of pedagogy. It is not only a freedom
from passion, it is a freedom from totalitarian kinds of education. Teachers cannot help
but influence their students to grow and walk along their own paths, at least in liberal arts
education. Growth and learning cannot happen, however, when teachers have
preconceived notions of the student they are trying to mold, a kind of totalitarianism of
the classroom. Students fashioned into products will only become consumers unable to
think critically about the world.
The specificities of curriculum will no question vary from Catholic university to
Catholic university. What unites them is a coherent philosophical anthropology rooted in
Catholic theology. Formal education can handle a religious education handed on over the
centuries when that education is rigorous, thoughtful, and morally upright. The Catholic
university argued for in this dissertation provides all of these to the benefit of our
children.

6
II. THE HISTORICAL PROBLEM

It is no controversy that the Catholic Church has her own take on metaphysics.
Borrowing from Plato, Aristotle, and the Church Fathers’ own insights, she has crafted
her own theo-philosophical anthropology over her two-millennia existence. Included in
Church teaching is the notion that God made humankind in His image (imago Dei), that
there is something about human beings that reflects divine nature, namely the ability to
love and to reason. Being made in God’s image bestows on us an inherent dignity, or an
indissoluble worth and respect, about our nature.6 It can never be sold or given away, but
it can be violated. The ways of violating one’s dignity are too numerous for this
dissertation, but it will touch on the ways a relational-spiritual violation can happen to
students of Catholic universities. Since this dissertation concerns Catholic universities,
one way is in the curriculum (particularly philosophy and theology) according to formal
education’s understanding of philosophical anthropology.
It starts with the turn of the twentieth-century and the controversy over the
American bishops claiming the Catholic Church7 has not the authority to command them.
I will proceed to explain the aforesaid controversy and how it leads into the curriculum
debates of the American 1940s and 50s.8 I will then discuss how these debates were the
6

The theme of dignity is taken up more extensively in the succeeding chapters on Emmanuel Levinas,
Jacques Maritain, and argumentation for the student-teacher relationship. Levinas is necessary, as I will
explain at the end of the chapter, for “grounding” the university in relationship in order to justify the
student-teacher relationship. Like Maritain, dignity plays a role in his philosophizing. Maritain is
necessary for embodying Levinas and making the student-teacher relationship concrete in the university.
7

Meaning the magisterium—the teaching body of the Church—and the pope, referred to as “the Vatican”
onward.
8

There is a recommendation for Catholic schools to adopt secular values in promotion of their missions
and morals.
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foundation of major historical events in American Catholic higher education.9 These
events culminate in the now infamous Land O’Lakes Statement, and so I will expound the
document’s contents and provide its philosophical presuppositions in the educational
philosophy of Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, its primary author. Next, I will do the same
exposition for the four documents of Catholic higher education—with emphasis on the
student-teacher relationship—immediately succeeding the Land O’Lakes Statement with
emphasis on Ex Corde Ecclesiae, the Vatican’s official document on Catholic higher
education. I will then explain the Ex Corde Ecclesiae’s take on the student-teacher
relationship,10 compare it with the Land O’Lakes Statement, and finally address the
historical problem we find ourselves in light of this pedagogical development.

9

These debates parallel the philosophies of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger, major influences on
Levinas’s thought.
10

Also taken up in the Levinas and Maritain chapters.
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Americanism11
Pope Leo XIII founded the Catholic University of America (Washington, D.C.) in
1887 in order that Catholic teachers could instruct the laity in the faith, beginning with
philosophy and theology as those are the foundational projects to any education. In 1895,
Leo authors the first of two letters addressed to the American Church to encourage the
Catholic faithful to be steady in their faith. More a celebration of America than a
condemnation, there was a general worry that American Catholics, while faithful to
Church doctrine, were starting to stray from their moral and intellectual foundations.
Americans were known for separating Church and State in a way unbefitting the Church,
namely, the reduction of Church authority to civil authority. Leo worried that American
Catholics were being led astray by their secular counterparts in separating the Catholic
Church and public law. He addresses two key areas: “the advancement of learning [and]

11

The history taken up here and throughout this dissertation would look significantly different if I were
engaging eminent philosopher Charles Taylor whose work describes the unfolding of how secularism came
to replace a religious mindset in Western culture. Of course any project would look differently through the
lens of any philosopher’s understanding of history, Taylor is especially known for his contributions to the
question of religiosity in the 20th century. I decided to exclude him from consideration for three reasons.
First, any dissertation needs limits, and for what I am saying here Taylor did not fit my goals. Taylor is
discussing all of the West as such over many centuries, whereas I am referring to a corner of it regarding a
semi-niche topic. Including Taylor seemed excessive. Second, while I could include the relevant parts of
Taylor—which would require further explanation of how his project may or may not fit into my own—the
purpose of the history presented here is to demonstrate conceptual continuity over the past 120+ years of
thinking about American Catholic education. The ideas thereof are located in their historical contexts, and
Taylor’s inclusion would seem to overcomplicate the issue. Last, the concretion of what to actually do
about the problem of recovering American Catholic education’s roots is more practical than theoretical. A
history working in the background as to how we are living—or not—in a secular age is a fine thing, but I
simply do not need it. One could easily argue, however, Taylor’s tracing of secularity to the present day
could contribute to a solution by pointing us in the right direction for how not to go about Catholic
education, but it also could not. I would much prefer to stick to primary source material and let the
documents therein speak for themselves, the authors, and the climate in which they were crafted. There is a
theoretical root as to why American Catholic education is the way it is, and it is found in the historical
documents discussed in this chapter. I thought it better to keep the analysis as simple as possible. Any
hermeneutic errors are strictly my own. See Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007).
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a perfecting of methods in the management of Church affairs.”12 I will focus on the
former. Leo encourages faculty and students to develop all their faculties because “an
education cannot be deemed complete which takes no notice of modern sciences.”13 For
Leo, education is not simply character development through theology, yet, there was a
worry that American Catholic religion was waning in favor of democratic principles as
the sole foundation of morality: “…it would be very erroneous to draw the conclusion
that in America is to be sought the type of the most desirable status of the Church, or that
it would be universally lawful or expedient for State and Church to be, as in America,
dissevered and divorced.”14 Education aids in establishing the Catholic faith among the
American laity, and though the pope does praise America for its “pro religion” stance of
welcoming Catholic worship,15 he laments that the Church and State are separated. The
Catholic Church, whose principle and purpose being to promote and encourage the
salvation of all peoples represented by Leo, is concerned that earthly cares carry more
weight than either eternal or everlasting ones. Since the Church does not have an
immediate influence on public law, there is concern for denigrating the influence of
religion and morality.
Leo followed up his Longinqua in 1899 with the now infamous Testem
Benevolentiae, or, “Concerning New Opinions, Virtue, Nature and Grace, With Regard to

12

Leo XIII, Pope. “Longinqua (January 6, 1895).” Vatican. Accessed November 22, 2020. https://
www.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_06011895_longinqua.html, §6.
13

Longinqua, §7.

14

Longinqua, §6.

15

By which he means allowing it to exist.

10
Americanism”.16 Testem Benevolentiae adopts a much more serious tone: “the object of
this letter is not to repeat the praise so often accorded, but rather to point out certain
things which are to be avoided and corrected.”17 Leo has in mind the theological
liberalism of Fr. Isaac Hecker. Hecker was a Redemptorist priest who went to Rome
asking the pope for permission to establish an English-speaking house (compared to the
German one he lived) so as to evangelize easier the English-speaking population of New
York. Not only was he denied, but the Redemptorists expelled him for disobeying a
direct order to stay in America, hence the controversy. The root of Hecker’s liberalism is
his belief that clergy ought to have more freedom in their own orders to move their
missions about and make their own (theologically inspired) decisions outside the order
and direction of a superior. Specifically, Hecker thought the Church had to adapt to the
age it was situated in so as to better serve Her people. More specifically, “the Church
ought to adapt herself somewhat to our advanced civilization, and…show some
indulgence to modern popular theories and methods,” in other words, change Church
doctrine to make converts.18
Leo dismissed Hecker’s philosophy, through Testem, by pointing out the Church is
the best judge of adapting to an age, not the individual. His condemnation is not directed
at Hecker per se, but the entire philosophy of “Americanism” (one he represents), which

16

Thomas T. McAvoy, The Great Crisis in American Catholic History, 1895-1900 (Chicago: Henry
Regnery Company, 1957), 379-91. Americanism was never declared a formal heresy, but American
sentiments never really pleased Vatican authority.
17

McAvoy, The Great Crisis, 379. His description of the matter is similar to Husserl’s description of
phenomenology as descriptions of intentional experience, which I will explain in the succeeding chapter.
18

McAvoy, 380.
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is never given a proper definition. In general, Americanism refers to the tendency of
American Catholics, especially the bishops,19 to adopt Protestant values in an attempt to
appear faithfully assimilated into American culture. Americanist proponents tended to
value “[New World] intellectual freedom…in contrast to Old World Authoritarianism.”20
It was thought that the Vatican did not appreciate the American Catholic adaptive
situation, and so its influenced waned whilst American bishops could decide what was
best for their flocks.21 The “American ideal” of freedom of expression made it easy to
justify any position one wanted. American bishops were concerned Catholic laity were
being given too much tradition when really they needed progression. Leo was concerned
that because liberalism22 was a core tenant of American government and culture,
American Catholics would slide into being Protestants. In particular, there was thought
to be a bishopric emphasis on “social, political, and cultural issues,” not doctrine.23 Since
doctrine is the defining feature of any religion, identifying itself apart from others, Leo
thought were American Catholics to absorb a less reserved philosophy of life, they might
forfeit their eternal salvation. What evolved as “Catholic liberalism” combined the social
doctrine of the Church with the openness of American freedom of expression and
19

Bishop John J. Keane of Dubuque, Bishop John Ireland of St. Paul, and Bishop John Lancaster Spalding
of Peoria all promoted varying degrees of Americanization in Catholicism to the end of progressive ideals.
Americanization launched the classical “liberal vs. conservative” dialectic in American Catholicism. See
James Hitchcock, “Americanism: The ‘Phantom Heresy’ Revisited,” in The Battle for the Catholic Mind:
Catholic Faith and Catholic Intellect in the Work of the Fellowship of Catholic Scholars, 1978-95, ed.
William E. May and K. D. Whitehead (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine Press, 2001), 236-47.
20

Hitchcock, Americanism, 243.

21

E.g., how best to teach them Church doctrine.

22

Here meaning ideas that challenge traditional reasons for holding Catholic theology.

23

Philip Gleason, Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 285.
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experimentation with new ideas. But involvement with socio-political liberalism was not
a theological issue. Leo was hitting more on theological liberalism, a theology that
makes palatable difficult moral and theological teachings to encourage more
conversions.24 That kind of mindset greatly affected the psyche of American Catholic
educators.
The Augustinian/Thomist Debate
The fundamental problem facing educators before and after WWII, especially
theologians, is how does Catholic education move forward.25 There are two options. On
the one hand is the Augustinian-Bonaventurian model (related to the “religious” model
above) which emphasizes faith formation and personal conviction. It places its
curricular-pedagogical goal in the hands of faculty as potters of the students’ souls in
teaching them how to live as Christians. It acts as a journey for the student in discovering
the finer points of Christian living. On the other hand is the Thomistic model taking its
cue from Scholasticism. It emphasizes teaching theology as a science (systemized
knowledge) with intellectual rigor geared more towards academic study. Its goal is to
form students in knowledge of the Catholic faith informed by Church doctrine as passed
on by theologians. This approach has more of an official endpoint in mind, providing
explanations of theological material for students to be able to defend in private or public

24

This miscommunication is further part of the misunderstandings between the Vatican and American
bishops.
25

The problem is fundamental because how one goes about Catholic education impacts how the faithful
are formed, thus denoting the future of the Church in the United States. Educators were uncertain whether
a classical, character-based education was better for forming Catholic consciences (and so to live as faithful
Catholics), or a deeper, more sophisticated theology would combat the rising secular forces in society
depleting Catholic morals via an apologetic and academic ethos.
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about the Church and faith. These options, however, do not oppose each other as St.
Thomas Aquinas himself was not only an “intellectual”. The name is misleading because
his faith guides and leads him through philosophical questions the same as it does for St.
Augustine or St. Bonaventure. That is not strictly the case for either approach’s
proponents as the following three positions exemplify.26
Positions on theological education are framed by a distinction between “college”
and “university”. “College” is understood to refer to undergraduate education, while
“university” to graduate. Colleges are found within universities (e.g., the Klinger School
of Arts & Sciences at Marquette University) teaching undergraduates the basics of their
fields. Graduate schools, depending on the field, are there to deepen instruction often in
technical ways not available to the general population. Fr. Gerald B. Phelan argues not
only that theology is the queen of the sciences, but that there is a distinction between how
theology is taught at colleges compared to universities. Theology is more of an
intellectual, scientific pursuit (what one might call “systematic” today) and religion more
about morality and the general character of the school. The former ought to have all the
resources necessary (funding, etc.) to do theology at a “higher level,”27 something like
rigorous academic work deepening religion, while colleges instruct religious virtue.
Theology is built on top of religion, and “intellectual revival” is the heart of Phelan’s
position.

26

Pamela C. Young, “Theological Education in American Catholic Higher Education, 1939-1973,” (PhD
diss., Marquette University, 1995), 1-52.
27

Young, Theological Education, 14.
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Fr. Francis O’Connell develops the idea of a theology for the laity for colleges in
not only advising an increase in religious devotion in such courses, but in building up the
student to “engage in intelligent discussions of religious issues” so as to “harmonize
Revelation and reason”.28 In that sense, Phelan’s concepts of theology and religion are
blended together, but function as an apologetic to educate the laity in the basic truths of
the Catholic faith so as to permit intelligent discussion, defense, and dissemination of
Catholicism. Fr. John Courtney Murray sides with O’Connell and Phelan on the notion
of instilling religiosity (understood in a practical-pastoral context as living God’s Word),
but disagrees that it should serve an apologetic function. Murray accepts graduate level
theology as a more advanced treatment of theological truths, but theology for the college
student teaches the livability of faith in order to “energize [students’] spiritual life.”29 It
is not a bunch of doctrine for memorization and defense, but an instantiation of what it
means to be a Christian. For Murray, colleges and universities need to provide the kinds
of theologies students want, need, and desire to learn because “those of us who teach
should learn from those of you who learn from us.”30 Among these three theologians,
there is a consistent push for laity, in particular in colleges, to gain some kind of upper
hand in American society through theological education whether through a personalAugustinian approach on living one’s life as a Christian, or through an intellect-centered
academic approach in defending the truths of the Faith. These positions are indicative of

28

Young, 15-16.

29

Young, 21.

30

Young, 18. Like Levinas, Murray also discusses relationship, except he lays out the relationship of
Church and State, not intersubjectivity.
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the debate and resolutions to come in the following decades of Catholic higher education.
Before elaborating on these, it is important to note the concept of “need” arises frequently
in Pamela Young’s description of pre-Vatican II Catholic higher education.
The notion of a theology for the laity was gaining traction right when laity began
pouring into Catholic universities. Catholic colleges were originally founded to
encourage men into seminary. From grade school through tertiary studies, (young) men
were surrounded by clerical teachers and administrators.31 The entire process was built to
push them along a path of God and service, but as lay people were admitted to
universities, the sheer numbers (due to the G.I. Bill) overwhelmed the amount of priests
and religious needed to keep up with enrollments. The laity, as Fr. John M. Cooper
argues, do not have the same needs as seminarians. They are “preparing…for life in the
world [not a religious order]” and “many technical matters that are essential to the
professional theological equipment of the confessor, the parish priest or the religious
teacher are quite unnecessary for the layman or laywoman.”32 Sister M. Madeleva Wolff
backs this notion up with her support of religious education stating most lay Catholics
and religious Sisters “have little better than a good eighth-grade education in religion”33
given that all the best courses and instructions are reserved for seminarians. Without an
education, Catholics could not be expected to live our their faith in a meaningful way.
They needed to be taught in such a way that their faith could be lived out and intertwined
with their everyday lives and professional obligations. The best way Cooper and Wolff
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believed that to be the case was through classroom instruction. But classroom instruction
can also include more rigorous, academic lessons as the Thomistic approach emphasizes.
Fr. Walter Farrell, O.P., argues that speculative theology is what makes a college or
university Catholic given that it is on theological bases that one can call oneself Catholic
at all. Instead of teaching faith, the Thomistic approach “presupposes faith” with the
notion that “theology can be [intellectually] learned” and not simply lived.34 The
emphasis for Farrell is on the how—how should theological material be presented. The
Thomistic, intellectual approach is preferable because, presumably, it allows for less error
due to its systematic organization: students need organization, and they can more easily
see how theology fits into everyday life when they know how to classify it. This position
is elaborated on by Fr. Bernard Cooke, S.J., by explaining that the pastoral function
traditionally found in religion is bounded to theology in the latter’s “deepening and
clarifying the faith commitment of the students.”35 Students need to know how their faith
differentiates them from non-Catholic theologies. Theology is taught and religion,
understood as practical theology, flows from that into one’s life. These needs, rather their
debates, are what fundamentally shaped theological education in the coming years.
It is also possible this entire debate is nothing but semantics as Roy Deferarri has
said.36 To say it is semantics is misleading because, though subtle, the slight gradation of
difference in the wording and course descriptions, etc., makes the problem what it is. The
problem is whether one is learning theology (of which one need not a religious
34

Young, 38, emphasis mine.

35

Young, 45.

36

Young, 44-45.

17
affiliation) or religion (where living out one’s faith is is part and parcel of knowing it).
What complicates matters further is that the Augustinian/Thomistic debate is not as clean
as it seems. There are complex factors behind the scenes leading to these positions37
which I cannot elaborate here, but can offer an instantiation relevant to this dissertation.
Thomistic advocates are not opposed to faith-as-a-journey in the classroom. As I pointed
out earlier, Thomas himself was working out his faith in his work. No question there are
Catholic scholars who do this without thinking about it, and the Thomistic advocates are
certainly not opposed to the working out of one’s spiritual struggles. Of course, the
Augustinian approach lacks the rigor expected of tertiary-level education.38 Each
approach has a weakness, but the trouble lies in the outcomes of such positions. What
happens (or is supposed to happen) to students who take seriously these curricular
approaches? The needs of students are as infinite as their souls are deep, and either
position will certainly lack what good the other offers. The Augustinian might provide a
deep engagement with one’s own convictions, but the Thomistic might enhance such
convictions with academic theology, and in theory, there is no telling why one could not
simply adopt a both/and approach.
This process of religion as “a life to be lived”39 rather than speculated developed to
the point of separating the pastoral side of theology completely from the classroom. The
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“abandonment of the Augustinian perspective”40 is bad for such theologians because for
them it represents a decline in authentic Catholicity given one can be “professionally
trained” anywhere. Yet, one could argue the opposite case just as easily. The university
classroom is not there for students to explore their faith in creative ways, it is there to
properly instruct them in the near non-objectionable aspects of faith (e.g., dogma) in
ways they—in the past or present—could not access for themselves. Professional
training with Catholicism cannot be found anywhere else, so Catholics need it to find
work and function in society. What comes of this debate for this dissertation is that
theologians were taking seriously the fact that students have specific needs outside
theology,41 shaping the future of American Catholic higher education, and these positions
are indicative of future developments, most notably the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL)
in 1967. As the structure of the Catholic university shifted, so did the attitude toward
Catholic academic promise. Before I discuss LOL, I will first describe the basic structure
of Catholic universities up to that point with some commentary on historic events to
further denote the place of Catholic higher education in the 21st century.
Complications Leading up to the Land O’Lakes Statement
Coming out of the Catholic intellectual scene was this desire for intellectual rigor.
Monsignor John Tracy Ellis’s essay “American Catholics and the Intellectual Life”42 puts
into words what many Catholic academics were thinking but not expressing outright.
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“Intellectual Life” spurns people to action because enough pressure had built within
Catholic higher education that people were tired of being pushed around by secular
counterparts and wanted more freedom, understood as interaction with the outside world.
Philip Gleason writes the “rising chorus of complaints about [Catholic] separatism,
ghettoism, the siege mentality, undue reliance on crude pressure-group tactics, and the
pervading smugness and complacency that would later be called ‘triumphalism’” in lay
publications like Commonweal and Cross Currents.43 Catholic educators came wanting
less inferiority and more achievement.
Because Catholics had difficult living conditions, Ellis argues American Catholics
had issues with intellectual accomplishments compared with “what the immigrant status
implied by way of poverty, hardship, yes, and even illiteracy.”44 Intellectual achievement
was not realistic. Gleason clarifies the economic situation is “too great a priority to the
moral development of students as opposed to their progress towards intellectual
excellence.”45 And for that reason, “any true intellectual distinction [among Catholics]…
would have met with very slight appreciation in the United States.”46 There simply was
not enough historical precedent among lay American Catholics to justify pursuing
intellectual work.47 The unfortunate “state of Catholic leadership in most walks of life”
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also did not help building scholarship.48 He cites a study determining “the relationship
between scientific eminence and church membership” of which only three Catholics are
found out of 303 scientists.49
Ellis’s conclusion is that the time of material poverty in the laity has passed, and
time was ripe for change in American Catholic intellectuality, away from strict moral
development and towards the life of the mind.50 His solution is for Catholics to stop
moping about the past and work harder. He writes, “it is…a unique opportunity that lies
before the [American] Catholic scholars which…may inspire them to do great things.”51
No matter the intellectual excellence boost to Catholic higher education, Catholics “were
not in a position to define academic excellence.”52 Catholic universities required models,
and they found them in Ivy League schools and upper-tier State schools (e.g., Stanford).
What Catholic higher education required was a means of integrating the student learning
experience in unique ways separate from these schools. An attempt was made with neoThomism, which perished almost as quickly as it arose.
Neo-Thomism, sometimes referred to as neo-Scholasticism, is the 20th century
revival of the methods and philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas catalyzed by Pope Leo
XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris, encouraging institutions of Catholic higher learning to
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promulgate his philosophy and theology.53 It was a reaction against the claims of modern
philosophy to destroy metaphysics and provide anew a foundation in natural science. It
gained momentum up to the 1950s because of seminarian pedagogy—the priests
educated in the decades before were trained in the neo-Scholastic method, and they in
turn became the succeeding generation of professors. The breakdown occurs in neoThomism’s philosophical side seeking to provide a comprehensive worldview. The main
source of criticism actually originates in students.
There are three main critiques of neo-Thomism. First, how it was taught. It did not
help that there were ill-prepared teachers for neo-Thomism’s many formulaic deductions.
Because it was a method, it required more “training” than most other schools of
philosophy. One could not simply pick it up and instruct students in how to philosophize.
For that reason, students often complained that “philosophy was simply ‘memory
work’.”54 Not only these, but also its “dryness, formalistic technicality, remoteness from
the present, and a lack of clear relevance” to other disciplines.55 Beginning with students,
neo-Thomism was on a downward path.
Second, like the unprepared teachers, neo-Thomism’s different interpretations
added to the confusion of its official positions. Sometimes the matters at stake were so
obvious, a non-philosopher could readily understand them. Other problems even
specialists had difficulty. For example, whether Thomas’s thought was accurately
53
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portrayed by his historical interpreters. That raises a problem for Catholic educators, for
how can different schools of Thomistic thought claim to unify the Catholic university
when those differences seek to undermine it? Add to the problem the confusion in the
student body and you have the second critique.
The third problem shared by students and professors alike was the increasing
authoritarianism of the Thomistic school. By “authoritarianism” one really means
Church authority. Neo-Thomism had become associated with the institutional Church to
the effect that the teaching of one’s ideas implied the other. It was becoming an ideology.
Students were, on the contrary, finding themselves attracted to subjective modes of
inquiry in order to better understand their own inner movements. Neo-Thomism, for
them, was stagnant and needing an affective component to enhance philosophical
reflection. As the tension between “conservative” neo-Thomists and “liberal” detractors
increased—notice the similarity between pro-Americanization “progressives" and Church
traditionalist “conservatives” in the Americanist controversy—the Catholic Church
initiated Vatican II,56 effectively eliminating the debates on the need for religion and
theology, but adding a new debate on the place of freedom in the Catholic university.
An instance of this new debate is the Catholic University of America’s rector,
William J. McDonald, forbidding progressive thinkers from speaking on campus so as
not to become partisan in the Vatican II theological debates.57 One theologian, Fr. Hans
Küng, relished his rejection with a national speaking tour. His lecture “The Church and
56
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Freedom” discussed the shift in Church thinking about obedience, law, and subsidiarity.
Among his many claims, Küng called for a wider acceptance of freedom of conscience,
that is, the obligation of the Church to support her people’s judgment on the truth of
theological dogma. Catholics ought not be obligated to accept anything they do not
personally approve. Küng denies that this tendency leads to relativism, albeit he does not
explain how, for the freedom he is advocating resonates with the American Catholic
public58—freedom from authority. This freedom is too powerful to resist amid the
demands for less authoritarianism in academic speech. One such case is the University of
Dayton controversy that leads into the secularization of Catholic boards of directors.
In fall 1966, an unnamed philosophy faculty member accused other philosophers in
the department of teaching heresy and views opposed to the magisterium. Immediately
the campus erupts into discord with factions supporting both parties, but the issue does
not lie with the faculty or administration, rather with the bishopric. The unnamed faculty
member first writes directly to the archbishop, Karl J. Alter—who would rather have not
involved himself—before confronting Dayton’s board of directors. Alter asks Dayton’s
president, Fr. Raymond Roesch, to find the truth of the claims, who forms an ad hoc
committee of associated members of the university to investigate the heretical claims.
The committee finds said accused faculty innocent, yet the “complainants called Roesch’s
report a whitewash.”59 A second committee is formed with non-Dayton affiliated people
who in-turn did not clear the accused faculty of heresy, but neither did they condemn.
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Regardless, the situation was exacerbated by the report’s position that individual
Catholics ought respect the magisterial authority of the Church, but respect does not
apply to the university itself because the relationship to the magisterium is “indirect” and
hence “outside of all authority”.60 The main issue underlying this relationship between
faculty, university, and magisterial teaching is academic freedom, which I will return to in
a moment. For now, heretical teaching or not, do faculty have the right to say what they
want at Catholic universities? The president’s ad hoc committee suggested “yes” because
the university’s purpose is to become secular, meaning “a new freedom for [people] to
perfect the world in a non-religious way.”61 The call was not taken seriously and had no
backlash. Still, “never before had a formally constituted faculty committee at a Catholic
university flatly recommended secularization as the policy to follow,”62 and the process
of secularizing Catholic education was a long process. I will briefly trace this process
through the laicization of boards of directors in order to address the larger problem of
academic freedom.
Laicization began well before Vatican II’s decree that the laity ought to have a more
active role in Church function.63 It was only after the Council that such involvement was
officially permitted and encouraged. Laicization is
a shorthand term for the process, differing in detail from one place to another,
whereby Catholic institutions of higher education gained more or less complete
autonomy from their ‘sponsoring religious bodies’ by adding sizable numbers of
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lay persons to the boards of trustees that held the ultimate authority over those
institutions.64
Such authority could only obtain after several serious obstacles were overcome.65 First,
laity had no academic qualification. Due to the need to train priests and religious to
fulfill teaching duties, laity were usually forbidden from pursuing pedagogical roles in
the university. Second, laity with such qualification were often secular, and because of
the Catholic nature of the university, their contributions were ignored. Third, the
consistent debt Catholic universities faced without endowment prevented them from
paying laity a livable salary. “Catholic colleges and universities depended largely on
tuition revenue,” and with lower fees coming into the school, administrations could not
pay lay faculty. Schools often had “heavy reliance on part-time faculty, and aboveaverage teaching responsibilities.”66 On top of the practical problems facing laity
involvement, there were conceptual ones as well.
First, coupled with the training problem above, religious members communicated
their university’s mission better than laity. Laity were treated with suspicion that
“religious traditions, academic values, and institutional goals” would be communicated to
students in a manner acceptable to the administration.67 Second, and most controversial,
before Vatican II Catholic universities “rejected concepts of academic freedom and
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faculty rights” in secular universities.68 This notion will be revisited in the following
section. It suffices to say that Catholic administrators’ rights, actual or presumed, were to
ensure orthodoxy. Thus, intervention in matters pertaining to such orthodoxy was the
responsibility of the board of directors. Third, promoting laity—not clergy—to positions
of power (e.g., board of directors) would potentially damage Catholic schools’
reputations, making a secular academy. Various plans to renegotiate ownership and
control of Catholic universities from religious orders to laity after Vatican II sparked
outcry from both parties. One lay faculty at St. John’s University decried the transfer of
ecclesiastical control to lay control as “a blueprint for the complete secularization of
Catholic higher education.”69 Established above, lay involvement began well before
Vatican II in the form of professional schools. Small Catholic colleges expanded their
liberal arts offerings to include “business, law, medical, dental” and various professional
types of schools.70 The laity grew in influence because, unlike the religious, they had
increased numbers from their specializations. One does not make a living as a lay person
portraying a priest or nun.
This expansion couples with the discussion of the religion/theology debate over
Catholic curriculum. Increased enrollment, again, prompted colleges to expand their
course offerings because students demanded more options. The relationship to lay
faculty hence underwent a major shift. First, and most obvious, universities needed lay
faculty to teach such courses. Clergy were not equipped to deal with professional
68
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courses, and lay faculty with formal schooling could solve the problem. Second,
“changing aspirations in Catholic higher education” provided lay faculty an opportunity
to showcase their talents.71 Catholic universities began to adopt a secular mentality over
university prestige. Religious background takes a backseat to professional advancement
in teaching positions. There was a desire for greatness alluded to in the previous section
that is rooted in this shift to professionalization. Third, as lay faculty contributions
increased, there was a growing message that laity were treated as second-class citizens.
They “felt administrators treated them as employees” instead of people.72 Fourth, stated
above, Vatican II’s desire for laity to share in greater responsibility influences some
schools (e.g., St. Louis University in 1967) to appoint only laity to boards of trustees.
Trustees are in charge of the financial runnings of the school, which leads me into my
fifth point: their professional training in business forms the laity to share in university
financial responsibility. Catholic universities started to understand the nature of finance
—you cannot exist only on tuition and existing benefactors. You need people (laity) with
a personal interest in the university to contribute financially within. Such people will
only do that with a position of power to influence the direction of the school.73 That
position of power points us to my sixth point, that is, religious control of Catholic
universities might mean no federal money. The State of Maryland’s Court of Appeals
struck down a previous decision to grant federal money to religious universities because
the religious control of those schools granted them a sectarian character. One lawyer
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representing the religious schools recommended Catholic schools function more like
secular universities, instituting “tenure, promotion, and sabbatical leave” and also
academic freedom.74 Last, the clergy themselves played major role in laicization through
their defense of the laity. Former Notre Dame president Fr. James Burns, CSC, argues
“excluding lay people from university faculties…would deprive institutions of badly
needed talent,”75 and one solution was to finance graduate education for some Catholic
students in order to hire them immediately for teaching upon graduation.
I said at the end of the previous section the secularizing of Catholic higher
education was a long process. This current section describes that process less the details
appropriate for this dissertation. The question of academic freedom as the norm for
faculty, however, is intimately tied to laicization and pervades the literature on Catholic
higher education. It will now be discussed through the most influential document in
American Catholic higher education.
The Historical Moment: The Land O’Lakes Statement
The Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL) is a 1967 document signed by 20+ members of
Catholic university administration and staff,76 relinquishing traditional control of
American Catholic universities by ecclesial authority in favor of a self-legislating
autonomy and freedom from outside influence in the wake of Vatican II as a mark of the
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modern university and the Church’s contemporaneity.77 It stresses the need for Catholic
universities to adapt to the times by permitting an open air of dialogue between the
Church and secular ideas, emphasizing academic freedom as the key to the Catholic
university’s engagement with the world. This document catalyzes an era of the American
Catholic university in its authoritative break with the magisterium on matters of faith and
morals, believing itself to be the primary determiner of theological doctrine. It was not
met without controversy, however, and there are numerous build-ups to a formal
resolution of its questionable message in its wake (e.g., Kinshasa, 1968 and Rome,
1969),78 the pinnacle of which is contained in Pope St. John Paul II’s 1990 apostolic
constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae (ECE). Its architect, Fr. Theodore Hesburgh,79 touches
very little on the student-teacher relationship (and its importance), but its implications are
profound for the functioning of the Catholic university. I will briefly expound the
important contents of this document, and on the student-relationship, to contrast it with
the contents of ECE on the same subjects.
The document’s first sentence begins “The Catholic university today must be a
university in the full modern sense of the word, with a strong commitment to and concern
77
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for academic excellence.”80 This idea of becoming modern is historically influenced.81
Catholic universities were struggling to adapt to Protestant American culture with higher
standards of academic production in the wake of the “Catholic ghetto mentality” plaguing
Catholic/American relations. In essence, Catholic groups would segregate themselves
from contemporary American discourse for fear of persecution or a disinterest in
academic matters, preferring character development instead, and that was the LOL
committee’s mindset: to be modern means to be in touch with the world and its
happenings like the fresh air of Vatican II. As a university, that meant discussing the
problems of contemporary society with other faith traditions, but it also comes with a
certain theoretical influence.
Academic excellence is obtained through, what in the very next sentence is perhaps
the document’s most memorable and controversial: “To perform its teaching and
research functions effectively the Catholic university must have a true autonomy and
academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical, external to the
academic community itself.”82 Such a thought sent shockwaves through the Catholic
educational community. How can a Catholic university call itself “Catholic” without any
reference to authority, namely, Vatican authority? Fr. Hesburgh argued that Catholicism
is much bigger than rules and conduct. Catholicism ought to get its universities up and
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running with freedom and maneuverability through the bureaucratic red tape so notorious
in institutions of higher education.83 The Catholic university is an entity unto itself that is
capable of determining what is in its own best interest.84 For Fr. Hesburgh, the Catholic
university is an engagement with the world within a certain cultural context. Catholicism
manifests differently in each school and “is perceptibly present and effectively
operative”85 in the Catholic university, which LOL lays out in the broad categories of the
succeeding sections.
Section two claims the presence of Catholicism on Catholic university campuses is
primarily established by theologians. What makes the Catholic university separate from
the State is that academic theology is an exceptionally “high priority” because theology
defines Catholicism.86 Accordingly, section three states theologians are to explore “the
total religious heritage of the world” to conclude the meanings of theology for Christian
anthropology for the sake of theological dialogue.87 Section four elaborates this notion of
exploration as ecumenical interdisciplinary dialogue between theology and the rest of the
university.
Theology is necessary to enlighten all of the disciplines insofar as they proceed to
understand God’s creation, but theology cannot do its best work without understanding
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these disciplines on their own terms. In building up the other disciplines, and aiding in
solutions of “the problems of modern culture,”88 theology must dialogue with as many
fields as possible. Theology, as an inquiry into God’s nature, understandably influences
the Catholic nature of the school. It is only appropriate that it carry more weight. Yet,
the document makes another remarkable claim, that “there must be no theological or
philosophical imperialism.”89 Philosophy and theology cannot interfere with the
methodology of other disciplines. Each discipline is an island unto itself regarding its
methodology for gathering knowledge, and they are free to come to their own
conclusions apart from these. Dialogue here respects other fields as ends in themselves.
“There will necessarily result from the interdisciplinary discussions an awareness that
there is a philosophical and theological dimension to most intellectual subjects when they
are pursued far enough.”90 That is to say, LOL holds not all fields have philosophical and
theological roots. Theology cannot enrich itself when delimiting the claims of other
disciplines. This kind of interdisciplinary dialogue is only possible when “the Catholic
university has a broad range of disciplines.”91 Fewer disciplines equals less opportunities
for discussion. It helps having “considerable strength” in said disciplines for the dialogue
to be fruitful and works best when scholars want interdisciplinary dialogue for their own
good. The interdisciplinary dialogue of section four leads into the surveying state of the
Catholic university in section five.
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Section five advises the Catholic university to be the “critical reflective”92 agent of
the Church, as all universities monitor national trends. Its purpose here is to track all the
internal movements of the Church in order to “objectively evaluate them”.93 LOL does
not specify how, only that “the Church would thus have the benefit of continual counsel
from Catholic universities”94 for the university has heretofore rarely played a guiding role
in Church happenings. Sections six and seven state outright that research is encouraged
in all fields. Special preference is given to “problems of greater human urgency or of
greater Christian concern.”95 It is never clarified which issues qualify as greater concern.
One might say it is implied the issues of the late 1960s—American government and
urban issues—since they are cited in section seven as opportunities for service. The
Catholic university, in addition, is ready to serve “society in all in parts” including the
State.96 But the Catholic university must also “carry on similar activities” to the service
of the Church.97 Once more, it is not specified what kinds of activities are acceptable.
Then LOL makes an odd move. Section 8, “Some Characteristics of Undergraduate
Education,” expresses the manner in which undergraduates are to be educated. It
includes some implications of how students are to be instructed and teachers who instruct
them. This section argues that students need the freedom to develop themselves in
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relation to the times as modern citizens. To be integrated with society, students need “a
collegiate education that is truly geared to modern society,” an education that does not
shy away from debating difficult topics or hard positions while contributing to the
building up of community: “the intellectual campus of a Catholic university has no
boundaries and no barriers. It draws knowledge and understanding from all the traditions
of mankind [sic].”98 Teachers are expected to teach non-Catholic material (note: all
traditions). That’s well and fine considering there are insights found in all kinds of
authors, but there is a worrying implication about ignoring the rest of the Catholic
intellectual tradition. This education is set against a backdrop of “the effective
intellectual presence of the theological disciplines [that] will affect the education and life
of the students in ways distinctive of a Catholic university”99—the modern Catholic
university will teach and challenge material outright that was previously forbidden. It
used to be that Catholic schools only taught Catholic sources (philosophy and theology)
to their students as a training in the faith. Due to a changing of times and interest in
contemporary topics, especially in the wake of Vatican II, that was about to change.
Students would be encountering more diverse types of material than ever before, except
without the instruction in the faith, and their character development hinged on their direct
involvement in social justice.100
Then the document goes on to explain how the campus community functions.
Section 9 describes the Catholic campus is made not just for study, but for the expression
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of one’s Christianity in a Catholic atmosphere. LOL describes it as living out faith
“experientially and experimentally,” by which the authors mean new ways of being
Catholic in the world. As section 8 describes the student as autonomous, section 9
includes that autonomy in “find[ing] the meaning of the sacraments for themselves by
joining theoretical understanding to the lived experience of them…for a full, meaningful
liturgical and sacramental life.”101 Again, part of this sacramental life seems to be one’s
measure in contributing to social justice causes—“inner-city social action, personal aid to
the educationally disadvantaged, [etc.].”102 The section goes on further to mention that
the kind of “person-to-person relationshi[p]”103 developed between students and faculty is
a consequence of taking “Christian truth...seriously,” but it is led towards the end of,
again, “consecrat[ing] their talent and learning to worthy social purposes.”104 And so the
Catholic community is on display as one living a life ready to help the neighbor. This
theme is continued in the final section.
Section ten offers an account of the university’s administrative structure. Because
the Catholic university cares for students as people, and not just business assets, the
university ought to reflect the learning community described in section 9 by offering
“appropriate participation by all members of the community of learners in university
decisions.”105 The democratic ideals of the United States are reflected in the university
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governance. As a result, the Catholic university is constantly evolving with the times,
and must reflect the necessary outcomes of society. For example, moving with the
market, which also implies for LOL “[necessary] basic reorganizations of structure.”106
To achieve this end, “a great deal of study and experimentation will be necessary to carry
out these changes, but changes of this kind are essential for the future of the Catholic
university.”107 The section and the document closes with a reminder that “the Catholic
university of the future will be a true modern university,”108 yet Catholic in its
commitment to God and service to society and His people. I will now explain what Fr.
Hesburgh has in mind as per the university’s modernity in a speech he gave to the
National Catholic Educational Association (NCEA), then briefly summarize the relevant
sections for this dissertation of the major documents leading up to ECE in order to relate
LOL to the present discussion.
Hesburgh’s Vision of the Catholic University
Fr. Hesburgh was asked to keynote the 1969 meeting of the NCEA’s annual
conference.109 He spoke on the theme of change and its necessity for Catholic higher
education. Not only education and the Vatican, but the general 1960s upheaval of all
things historical in American culture served as a prominent reminder that times change,
and so do people and institutions. The most important aspects of change in Catholic
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higher education, for Hesburgh, are the “basic ideas behind the structural changes [that]
will be operative in the new structures.”110 The first idea is the change from religious
(clerical) to lay trustees, the laicization spoken of earlier.
I will not rehash that material, only remind the audience laicization is generally the
first major change to university structures after which follows all others. With the change
to lay-control of boards, laity now make all policy decisions for the university with
university statutes pronounced “under a state charter”.111 In other words, the Catholic
university is now a separate institution from the Catholic Church—it is “largely
independent of both” public and church authority.112 His speech mirrors LOL wherein it
was declared the Catholic university must have freedom from “authority of whatever
kind, lay or clerical,” internal or external to the university.113
Staying with the theme of freedom, Hesburgh elaborates further the ecclesial
relationship. Because academic freedom (censure) was a sore topic in university/Vatican
relations, Hesburgh’s solution comes from laicization in that the break with authority
“remove[s] from the bishops and the magisterium of the church all the possible
embarrassments that can come from an institution that is totally in the service of the
church without being the church or the magisterium.”114 Next comes the dagger to
positive magisterial relations: “The Catholic university, thus conceived, operates as a
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civil corporation, under a state charter and lay control.”115 That is to say the Catholic
university does what it wants when it wants without any recourse to another. The
Catholic university does, however, “truly answer to [the Church and the State] and is
organizationally responsible to neither.”116 How can the university answer to the Church
or State without having any organizational responsibility? It’s a concern in the above
documents, how Catholic universities are to organize themselves. Generally the
documents are in accord to give more power to Catholic universities to govern
themselves with the qualification, as I emphasized, that the gospel be witnessed and
magisterial authority be respected. That kind of responsibility is the kind that gets in the
way of professionalization.
The heart of professionalization is competence. Again, without repeating the above
history, Catholic universities need competent teacher-scholars to prove their worth to the
academic world. They will not attract students with a history of unacceptable academic
performance. Professionalization also means the university structure is oriented towards
academic excellence. Schools are free to decide their own standards of curriculum,
tenure, and promotion. These are all well and fine, but professionalization symbolizes
something deeper for Hesburgh, namely, severing “unmotivated obedience” towards
Church hierarchy.117 He is trying to state without stating it that the same hierarchy has
prevented Catholic higher education from becoming what it could be. In order to run a
top-tier university, one needs peers to compare oneself. Catholic universities only had
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each other heretofore to compare notes, but when all these schools are mediocre, it does
not give one much incentive to try harder. The teaching authority of the Church
transitions to the teaching authority of the scholar, which then impacts the students and
teachers.
His philosophy of the teacher is understandably shaped by this move to
professionalization. Professionalism eliminates any need for non-research oriented
faculty because to gain traction at an elite university, one must produce copious amounts
of material, an implication for the student-teacher relationship. Hence, teaching takes a
backseat, and the teacher is more dead weight than a contributing member to university
community. Research, however, is promoted to head of the class because it is what
brings prestige, and with prestige comes respect. Catholic schools are no longer the
victims of “ghetto mentality” as Ellis thought. The structure must shift to allow for these
changes to start.118
Hesburgh notes that this structural transition for Catholic university faculty “will
sound strange to other secular institutions” who had already implemented such
changes.119 How can a Catholic university be secular? He might mean “secular” as a
synonym for “lay-controlled,” but lay-controlled universities need not break with
magisterial authority the way he does. “Secular” is celebrated in the Land O’Lakes
Statement (“freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind, lay or clerical”) as
synonymous with autonomy. He even goes so far to say “there is the assumption that
118
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being Catholic means being unfree” regarding academic freedom related to the
magisterium.120 The importance of theology in the Catholic university, which all the
above documents support, Hesburgh qualifies with “theology…must enjoy the same
freedom and autonomy as any other university subject because, otherwise, it will not be
accepted as a university discipline” and without that, “the university will never really be
Catholic.”121 But how that theology is taught is another question.122 Here, he links
teaching to the notion of the student.
He comments, in passing, that the teachers eliminated by university research
preference “made ecumenism a reality in Catholic institutions of higher learning” before
the word was used with any regularity.123 That’s problematic in ways he does not address
because he does not see the problem—teachers are necessary for him to promote the
ecumenism sought in LOL and praised here. Yes, university matters are bigger than the
ecumenism in them, except there is constant discussion about community involvement,
social justice, and the common good. How else does one change society without
reference to otherness? And an otherness that needs dialogue, not war. Catholic
universities mirror change in their students and campuses.
Hesburgh briefly lists the three main issues for students on Catholic campuses.
First, he observes that students demand “relevancy” in all their courses. Given the
revolutionary push of the American 1960s, it is understandable students want material
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that matters.124 He quickly nixes it, arguing that the only relevant material necessary are
those subjects and questions relevant to our being, those of the liberal arts. Who else can
communicate their importance but teachers in an ecumenical context? “Ecumenical”
because of the globalized world related to student involvement, the second issue he
touches on. In essence, these are the beginnings of student government. Hesburgh
describes the urgency with which students want to change the world and healthily take
advantage of university resources without any elaboration, but he makes an interesting
move to the final student concern in religiosity and service. He singles out student
devotion of “service to the poor and disadvantaged” as a kind of prayer.125 What that
means for the university is that new avenues ought to be opened for students with
questions about- and answers for social ills, not simply those “who mixed chemicals or
measured elements in the laboratory,” because such former students are examples of
Christian compassion.126 Hesburgh ends his keynote with encouragement to keep the
changes coming for Catholic higher education’s survival. The changes do keep coming
beginning with the Kinshasa Statement and its sister projects.
Kinshasa, Rome, Catholic University in the Modern World
Leaving off Fr. Hesburgh and transitioning in to the major documents leading up to
ECE, is the Kinshasa Statement (Kinshasa, hereafter), the briefest of the documents. It
was a position paper adopted by the International Federation of Catholic Universities
(IFCU) stating in broad outline the nature of the Catholic university. The IFCU met at
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the Lovanium University in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo to discuss “the
Catholic university in the modern world,”127 but Kinshasa does not really expound on the
nature of the Catholic university as LOL does. Affirming the “institutional commitment
the Catholic university brings to its task [of] the inspiration and illumination of the
Christian message,” Catholic universities embody “Catholic ideals attitudes, and
principles” in all facets of university life.128 Like LOL, Kinshasa holds “the Catholic
university must be an academic institution, a community of scholars, in which
Catholicism is present and operative”129 and goes onto to copy LOL saying that this
presence is maintained through the academic excellence of theological scholarship.130
Recognizing the uncertainty of the times, Kinshasa also notes “the Christian community
itself is uncertain of the future of the Catholic university.”131 It then provides nine
objectives Catholic universities are to fulfill: integrating all knowledge “in light of the
wisdom of Christian revelation,” connect theology to all areas of knowledge, making
knowledge available to all, “to study and research problems of high Christian and human
priority” (e.g., the family), a learning community for all, an environment where all
participate in university life, promotion of ecumenism, university service to society, and
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preparing students to contribute to the common good.132 Kinshasa, however, then makes
a move away from the spirit of LOL in saying “Catholic universities are dedicated by an
institutional commitment which includes a respect for and voluntary acceptance of the
Church’s teaching authority.”133
The spirit of this line reflects a move away from the self-consuming individuality of
LOL. Instead of deciding for itself whom it will obey, Catholic universities will
incorporate Vatican authority into themselves. How the university embodies it is never
explained. The document references Pope Paul VI saying a Catholic university “draw[s]
inspiration from the light of revealed truth [becoming] a center for development and
diffusion of an authentic Christian culture.”134 Still, it is not an indication of explicit
Vatican teaching, but it does not negate academic freedom. The document simply places
limiters. In other words, Catholic universities ought not have the unlimited freedom LOL
wants because faithfulness to the Vatican in matters of faith, values, and morals precedes
one’s own desires.
This train of thought is continued in the Rome Statement (Rome, hereafter), another
position paper with implications for the student-teacher relationship. Like Kinshasa,
Rome copies what it wants from LOL, notably the paragraph on the Catholic university:
The Catholic university today must be a university in the full modern sense of the
word, with a strong commitment to and concern for academic excellence. To
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perform its teaching and research functions effectively the Catholic university
must have a true autonomy.135
Also like Kinshasa, Rome modifies this position with “nor is this [statement] to imply
that the university is beyond the law: the [Catholic] university has its own laws which
flow from its proper nature and finality.”136 An aspect of that nature is its orientation
towards truth:
Though all natural truth is readily accessible to us through the exercise of our
innate ability to grasp and to understand reality, the authentic Christian message
is not available to us except with a guarantee of doctrinal authority, which is the
magisterium of the Church.137
The theological truth and its communication, which LOL and Kinshasa situate at the
center of the Catholic university, is not possible without the magisterium. Kinshasa
further underscores this point in concluding that a Catholic university guides “a
community of persons who are diverse in experience and in function…and who,
whatever their task, draw inspiration from the light of revealed truth.”138
Second, Kinshasa notes the value of ecumenism, a “forming of thinkers fully
equipped for dialogue,”139 something Rome associates with witnessing the gospel. The
Catholic university is “an ideal setting for dialogue” with peoples of all beliefs, and they
are places to take advantage of the “ecumenical contacts of a high level” for cooperation
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in common goals.140 LOL notes in passing “theological investigation today must serve
the ecumenical goals of collaboration and unity.”141 It connects ecumenism with
theology’s task to investigate all things related to God and Church in “modern culture and
all the areas of intellectual study.”142 But as ecumenism is practiced, students must be
taught.
Rome, unlike Kinshasa, dedicates a section to students in the classroom. “Section
III, B. Teacher-Student Relationship in the Classroom” lays out its conditions and
aspects. The document presumes that Catholic universities will have trained faculty and
the necessary facilities to carry out scientific research.143 With those in place, Rome
founds the student-teacher relationship on “the discovery and diffusion of knowledge,”144
yet it places three intersubjective principles at their base. First, the objectivity of truth is
an absolute demand without exception. Rome argues the main purpose of the Catholic
university is to pursue truth, and truth must remain at the forefront of all inquiry or the
entire system will become arbitrary and collapse. The pursuit of truth happens in the
classroom. Since students and teachers are working together towards knowledge, the
second principle of intersubjective communication takes shape.145 Students, as
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explained, demanded more than just lectures from their universities—they wanted some
kind of subjective component for exploring their own inner worlds. Rome does not
object, but subjectivity can become overwrought, needing objectivity to level it. Rather
than discredit students for their contributions, they ought to be co-creators with their
teachers of knowledge in the truth-seeking process (the second principle). The
universality (objectivity) of knowledge “should also be universal in its becoming”.146
The third principle is the application of these two principles because they are the means
“which charity assumes in the intellectual sphere” for the benefit of all.147
The final major document before Ex Corde Ecclesiae (ECE) is “The Catholic
University in the Modern World” (Modern World, hereafter).148 Like the previous
documents, Modern World was created by Catholic university representatives invited to a
worldwide conference hosted by the IFCU and the Vatican. Also like the previous
documents, Modern World discusses the nature and objectives of the Catholic university,
saying virtually the same thing in its own words. For instance, like Kinshasa and Rome,
it adopts LOL’s position on autonomy in reference to its “teaching and research
functions” with one crucial difference.149 Modern World leaves out the qualification
“modern”: “A Catholic university today must be a university in the full sense of the
word,” not “the full modern sense of the word”.150 Modernity here refers to the freedom
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from external authority LOL espouses. It makes all the more sense how Modern World
can adopt Rome’s position on the university’s relationship to the magisterium: “[in
affirming] the autonomy of the university we do not mean that it stands outside the law,”
a rejection of LOL’s “academic freedom in the face of authority of whatever kind.”151
One authority not rejected by Kinshasa, Rome, or LOL is the authority of the ecumenical
encounter.
Modern World makes ecumenism an objective for the Catholic university in
“preparing persons qualified to participate in serious interfaith discussions” for the
purpose of spreading the gospel. Adopting Rome’s position, Modern World emphasizes
the necessity of theology to “cooperate ecumenically with other institutions” in
researching the same topics for reconciliation between Christian churches.152 But as
ecumenism is utilized for research, so students must be taught.
Like Rome, Modern World has its own section on teaching students. It focuses
more on the student in the Catholic university itself than the student proper. That being
said, it compares well with Rome’s section on the student-teacher relationship insofar as it
shares certain themes. For instance, the primary aim of teaching is to “help [students] to
be contributing members of society” and are “confronted with values which, reaching
beyond man’s [sic] mortal limitations, challenge a more restricted view of reality”153 at
the service of the theology department.154 It is close to the aims of Rome in witnessing to
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the gospel, albeit worded in a slightly more secular tone. The root of university teaching
is “a genuine respect for the dignity and freedom of each person,” especially as it refers
to freeing students from their own prejudices for a more just society.155 Students are free
to make up their own minds, in honest academic deliberation, apart from their teachers.
“[D]ialogue is a normal means of cultural and human growth.”156 It is the only way for
freedom to conquer indoctrination, another point shared with Rome and Ex Corde
Ecclesiae, the final document in our consideration.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae
Ex Corde Ecclesiae (ECE), “From the Heart of the Church,”157 is an apostolic
constitution, the highest Church document concerning important doctrinal matters. It is a
set of rules or laws given to the faithful to help fulfill and clarify some spiritual or
societal concern.158 Previously, only ecclesiastical universities (those founded directly by
the Holy See) had juridical norms via their own apostolic constitution (Sapientia
Christiana). This new document is for other Catholic universities, those founded by
religious orders, dioceses, or lay people with the intent of promoting a Catholic
worldview and “students…ready to shoulder society’s heavier burdens and to witness the
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faith to the world” (§6).159 Individual Catholic universities have unique charisms of their
own, and this document lays out the character common to all. It is written with many
dogmatic and theological assumptions, which will not be explained unless necessary for
comprehending its meaning. While several revisions of its content went through the the
USCCB, I am working with the basic theory in order to propose a new direction in
Catholic higher education.
Catholic universities are traced back to the first instances of the university,
manifesting with a specific mission peculiar to the Catholic Church. Like all universities,
they are dedicated to creativity and “the dissemination of knowledge for the good of
humanity” (§1). Their common purpose is to research, teach, and educate students in
their search for knowledge. Unlike non-Catholic (e.g., State) schools, Catholic ones unite
two poles of human experience: “the search for truth and the certainty of already
knowing the truth” (§1), or, faith and reason.160 The more specific task of the Catholic
university is to unite the search for truth with the source of truth’s origin, that is, God.
More on this notion in a moment.
Catholic universities are places where the Christian mind can flower through the
“unselfish transmission [of truth] to youth and to all those learning to think rigorously, so
Even that is a controversial matter, one which will be touched on throughout this dissertation. Also, I
will be using parenthetical citations for this section only, simply because it is much easier on the eyes to
note the section rather than footnote every paragraph. Unlike the other cited documents, ECE has
numbered sections.
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as to act rightly and to serve humanity [society] better” (§2). Accordingly, Catholic
universities are places for dialogue with the culture of the world. Culture is a technical
term here with two meanings.161 First, the humanistic meaning of the “effort to bring the
world itself under [humankind’s] control by [its] knowledge and [its] labor,” and second,
the socio-historical meaning of “express[ing], communicat[ing], and conserv[ing] in his
works great spiritual experience and desires, so that these may be of advantage to the
progress of many, even of the whole human family.”162 Culture is a combination of
humanity’s attempt over time to subdue nature for its dominion and share the wisdom
gained in the search for truth. St. John Paul II is careful not to differentiate distinct
cultures in the sense that all of humanity is separate. Yes, there are various peoples on the
earth, but for him “there is only one culture: that of man, by man and from man
[sic]” (§3). Catholic universities inherit that culture in humanistic- and scientific
pursuits. Because all people are united in a shared humanity, the Catholic university can
faithfully “explor[e] the mysteries of humanity and of the world, clarifying them in the
light of revelation” (§3). The text then shifts to a discussion of truth.
As Catholic universities serve humankind, everything they do is also in service of
the Catholic Church, while rooted in the conviction that all truth is connected to God, the
ultimate Source of truth. The pursuit of truth is the Catholic university’s responsibility
and primary means of service given that, contrary to State schools, it pursues “the whole
truth about nature, man [sic], and God” (§4). The Catholic university boldly proclaims
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truth because it is the root of all other values, “freedom, justice and human dignity”163
among the highest (§4).164 All aspects of truth in all disciplines are sought after and
explained in light of their relationship to God, Who is the source of all truth.
The search for truth unites faith and reason, which together build up humanity to
reach its full potential. Faith contains “the salvific message of the Gospel” and reason all
knowledge of nature (§6). Given the near all-encompassing reach of these, the Catholic
university is able to “dialogue with people of every culture” (§6). Culture is where we
find ourselves, and the gospel message coming out of Catholic universities renews it by
putting it into relationship with all fields of knowledge.165 This includes science and
technology which can explore the economic and industrial sectors. By themselves they
are meaningless, but Catholic universities can evaluate the good of advancements for
society’s benefit through “the moral, spiritual, and religious dimension[s] in its research”
unique to its Christian background (§7). Behind the meaning of scientific and
technological questions and research is “the very meaning of the human person,” which
the Catholic university has the greatest access to because it incorporates all the previous
dimensions (§7). To best search out and understand this meaning, the Catholic university
itself requires constant renewal, that is, a checking of itself ensure that its search is
Dignity is a complicated philosophical term. It basically amounts to a respect for the human being made
in the image and likeness of God, that is, given reason and a will. There are certain things one ought not
ever do lest one trespass against it, something holy and sacred. Things like torture, war, and genocide all
come to mind, but dignity includes everyday life, too, ordinary decency and courtesy for instance. That
expands into institutions, considering people provide the means necessary to make them work. Institutions
—marriage, government, university—exist because people exist. And that’s enough to demand the
university, as an institution, treat people with dignity, especially students and teachers. This notion of
dignity will return in the succeeding chapters.
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impartial—its only interests are the gospel, faith, truth, and the common good. By
establishing Jesus and faith as the foundations, the Catholic university is freed from any
political agenda.
With the introduction complete, St. John Paul II moves into the first section,
identity and mission, explaining the core identity, nature, and objectives of the Catholic
university. Catholic universities are academic communities that uphold and promote
“human dignity and…cultural heritage” primarily in their teaching, research, and the
services they can offer to their communities (e.g., clinics) (§12). Catholic universities are
guaranteed institutional autonomy and academic freedom so that they can do their jobs
with minimal outside interference166 as long as “the rights of the individual person and of
the community are preserved within the confines of the truth and the common
good” (§12).
With that being said, all Catholic universities must have certain features to be
Catholic. I will provide a brief summary of each one. First, the academic community
must have Christian inspiration, that is, a spirit of following the Christian lifestyle of
charity. You need Catholics to make a Catholic university, else it is just a school like any
other. Individual Catholics making up the academic community (in whole or partially)
creates this very spirit, flowing into point number two: “continuing reflection in the light
of the Catholic faith” on human knowledge, which the Catholic university wishes to build
(§13). The Catholic university adds to humanity’s knowledge through its faith, initiating
a dialogue with the world in the pursuit of truth. Third, the university must remain
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faithful to the Christian message (the gospel) as passed on by the Church. It cannot
tolerate heretical or alternative interpretations to the contrary when done in a spirit of
hostility towards God and the Church. The fourth point, the Catholic university must
commit itself to serving God’s people in their journey to “the transcendent goal” of
Heaven (§13). As all universities teach, research, and provide services, the Christian
message makes the Catholic university different as “Catholic ideals, attitudes, and
principles” permeate the campus (§14). The spirit of these schools is distinct from nonCatholic ones, but the Catholic university can still be a research institution, one
characterized by four principles: “(a) the search for an integration of knowledge, (b) a
dialogue between faith and reason, (c) an ethical concern, and (d) a theological
perspective” (§15). St. John Paul II then elaborates on each of these.
One discipline’s knowledge is never completely separate from another. All fields of
knowledge work together to integrate their discoveries, but Catholic universities
determine the meaning of each field by putting Jesus at their center with a philosophical
anthropology in the light of the gospel. Accordingly, faith and reason work together in
coming to “bear harmonious witness to the unity of all truth” (“the certainty of already
knowing the truth,” §1) because all truth is rooted in God (§17). The methods of one
discipline cannot contradict faith when its intentions for truth are pure. But the search for
truth cannot be unmitigated. It must be tempered with ethical consideration of the human
person. “Knowledge is meant to serve the human person,” and its research is guided by
moral norms (§18). Science and technology especially need to be careful because the
primacy of the technical threatens the dignity of the human person and our relation to
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God (§18). Theology is the most important discipline for the Catholic university because
it unites all knowledge and meaning in all fields, providing “an orientation not contained
within their own methodologies,” namely to God (§19).167 Quickly shifting to research,
St. John Paul II makes a point that interdisciplinary studies are of utmost importance for
students in directing them to “an organic vision of reality and to develop a continuing
desire for intellectual progress” (§20). They help students see connections between the
disciplines, but intellectual reflection opens the mind to more questions than answers, and
so the place of faith becomes clear: “the complete answer to [questions] can only come
from above…” (§20). Faith completes the circle, so to speak, in linking reason to God.
Ethics, aside from faith, is held in highest esteem because “the moral implications…in
each discipline are examined as an integral part of the teaching of that discipline” which
drives development of the whole person (§20). In other words, students’ characters are
formed according to how each subject treats of ethics. The ethics of a discipline is part
and parcel of the discipline itself. For example, theology be taught in accords with
“Scripture, [sacred] tradition, and the church’s [sic] magisterium” (§20). Regardless of
one’s field, a student will be educated for “the service of society and of the church [sic]…
and to give the witness of their faith to the world” (§20). Having explained the nature
and objectives of the Catholic university, St. John Paul II moves into section two—the
university community.
Bringing the Christian message and Catholic ideals to the world is only possible
when the spirit of Jesus lives in the campus community uniting its members in “a
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common dedication to the truth, a common vision of the dignity of the human person,
and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ which gives the institution its
distinctive character” (§21). The university community has the spirit of Jesus flowing
through it because of its dedication to truth, dignity, and the gospel. Such are generative
of “freedom and charity” by which the university members engage one another in
contributing to the common good of the school in the capacity they are able (§21). For
example, St. John Paul II places teachers in high esteem, regarding they ought to be
“witnesses and educators of authentic Christian life” (§22). Teachers are exemplars of
professional accomplishment and Christian humility. Similarly, students are tasked with
developing an authentic Christian lifestyle in light of their ongoing search for truth. They
are to provide Christian witness in their professions (§23). I will elaborate on these
sections after the rest of this summary.
Administrators are to grow the university through servant-leadership. Religious
orders, usually the founders of Catholic universities, are to prepare religious vocations for
the world. Laity drive the university because of their upper-level positions. The future of
Catholic universities depends on them and their responsibility. Non-Catholics also
contribute to the Catholic university’s mission by providing professional formation for
students in their fields. Having sketched the university community, St. John Paul II
discusses the Catholic university’s place in the Church.
The Catholic university must have a relationship with the Church, local and
universal, for its identity as Catholic to remain complete. It thereby contributes to the
spiritual life of the Church in relating the Vatican to the rest of the world. Because of this
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institutional relation, fidelity to the magisterium “in matters of faith and morals” (§27) is
essential both for the school and individual Catholics. Non-Catholics are only expected
to respect the Catholicity of the school in exchange for respecting their religious freedom.
Bishops have a special responsibility to promote the school on top of ensuring and
building Catholic identity, but they are not autocrats dictating university policy. Rather,
they are co-authors with the university community.
The Church accepts academic freedom in respect to each academic disciplines’
confines, but places an asterisk next to theology. The theology must be orthodox no
matter what, else the university becomes secular in the sense of adopting the world’s
norms and charter. The Catholic university must represent the Church as best it can, and
because theology is what makes the capital “C” Church Catholic, it must be a priority.
Theologians “develop and more effectively communicate the meaning of Christian
revelation” as passed down through the Bible, tradition, and the magisterium (§29). They
must be wary, though, that they speak within the confines of the bishop’s authority. The
rest of the document goes on to explain the role of Catholic universities in their localities,
pastoral ministry, evangelization, and cultural dialogue. As stated above, I will now
explicate the role of students and teachers in ECE to contrast it with LOL, paving the way
for the current academic situation in Catholic higher education.
The Student-Teacher Relationship According to Ex Corde Ecclesiae
The teacher is the focal point where all the positive, Christian attitudes of inquiry
and virtue combine in university lifestyles. They are the fulcrum around which students
model their academic lives, not only in scholarship, but also in conduct. The Catholic
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professor is a multi-layered example of how one ought to live one’s life. That may sound
flippant, but St. John Paul II lays out Catholic university teachers’ lives are ones of
holiness, “which evidences attained integration between faith and life, and between
professional competence and Christian wisdom” (§22). They are proof that it is possible
to live a professional, academically excellent life and one of faith, hope, and charity.
Humanism, note, is at the core of this vision for the teacher: “all teachers are to be
inspired by academic ideas and by the principles of an authentically human life” (§22).168
Knowledge-learning and searching are at the heart of the academic, intellectual life.
They are in no ways incompatible with the authentic religiosity advocated in Kinshasa,
Rome, Modern World, and now ECE, which connects with Rome on the student-teacher
relationship as per dignity of the student.
Students are understood as ideal apprentices. They are the ones around whom
teachers direct most of their professional energy. The Catholic student is a clay sphere
for whom one is responsible for molding into a responsible citizen and a witnessing
Christian. Not only are they to receive professional training, but more importantly a
spirituality to guide them in how to lead Christian lives. It happens through the
cultivation of their minds in humanistic study as it grows their “ability to wonder, to
understand, to contemplate, to make personal judgments, and to develop a religious,
moral, and social sense” (§23). These principles are at the heart of a liberal arts
education. Again, humanism plays a key part in their development. The acceptance of
all things human to improve one’s character is by no means a rejection of all things
168
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divine. The two are intertwined, albeit separate.169 Students learn how to seek the divine
in the search for knowledge and truth. Compare with the student-teacher relationship of
the Rome Statement: objectivity of truth, intersubjective relationship, and contribution to
knowledge as charity. ECE affirms there is a real, universal truth accessible by all.
Students and teachers cooperate in discovering it, hence the document affirms the
importance of the student-teacher relationship for the instruction of knowledge. Because
teachers are humble enough to know their knowledge is limited,170 there is openness to
student insight. Clearly ECE adopts principles from the preceding documents, but it is
not without some controversy. ECE’s philosophy of the teacher and student contrasts
with LOL, which I will now explain before moving onto the context of the current
debates on this issue in Catholic higher education.
Land O’Lakes Statement & Ex Corde Ecclesiae on Students and Teachers
Ex Corde Ecclesiae sees teachers as the highlight of the Catholic university, as
exemplars of authentic Christian living because they teach their disciplines with a
“coherent world vision” (§22), inspiring students to live Christian lives in “freedom and
charity” towards their neighbors and in their studies (§21). Students are understood to be
apprentices of a kind, tasked with developing an authentic Christian lifestyle in light of
their ongoing search for truth and are to provide Christian witness in their professions.
Like LOL, ECE endorses student engagement with the modern world to more effectively
challenge its injustices and embrace its advancements. Teachers are permitted to teach
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any material they find helpful or necessary in the completion of their courses in shaping
their students for their fields. One would think Catholic material is a given since the
nature of the liberal arts is education for a whole life, and Catholic universities promote a
Catholic worldview. Students encounter material through the “lens” of the Gospel and
Catholic doctrine for what it means to be a Christian today. Both parties have a
responsibility to promote and integrate the gospel in their work. In particular, theologians
have the specific task to uphold magisterial teaching in their research and classrooms.
On this point, ECE gives bishops canonical status to interrupt a university’s
functioning when its orthodoxy is at stake. “Each bishop has a responsibility to promote
the welfare of the Catholic universities in his diocese and has the right and duty to watch
over the preservation and strengthening of their Catholic character” (part II, §2). That is
to say, the bishop can prevent a theologian from teaching and researching at a Catholic
university should said theologian be treading in dangerous waters.
Here lies the major tension with LOL. Hesburgh et al., thought that any juridical
interference from the Vatican (e.g., canon law) was a violation of the freedom necessary
for a university to be a university, hence the desire for autonomy, for example, enforcing
what theologians can and cannot say. And the word “Catholic” simply meant, or
appeared to mean, the broad atmosphere and de facto position of the school on social
matters, regardless of what individual faculty think. But what happens when faculty
don’t think what the Church thinks?171 Each text offers different answers.

171

It is possible the Catholic university will cease to exist, reminiscent of Heidegger’s “anxiety” in the
next chapter.

60
Unlike LOL, ECE places squarely the Catholic university within the Church as a
member of Christ’s Body. The Church is seen as an evangelizing agent to the specific
territory it finds itself while dialoguing with its local community and embracing the
goodness thereof.172 But ECE makes it much bigger than what the individual thinks. The
Catholic Church is a community of believers much like a university is a community of
learners. As noted, ECE elaborates on all the breadth of topics listed above in LOL, but it
sees teachers and students differently. In LOL, the student is treated as an autonomous
agent capable of making decisions for oneself apart from external authority as noted in
the opening section. The student is his/her own boss. Now there is no question we need
to make our own decisions in everyday life. Not as self-actualizers per se, but as
members of the mystical Body, one with reference to other people. LOL practically
desires a radical individualism for teachers to teach what they want (regardless of
whether it violates Catholic values, morals, and theology), while acknowledging human
interdependence anyway, whereas ECE wants community to be founded on the Gospel
(faith). These philosophies affect how students and teachers respond and interact with
each other and the university institution. Hence, two major schools developed out of
these documents in a kind of post-Vatican II free for all.
The Historical Problem
As established, the Land O’Lakes Statement attempted to implement the insights
of Vatican II into American Catholic universities. It was the result of the IFCU’s
discussion about the “ways Catholic universities might join in the renewal of the Church

172

This notion of “sight” is crucial for understanding Husserl’s notion of phenomenology.

61
sparked by Vatican II.”173 Kinshasa, Rome, and Modern World lay out their own
philosophies on how Catholic universities are to function now that the Church is formally
dialoguing with modernity. The practical and theoretical problems discussed above all
play an important role in the direction of post-LOL, but the transposing of religious
control to “independent boards of trustees” comprised of lay- and religious people and
placing university prestige (e.g., research) ahead of missional work174 generated a split in
understanding the Catholic identity (character) of Catholic universities between what
Christopher Janosik calls pluralism and restorationism.175
Proponents of restorationism176 advocate a closer relationship to the Vatican and
less interaction (e.g., dialogue) with the secular world. For them, identity is centered on
the tradition of the Church, and the meaning of being “Catholic” precedes the meaning of
“university”. Things like autonomy—independence from Vatican influence—inhibit
authentic Catholic teaching and spirituality because the Church does not follow the
world: she follows Jesus. As Janosik puts it, “identity is inextricably tied to…the
charism of the founding religious group, and a distinctive educational pedagogy which
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places faith at the center of the intellectual enterprise,”177 and the goal of faith is
salvation.
Proponents of pluralism,178 however, prefer distancing Catholic universities from
the Vatican so as to exercise more governance over their schools as they see fit. Vatican
control is seen as a paternalism inhibiting academic greatness and the expression of truth.
Without autonomy, Catholic universities would be devoid of “the resources necessary to
continue their mission of education”179 at a reasonable rate because dependence on the
often slow bureaucratic process of the Church in handling everyday affairs is far too
tedious for a university. For pluralists, identity coincides with autonomy, and autonomy
is about survival: Catholic universities, no matter their ecclesial relationship, would not
exist at all were schools not free to govern themselves. Both movements, though, have
their problems, each of which negatively affect the student-teacher relationship.
Restorationism misses the goodness of pursuing knowledge180 and the promises
dialogue can bring, whereas pluralism pushes a non-religious “outcomes” agenda at the
expense of legitimate authority. This research seeks to alleviate these strains by putting
the conversation back on the initial one who makes the university possible: the student.
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Restorationism understands that professors must actually communicate knowledge to
students for the latter to learn, yet it seems a de-emphasis on research may actually hurt
student growth. In seeking to educate for faith, restorationists may have neglected
research to the bane of their students: a new piece of knowledge may be just what a
student needs.
Pluralism, on the other hand, has the inverse problem: too much research takes
away from professors giving their students proper attention in- and outside the classroom.
Faculty know all too well the pressures coming with seeking tenure, providing service,
and grading over many hours. These pressures are partially rooted in the self-governance
of the university: without any outside input—morally or spiritually, directly or indirectly
—administrations are free to treat their faculty however they like. A new approach is
needed between restorationism and pluralism.
Ex Corde Ecclesiae explains why “Catholic universities are the very heart of the
Catholic Church,”181 namely, because they evangelize all whom enter their doors,
Catholic or not, and evangelization is the spreading of the gospel—a necessity for faith,
an essential aspect of my argument. The pope’s intention was to define the Catholic
university such that, regardless of individual mission, the schools could perform their
institutional obligations in communion with the Vatican. One might even say ECE was a
direct rebuttal of LOL given the pope’s citation of Canon Law 810 wherein a teacher is to
be dismissed if he/she is found to lack Catholic doctrine and morals, something LOL calls
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into question.182 ECE needs more backing on the student-teacher relationship because
the conversation surrounding restorationism and pluralism is tired. Like the Augustinian/
Thomistic debate of the pre-Vatican II era, the current debate is changing due to the
times: online courses, student loan debt, funding cuts, et al. Catholic universities need to
justify their existences, and “the effort at [a] definition [of Catholic universities] began
with the Land O’Lakes Statement.”183 This dissertation argues that to begin solving the
current crises in Catholic higher education, a necessary mediating step is required to
refocus the conversation(s) towards the Catholic university’s twofold end of gospel
witness and formation of citizens. I begin with Levinas’s phenomenological ethics.
As I have noted throughout this chapter, Emmanuel Levinas’s ethics serves as my
jumping off point. Since relationship is the basis of the university, the reason for using
him is that his ethic is one comprised entirely of intersubjectivity. His Jewish roots have
a wide array of connecting points with Catholicism, especially Jacques Maritain, bridging
our historical, cultural, and theological gaps. Levinas’s own reading of Judaism as an
ethic encompassing the alterity of the Other creates a metaphysical and ethical space to
work out much of the tension in Catholic higher education. In order to better explain
how his ethic works, I will briefly cover his two primary influences, Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger, then explain his ethic and put it in relation to spiritual poverty (need)
concerning the student-teacher relationship.
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III. THE ETHICS OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS

Emmanuel Levinas’s concern for the subject (the self) arose out of a concern that
ethics had lost its way in post-WWII Europe. His approach to ethics is through human
relationships, an intersubjectivity of surrender, of giving way to the Other.184 What this
means for us will become apparent in this chapter. While it is debatable whether or not
his work is the result of the Holocaust, this project is not historical in nature, so it will not
be discussed at length. What I will briefly elaborate is the influence of Edmund Husserl’s
and Martin Heidegger’s philosophies on Levinas’s thinking since the latter is as much of
a response to them as it is an original philosophy in its own right. I will then explain
Levinas’s account of the face-to-face encounter with its parallel- and application to the
student-relationship. I will conclude that Catholic university life as preparatory work for
good citizenship is founded on student-teacher relation. This chapter does not concern
Levinas’s thoughts on education and its myriad of applications as that has already been
done,185 and his educational philosophy is embedded in his ethics anyhow. Questions
important for Levinas and his larger project concern the State, justice, and the political. I
will not be elaborating on these as they are outside the confines of this project, but I shall
add a word near the end on the importance of justice and briefly the formation of the
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State as it interplays in the background of the student-teacher relationship in the Catholic
university.
It raises the question as to why bring Levinas into the question of American
Catholic higher education. He is neither American nor Catholic.186 One might argue that
universities already utilize him in an indirect way when they put learning and postuniversity life first, ahead of market pressures, expansion, and net worth. Given
American university culture, that is highly unlikely even for Catholic schools. Levinas is
needed to steer American Catholic universities back onto the path for which they are
purposed, and it begins the student-teacher relationship. First, I must explain his
intellectual influence to underscore his ethic.
Husserl and Heidegger’s Influence
For Levinas, the base human relationship is I-Other, or self-Other, an instance of
the smallest possible group. The student-teacher relationship is a broader function of the
I-Other relationship. I say “function” because any two people can relate in any number
of different ways. The fundamental expression of the I-Other relationship is one of
learning, pedagogy, or student-teacher because of the “newness” of the Other before me,
similar to the encounter with new material in a course. The Other, the one who is not me,
teaches me about herself. In the abstract, it is minimally that there are other selves in the
world. In concretion it is dependent on the context. Personal and professional
relationships are based on the I-Other, and no matter the situation, there is an Other to
teach and an I to be taught. What makes the university situation unique is that the student
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and teacher are both abstract and concrete: relationship-wise they relate pedagogically
because of the I-Other structure and professionally they relate pedagogically because
formal learning happens in universities. There are two levels of pedagogical relationship
going on. In order to understand these levels, how they work for Levinas, and how they
work in this dissertation, one must first glance into the work of Husserl and Heidegger.
Like any philosophy, Husserl and Heidegger’s thought is difficult and complex.
Because this dissertation does not concern itself with these thinkers but Levinas, it will
suffice to summarize a few concepts to provide the necessary background for
understanding how Levinas’s project works, their place in my argumentation, and the
connection to Catholic higher education.
Husserl’s project is to explain how human consciousness finds meaning in the
world by experiencing essences.187 “Consciousness” is a bit of a complicated term for
Husserl, but generally he means “a comprehensive designation of ‘mental acts,’ or
‘intentional experiences,’ of all sorts.”188 It is through these intentional experiences that
he argues meaning can be found through the foundational concept in his philosophy
“intentionality”. For something to be intentional it is directed or “about” something. For
example, when I swing a baseball bat I intend to hit a baseball. The act of swinging has
meaning for me: hitting the ball to get on first base. In consciously choosing to swing, I
form meaning in my everyday life by “seeing” for what purposes baseball has for me.
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But Husserl takes a step back from the ordinary world to understand how that intention is
even possible. He finds it in the field which came to be known as phenomenology.
Phenomenology is the study of how things, or phenomena, appear to
consciousness. A phenomenon is something—material or immaterial, actual or fictive—
that I can experience, whether through memory, the senses, thought, emotion, other
people, or virtually anything one can imagine. What makes my experiences unique as an
individual is that live through them. They form my inner and outer worlds as what I
know to be meaningful on a daily basis. In experiencing something, it is present, that is it
“appears” to my consciousness. It is somehow interacting with me in a way I find
important. What matters to Husserl is that my ability to have and create intentional acts
(e.g., swinging a baseball bat) matters most because without intentionality, I cannot begin
to make sense of the world. For Husserl, nothing escapes intentionality. Nothing appears
to my consciousness without being intentional, or about something in the world, because
to be conscious is to be conscious about something. I am who I am in light of my
intentional experiences such that were I to lose my intentional states about the world, I
would lose my identity, or sense of selfhood. Not only these, but intentionality for
Husserl is strictly cognitive, that is to say, I can only have intentional experiences as
mental experiences, ones my consciousness can comprehend as images.
Returning to the baseball example, I can swing and miss and experience the
sadness and frustration of striking out. Or I can swing and hit a single experiencing the
elation of driving home two runs. In either situation, I am having experiences I am able
to grasp as complete in themselves: swing and sit, or swing and run. Nothing is beyond
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these experiences of being on the ball field here because they are all comprehensible as
ideas, or essences. In swinging and missing, the idea of sadness is now present to me in
my consciousness. In swinging and hitting, the idea of elation is present to me. It is “in”
me, but will pass and I will experience something else.189 It is nothing my intentionality
cannot handle.
It is important to note that sight has an important place in Husserl’s thought as an
“ocular paradigm of knowledge, truth, and reality.”190 He utilizes sight, seeing, and
vision as metaphors (usually) when describing how one goes about phenomenology
because all things are “visible” to consciousness and intentionality. Even with the
baseball example above, yes, I am literally seeing the ball with my eyes, but notice how
the concept of intentionality has a “sight” assigned to it: my consciousness “sees” the
object it is experiencing (e.g., swinging the bat) in what Husserl calls an “adequate
perception,” that is, one that has an equal ratio of “sight” to intention.191 In other words,
what I see is what I get because my intellect fully comprehends the intentional object. In
order to comprehend or “see” something one needs “light,” an illumination.
Consciousness is “illuminated,” it gains new information and understands it, when it
generates intentional acts by interacting with the world around it. Heidegger picks up on
Husserl’s notion of intentionality and interaction with the world, not strictly as
comprehending essences through experience, but as generating personal meaning for
189

Christian Beyer, s.v. “Edmund Husserl,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), accessed
March 11, 2019, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/husserl/.
190

David M. Levin, The Philosopher's Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment (Oakland, CA:
University of California Press, 1999), 67.
191

Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, 402.

70
oneself by engaging in functional activities. Heidegger begins by emphasizing individual
human existence.
“Dasein” is Heidegger’s word for “human existence,” but not in a biological or
anthropological sense. Philosophically, Dasein is a being192 whose consciousness is
aware of the meaning of its own existence as being constituted here in existence. In other
words, a human being aware of the meaning of its existence on earth.193 As one interacts
with the world over the course of one’s life, one seeks out meaning for it. The term
Heidegger uses for meaningful interaction with the world is “care”. Care shifts Husserl’s
notion of intentionality in that, as intentionality has consciousness orienting itself towards
objects in the world as they concern intelligible structures of consciousness, care has one
orienting oneself toward the world as concerns one’s concrete existence and the projects
of one’s life.194 It is a kind of openness towards the world taking in what the world has to
offer for my benefit. Care manifests as action, the doing of things in the world, and
comes in three dimensions: projection/understanding, thrownness/disposedness, and
fallenness/fascination under the umbrella of anxiety and moods. I will unpack these
terms one at a time.
Anxiety is, in general everyday life, the awareness of the possibility of the nonexistence of certain realities given the choices I make. For instance, say I choose to enter
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the Major League Baseball draft because I want to become a professional athlete. There
is a distinct possibility I will not be drafted. I begin to experience anxiety because I am
aware (self-conscious) of a world where I am not playing baseball. Anxiety also has a
more pointed meaning for Heidegger as the existential response to the awareness of a
world where I might not exist, that is, an awareness of my own death where I “[find
myself] face to face with the ‘nothing’ of the possible impossibility of [my] existence.”195
Not the death of something in the world, like my baseball career, though it can cause
anxiety. Heidegger’s focus is anxiety literally over my own finitude where I am left open
to the fact that I will not be here. As a result, it arises within me a state of existential
distress over all possibility in the world as related to projection.
Projection is the openness of possibility (freedom) and the choices one can make
towards the future. My existence can only act within certain constraints, and I cannot do
something unless it is available to me in possibility. For instance, I cannot become a
baseball player without a field, a team, or any knowledge of the game. It is also possible
I can have all of those things and still reject playing it. Understanding puts projection
into practice. It is the idea that I find things meaningful when I interact with them for the
purposes—any purpose—I desire.196 For instance, should I want to become a baseball
player, I use cleats, a ball, and a bat to play the sport. That is to say, I use these objects
for the sake of this project, and this breeds meaning into my existence. Both
understanding and projection “have nothing to do with comporting oneself towards a plan
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that has been thought out,” in the sense of an invisible hand guiding one towards some
further end because I have my projects in the present moment.197
In the present moment, I also find myself having been “thrown” sometime in the
past. Thrownness is finding myself put in a world not of my own choosing, yet I find the
world matters to me for completing projects (e.g., playing baseball), that is, the things I
want to pursue. Sometimes I cannot manage to obtain the things I need to complete the
projects I want. At this point, recalling anxiety, I experience myself as a finite creature. I
am limited in that I cannot escape the fact that I exist, but I can change the way my
existence interacts with the world. In this way, I can “shed” my thrownness by being
receptive to the things I find important. This receptiveness is what Heidegger calls
“disposedness”.198 Being disposed is being able to receive things in a certain way, in
particular for my use. For instance, in wanting to use a baseball field to practice running
the bases I need to have a disposedness to want to run. Even with a disposal to run, in
this instance, my interaction with that world and the things in it is affected by what
Heidegger calls moods.
Moods are not subjective states of mind or personality. They are quite literally
what my individual meaning consists of at a given moment.199 A mood is my interior
stance, how I am receptive (open) to receiving the world. On an everyday basis, I find
myself in these different moods (e.g., anger, silliness) and they influence how I interact
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with things I find important. For instance, I find that baseball is important to me. What I
normally find funny when in a silly mood (say, tripping over a bag) is now aggravating
me because I find myself in an angry mood, say, over my own inability to develop a skill.
The anger changes how I receive the important object, and I begin to see all things
through this mood.200 In this way, thrownness/disposedness acts as a kind of
determination—I can only have so many possible moods towards something in the
world.201 For example, I am angry, sad, or depressed about my running ability. The
possibility of success is not an option in those moods because I am not open to it.
Success and relata are not possible in a state of “fallenness” either. Fallenness is
the notion that I, the self, am disconnected from realizing my own “potentiality”.202 I
have lost the ability to relate to myself in a way that characterizes my actions as my own.
In this way, fallenness is related to what Heidegger calls an “inauthentic” self. For him,
to be fully alive is to own one’s life as one’s own. An authentic life is one that is mine,
one where I determine my projects, my choices, my relation to others, and what I think
about the world by myself.203 To be determined by others is to have a “they-self,” a life
determined by others in which I am concealed from myself and the world.204 This
absorption happens by means of fascination.
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Fascination is the idea that something that holds my attention to the effect that I
lose my authenticity. I can be so caught up in worldly affairs and the concerns of others
that I forget who I am and what I am about. Heidegger gives the example of idle talk as
“the possibility of understanding every thing without previously making the thing one’s
own [inauthenticity].”205 In other words, knowing facts (theoretical knowledge) does not
necessarily make known to me the relevance of those “facts” for my own concrete
existence. Facts, theoretical knowledge, can be “idle talk” when they serve to distance
me from myself by becoming absorbed in their contents and not my own life. Heidegger
indirectly implies the best way to exist is for myself away from other people,206 lest I
become too concerned with them, and focused on my own existence else I become
inauthentic.
The above fundamental structure of human existence lead to what Heidegger calls a
“totality of entities” or “involvements”.207 Totalities are interconnected projects utilized
as ways of inhabiting the world. It makes use of things as equipment or tools because
things help me to complete tasks. For example, students are studying at a desk when the
lamp’s bulb burns out. One of them goes to the closet for a fresh bulb in order to put it
into the lamp, in order to study, in order to pass a class, in order to graduate, in order to…
and so on. One small action is connected to a host of other “projects”. Were I not able to
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choose things for myself, these projects would never come to completion. Totalities
absorb the world into me and me into the world. As a result, because I have the ability to
take things into myself and make them my own, everything is reduced to me. Everything
is now mine.
Post-Hesburgh universities have a similar feel. Instead of serving their
communities in a way akin to St. John Paul II’s philosophy, rather they monopolize
resources into themselves for their own projects. For instance, faculty labor is utilized to
produce research papers. Faculty are persuaded to expend energy towards article
production instead of dedicating more time to care of their students. Most universities
prefer this setup because the articles produced generate free publicity, higher rankings,
and greater probability in attracting grants. In this way, they embody the Husserlian call
to intentionality: their cognition is oriented towards ideas of fame and fortune. Heidegger
summarizes these projects, again, as totalities. To Heidegger’s “totality” Levinas opposes
“infinity,” hence the title of his magnum opus, Totality and Infinity.
When Levinas begins philosophizing, he places his project squarely in the context
of war: “Does not lucidity…consist in catching sight of the permanent possibility of
war?”208 Now Levinas is a thinker known for his lack of clear writing,209 so knowing
whether he is speaking philosophically or literally is important.210 “War” for Levinas has
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two meanings. First, it is literal war. A common reason why countries take up arms is
because they cannot come to some kind of agreement. Both sides contend the other is not
being rational because the opposing side is not meeting the other’s demands. War is the
only reasonable thing left to do, and it has a way of “suspend[ing] morality”211 such that
the rules of right and wrong are dismissed, ignored, or brushed off (temporarily) in favor
of a greater cause. As long as the enemy is annihilated, what does it matter whether one
is acting morally? For this reason, Levinas adds that politics is the “art of foreseeing war
and winning it by any means,”212 and it wins by turning the private lives of individual
citizens into a public cause: anyone can be annihilated, or murdered, at any time. Ethics
is necessary to end this all because we are vulnerable, hence the second meaning.
The second meaning of war is the struggle between rational systems of
philosophy to gain dominance over each other. Every time a systematic or similar type of
rational thought comes up, it gains followers and opponents.213 These fight ad nauseum
until another system comes along challenging them, and the fighting starts all over again.
It is a never-ending cycle for dominance built upon the structure of rational thought. The
problem for Levinas is that in these systems, one is relating to an abstract entity, not
anything personal that can speak214 to me in an intimate way. In particular, Levinas has
Heidegger’s neutered “Being” in mind.215
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It is out of the twofold meanings of war that Levinas can base his ethic, which I
will describe further below. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas is speaking literally about
war as a production of Heideggerian philosophy216 and is speaking philosophically about
war when referring to the kind of philosophy he understands Heidegger’s to encapsulate.
The idea of being encapsulated is of utmost importance for Levinas. To be encapsulated
is to be part of a totality. Expanding on Heidegger’s notion, a totality is the complete
comprehension and completion of something, or to be comprehended and completed as a
unity of some larger whole. In human relationships, he designates this comprehension
“sameness”. Sameness is a kind of totality “where self and the other are treated as
though they are [one].”217 They are treated as the “same” insofar as totalizing a human
being into sameness is to categorize one in such a way that one can be grasped and
broken down into pieces, much like a philosophical concept. Much like war. One is
simply encapsulated and comprehended as part of a larger idea in the universe. In this
way, sameness is anything that is united under a single concept. Applied to human
relationships, sameness is the category of how the self218 understands its place in the
universe. For Levinas, the self is characterized by the habit of reducing and making all
things similar- and identical to me. When I encounter something in the world foreign to
me, I immediately bring it under my rule. I do not stop to consider whether something or
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someone has an identity independent of me in such a way that I leave it be. Rather, I
consume these things so that they become part of me—they become the same as me—for
as an autonomous being, the self has the power to do what it pleases.
The autonomous self in Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Husserl, does not engage
in the kind of “letting exist” that Levinas encourages. These facts are important because
they are same philosophies present in contemporary Catholic higher education today.
Husserl and Heidegger parallel the early debates and Fr. Hesburgh quite well, while
Levinas pairs with St. John Paul II and, as I will later show, Jacques Maritain. Husserl
and Heidegger are needed not only to explain Levinas, or help to explain Levinas, but
also to give ground for my argumentation as to the history and elaboration of Catholic
higher education. Their phenomenologies are present in the history of Catholic education
and philosophies of Catholic educators and institutions without full consciousness
because these philosophies are used indiscriminately. They underlie what Catholic
institutions of higher learning are trying to do, and I argue it is inherently selfish like the
Heideggerian self. Levinas offers a reclamation of the self in recognition of the Other,
similar to the student-teacher relationship, but he needs help because the I-Other
relationship by itself is not developed enough in his work to stand alone in institutional
education. Hence my inclusion of Maritain. These lines of thought will be argued in
chapter four. For now, I will now layout Levinas’s argumentation in this text by laying
out his philosophy of the self, the relation of self and Other, some epistemological notes
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throughout, an explanation of key terms for him and this dissertation,219 the student as
poor-Other, and conclude with a word on the student-teacher relationship.
The Organization of the Self
In the student-teacher relationship, the teacher is the self and the student is the
Other because, while the Other instructs the self in Levinas’s account, it is the student
who is “foreign” (other) to the teacher on the basis that the student approaches the teacher
to learn in the university. The overlap, one will see, is that there is an encounter between
student and teacher, both learn from each other, and both share a common world. To
understand how these dynamics work, I will first elucidate the nature of the self
according to Levinas.
In order to establish precisely in what ways the self is separated from the Other,
Levinas must first clarify what it is about the the self that makes it a self. Husserl’s
notion of intentionality explicated at the beginning of this chapter holds that
consciousness is always conscious of something, namely, an object in my field of vision.
It is taken almost for granted that I, the subject, am relating to objects exterior to me such
that they come to me for consumption by my intellect, whereby they become mental
representations. Similarly, Heidegger’s intentionality is oriented towards objects in the
world as they manifest according to their practical usage in my day-to-day affairs. But
Levinas picks up on an aspect of human experience that the former have overlooked. If
Husserl’s notion of selfhood is consciousness of something, and Heidegger’s is the use of
something, then Levinas’s is the enjoyment of something. Now, a clarification is in order.
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Levinas is working out what a self by itself looks like separated from other
people. Selfhood, for him, arises with “relations that are produced within the same.”220
In other words, what makes my life singular is somehow intertwined with my relating to
things as the same as me. (We can safely acknowledge Levinas means a human self.)
Philosophically, selfhood is “to have identity as one’s content.”221 That is to say, the self
is a being that relates to itself with all the things that it claims as its own, things it claims
to be part of it. This notion of identifying things as oneself implies there are things not of
oneself. Those things are “other,” or things of relative difference between themselves.222
When something other is identified as mine or part of me, it ceases to be other and is one
with what Levinas calls “psychism”.223 Psychism is his term for the inner life, that is, the
world constituted by me in that I “[establish myself] as commander of the world,” as one
who determines all things for myself.224 Levinas argues that the inner life is
characterized by enjoyment (pleasure), the most basic constitution of a self.225
Enjoyment is an ontological structure—a way of being or existing—that the self
cannot help but concretely embody. Its main concern is “growth and plenitude”226
characterized by pleasure, or as “living from…”, by which he means I live from that
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which gives me life or vitality.227 Not biological life, but inner life, the things that make
me come and feel alive as a human being. I use things, yes, but not in a strictly utilitarian
sense of means to ends as one uses a hammer to pound nails for a house, or a bat to play
baseball, and an ongoing list of projects in Heidegger’s sense. I use them because I get
pleasure from them, I live from them, and this pleasure is independent from use in that it
makes me happy. When pleasure is understood as happiness, however, it is not necessary
for life because I can still live and not take pleasure in things, but when I do take
pleasure, it “nourishes” me in a way no other thing can. Pleasure, now taken as
nourishment, is an “invigoration” of my life, “the transmutation of the other into the
same.”228 Relative others become the same (they become one) when they are consumed.
For example, a spectator can consume a ketchup slathered hot dog at a baseball game,
both of which are consumed for my enjoyment. I consume things for no other reason
than I enjoy them, not because I can think them in my mind as ideas, nor use them for
projects. I enjoy things for their own sake, including books and learning. Enjoyment,
then, has several meanings working alongside each other: pleasure, “living from…,”
happiness, and nourishment. The common denominator here is that these are all forms of
consumption—turning otherness into sameness. Students tend to turn the otherness of a
text into the sameness of themselves when they, process, and expound on the contents.
They take pleasure in being “nourished” by the texts.
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Not only do I take pleasure in things, but the act by which I am nourished. For
example, I enjoy eating bread itself, but I also enjoy the bread in the act of eating. I am
nourished by what I do while I do it. Even hunger pangs give me enjoyment when I
anticipate I can satiate them. In this way, “enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all
the contents that fill my life”229 because everything I enjoy brings me happiness, etc.
Notice that this relationship is with something other, something not me and is concrete
involving real objects. Notice, also, that in the concept of nourishment lies “need”.
The notion of need is a complicated term for Levinas. It is not the same “as a
simple lack”230 as something I do not have, or an insignificant poverty. Rather, the things
we live from do not “enslave” us, but we enjoy them. Lying in the sun, I feel the warmth
on my skin. It is not for my survival, yet neither do I reject it as something bad for me. I
enjoy it, and as the enjoyment is mine231 my independence as a self arises from it, else the
sunlight would already be part of me and I would have no need to pursue it. In a sense, I
“need” the sunlight not so much to nourish my body as much as to nourish my inner life.
What makes a “need” different than sheer want is that we take delight in having needs. I
enjoy being “needy” of sunlight because I can anticipate how it feels. Delight is found in
waiting for the satisfaction: “Need, a happy dependence, is capable of satisfaction, like a
void, which gets filled.”232 In this way, need is something that gives birth to abundance
when it is fulfilled. Enjoyment allows me to be “at home” with myself, that is, it creates
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a kind of experience that is solely my own. Specifically, I form myself by integrating the
relative, impersonal other not by opposing it as one idea opposes another, but in
surrounding myself with it. But I would not be able to experience need and enjoyment
without a body.
I need a body to help me enjoy life because, as temporal creature, it takes time for
me to fulfill my needs. I am not a beast, so I must labor, change my environment to suit
my needs whether that means building a house or a baseball field. “Need” in this case
does not demonstrate the deprivation of human existence, but its inventiveness. Unlike
Heidegger, who would add a litany of reasons why I am building this or that architectural
piece in order to establish an authentic self, Levinas points out we simply enjoy the
building for its own sake. I take pleasure in standing, say, on a roof in the sun not just
because I like the warmth, but because what I am doing (laboring) makes me happy.
Base running drills are hard work, but its an enjoyable work I like for no other reason that
my liking it. I am consuming the sun and pleasure in building as I build. I am
consuming the smell of freshly cut grass and dirt when I sweat rounding third. In all
these things I enjoy I am not thinking about them. I am, again, consuming them, and my
body makes it possible. They come to me as they are, I enjoy them in the present, and I
seek them out according to my desires. It is how my selfhood is formed. Becoming a
self by itself, here, means becoming independent from totality by separating oneself from
the whole. For Levinas, it occurs when needs are filled. My needs are mine, not anyone
else’s, and so they make me independent from the rest of existence. “Ipseity” is the term
for this uniqueness of one’s life.
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Ipseity designates one who lacks “the individuation of a concept,” or one who is
not part of a genus.233 I am “withdrawn” into myself in solitude, outside of any concept
(that is, part of any whole) or relationship. My existence is solely for myself by myself.
I am self-sufficient. Again, enjoyment here is not psychological or biological because
there is a joy in just existing, outside of my projects (doing things for the sake of
something else). Any action I take springs from enjoyment because enjoyment is my
existence. I build a house and run bases because building and running are enjoyable
before any specific content they inhabit. In this way of one “having pleasure” before
some kind of act, Levinas asserts that self is not ontological (having being) but
axiological (having value).234 I do not begin to become a self by “assuming being” in
something greater than me, but by enjoyment in my inner life. The things I enjoy are not
objects under some grand theoretical system. Yes, they can be literal material things, and
I consume them, but the nourishment they provide are not, for Levinas, part of some
larger system. They just are, much like my enjoyment.
But just as enjoyment is not reducible to mere use or utility, neither is it reducible
to intentionality. Levinas’s critique of Husserlian intentionality is centered on Husserl’s
fixation with all thought as a kind of sight as noted above. When “seen” through the eye
of consciousness, all thought is reducible to representations in the mind because
everything I experience, for Husserl, is rooted in cognition. Levinas says, “the object of
representation is indeed interior to thought: despite its independence it falls under the
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power of thought.”235 Being intentional, and thereby in the mind, no intentional object—
that is, nothing in the mind—escapes the intellect’s grasp. There is no room for anything
unique, nothing to spontaneously surprise me in intentionality. Not only this, but while
objects and consciousness are distinct from one another, the latter still manages to
“produce” (bring about) the objects as endowed with meaning, that is, I am oriented
towards it in a way that it matters to me not anyone else. Everything is not just reducible
to consciousness, but is reducible to me, the self. Levinas rejects this notion of
intentionality because, as I will explain, he holds there is an aspect of human experience
(the encounter with the Other) that escapes intentional awareness. Not only that, but I
experience it at a level “invisible” to consciousness at level of pre-cognitive sensibility.
That is, I feel something about this Other that I do not experience with mere thoughts.
Something is “beyond” thinking here, something is beyond intentional consciousness.
Before Levinas can get there, he must first explain how his basic notion of the self as
formed in enjoyment does not simply duplicate enjoyment as intentional.
Husserl’s notion of intentionality involves my producing meaning by constituting
(actively relating consciously to) objects, whereas Heidegger’s would have me use
objects as tools for accomplishing projects. Here, Levinas inters the body, as discussed
above, in order to offer a response. The body is, metaphorically, “indigent,” needy, and
“naked” to consciousness because needs are absences,236 but again, not mere absences.
The indigent, poor body as an absence cannot be represented or used in a way pleasing to
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intentionality. The function of the body, for Levinas, is to establish my position on the
earth. Both the earth and my body are corporeal and needing nourishment in order to live
and thrive. What I enjoy is not “my life as the represented is within representation,”237
but my life as nourished. Rather than constitute or use them, I assume objects into myself
by passivity, by welcoming them for consumption rather than somehow actively engaging
them as in a conversation. To welcome is to be receptive, to let things into oneself, not to
manipulate or destroy.238 The concrete world makes it possible for there to be
consciousness and thereby intentionality, utilization, or welcoming of objects at all. The
primary place I welcome objects is in the elements.239
Like enjoyment, the elements are “primitive” in that they underlie representation
and utilization, but what gives them primacy240 in experience is that they are
uncontainable or non-possessable. Husserl and Heidegger, who want to comprehend
everything in abstraction or projects, overlook the fundamental set up of the world I
inhabit as concerns enjoyment. Enjoyment happens in the elements. I am immersed in
the things I enjoy—I absorb the sunlight, I smell the air, I drink cool water, I feel the soil
between my fingers. Yet, these nourishments are themselves first immersed in the
elements, and the elements are not objects. Odd as it sounds, the elements are for
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Levinas not objects because they are “too indeterminate, too formless.”241 “The element
comes to us [on all sides].”242 There is nothing to really limit them in a
phenomenological sense. The elements are more qualities of existence than essences and
are simultaneously in us as nourishment and exterior to us as other. In a similar manner,
“in enjoyment the things are not absorbed in the technical finality that organizes them
into a system.”243 Like elements, enjoyable things precede rational ways of thinking like
intentionality. Hence, what Levinas is trying to demonstrate with the body and nature is
that the self and its enjoyment elude certain “conception[s] of knowledge”.244 One way I
gain knowledge is through the senses, but for Levinas, sensibility does not give
knowledge.
Sensibility “is the mode of enjoyment,”245 that is, sensibility is what allows me to
have a relationship of pleasure with the elements. Instead of providing knowledge,
sensibility is a feeling before anything else. I feel myself affected by things before I
conceptualize them. Levinas gives the examples of “the green of these leaves, the red of
this sunset.”246 As I live I sense them as enjoyable, I absorb them, and they become part
of me. Sensibility’s function is not to constitute representation (or its possibility), but
“the instance of enjoyment.”247 It needs not tools or anything readily usable, except the
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body. Through the body, enjoyment is pre-reflective—it exists before thought. Unlike
thoughts and their objects, which come and go and are discarded on a whim, in sensibility
the self “hold[s] onto [a thing’s] exteriority.”248 The thing exists in the world as it is, and
the self leaves them as they are felt because, as they are elemental, I cannot possess them
in thought. Because the elements are not “possessable” in thought, and they exist before
I am conscious of them, they precede thought and are “are not to be ascribed to the
totality to which it is closed [off].”249 Sensibility is outside totality because it does not
have anything to do with concepts or projects, and these have a certainty stability about
them—they stay the same whether I am thinking of them or not. Sensible objects, as they
come out of the elements, are unstable. I cannot guarantee, for example, that the sun will
not always burn me, or the seawater toss me about, nor the “elements” of university life
always give me what I desire. I am happy in one moment and fighting for survival the
next. The world is enjoyable, but dangerous, and so I labor (alter the natural world)
myself a home, a dwelling place where I can mark off my possessions and territory to
protect myself from the uncertainty of the outside world. But then the Other comes onto
the scene.
At the university, again, this Other is the student because the student is passing
through. The teacher “remains” in the university seeing generations of students come and
go. It is the student who approaches the teacher to begin an encounter.
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The Other, the Face, and Infinity
Levinas’s description of the self’s meeting the Other takes place in what he calls
the “face-to-face encounter”. Before explaining this term further below, I will first
explicate Levinas’s transition from the sensible to the Other via metaphysical desire, the
face, and infinity. Through sensible and representational knowledge, I know the world in
a way reducible to Husserlian intentionality or Heideggerian disposedness. When
individual objects come to me, I experience a kind of wholeness about them. The
qualities (e.g., color, size) are not separated, but integrated with the object.
Representational knowledge is found, again, in the metaphor of light and disposedness is
found in utility and projects. From the perspective of those epistemologies, sensibility is
deficient for acquiring knowledge about the world. Yet, each time the light “shines”
insight onto something, it is within a metaphysical void Levinas calls il y a, or, “there is”.
For Heidegger, there is a kind of horror in the anxiety of knowing I will die. Against him,
Levinas uses this term to refer to the horror of existence itself and the fear that
nothingness is all there is for me. The il y a incorporates an inescapability of myself from
myself as I take recourse in knowledge to fill the supposed epistemological emptiness of
satisfaction in enjoyment. In this way, Levinas is expanding on the notion of a “horror”
of existence in order to counter that “enjoyment…characterizes all sensations whose
representational content dissolves into their affective content.”250 The emptiness of
satisfaction in enjoyment is a misnomer. Sensibility is not about representation, so of
course it is “inadequate” for acquiring knowledge. Rather, it is about affectivity—the
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feeling I get when I find something enjoyable, and this feeling as a form of contentment
delivers me from the horror of the il y a.251 The world is the self’s for the taking, and it is
taken as enjoyment, something previous phenomenologies failed to articulate. As a
solitary self, the I relates to everything “other,” or exterior, to it—elements, tools for
labor, dwellings—as reducible to sameness. Relationship happens when I go out from
myself and my projects towards the Other. What makes this movement exceptional,
Levinas says, is that it is characterized by “Desire” or “metaphysical desire”.252
It is an insatiable, unsatisfiable urge and longing for the Other. It is not the same
as a “need,” a corporal desire for something I consume, like a piece of bread. I have
bodily needs like these, and there is an interesting feature to all of these needs: their
satisfaction does not bring me peace. Satisfaction drives me to more needs. For instance,
I eat bread and I want more. I fill my belly, and I want to sleep. I wake up, and I want
more bread. Eventually, I realize that satisfying my needs is not enough. I look for more
things to consume, and whatever they are does not matter. For needs, more will never be
enough. With needs, I am recovering something lost, “a longing for return”253 to what I
previously had, namely, satisfaction.
Metaphysical desire, however, does not want satisfaction “because it does not call
for food,”254 nor does it want return because it wants to go outside itself. In this
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movement it has a peculiar characteristic, Levinas says: “[metaphysical desire] desires
beyond everything that can simply complete it. It is like goodness—the Desired does not
fulfill it, but deepens it.”255 In other words, contra need, metaphysical desire is not
fulfilled or satisfied by the object of its desire. Unlike a need satisfied, Desire is
hollowed out: it is structured such that no matter how much I strive to fulfill it, the more
it intensifies.256 The striving is done by moving towards the Other, and the fulfillment the
attempted “grasping” of the Other.257 In moving towards the Other, what Levinas has in
mind here is service, which I will touch on and relate to Desire when discussing the
student-teacher relationship. What is important here is the Other escapes this reducibility
to the sameness of enjoyment and satisfaction of need by virtue of what Levinas calls
“the face”.
The “face” is a complicated term for Levinas, but unlike most philosophical
words, it is not a technical one. Technical terms change very little, or at all, over the
course of a philosopher’s work. The meaning of “face” does not change, but it is neither
something completely fluid. The “face” is but one dimension of the relationship with the
Other. Ordinarily, a face is a visage: the literal look on a human countenance. For
Levinas, “face” is his term for the vulnerable, impoverished, exposed humanity of the
concrete other (the human being) irreducible to any representational or utilitarian

255

Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.

256

Whereas with a need, the desire may return (e.g., I want more bread), but the desire is always
satisfiable.
257

As I explicate further, I will explain why for Levinas grasping the Other is not possible.

92
knowledge.258 The face, the humanity of someone, is that aspect of the person that no
idea can encapsulate and no project can grasp. It “refus[es] to be contained…it cannot be
comprehended, that is, encompassed” and is “inadequate” to any idea I can conceive.259
When physically looking at someone’s countenance, I can tell whether they are joyous,
upset, or something else. I can describe what I perceive with any number of words and
phrases, but that is not what Levinas means. People are more than their physical features.
In this way, “face” separates me from the Other. It is what makes the Other other. Yet,
the Other is not me only in a comparative sense. For example, your hair is long and mine
is short. It is not simply a question of matter or accident. Both of these ways of thinking
about the face and the Other puts us under totality because the face, unlike concepts, is
not “equal” to anything else.260 Hence, the “face” is a metaphor, referring to one’s
humanity as it is “invisible,” or unseen by the light of vision in representation, utility, and
totality.261
This way of speaking may be odd, but we are speaking in relational logic. It is
not formulaic. We are not speaking in propositions. Yes, these sentences can be broken
down according to propositional logic. There is no denying that, but Levinas is talking
about an aspect of human beings—their very humanity—that exceeds encapsulation by a
logical operator. This excess is what Levinas calls “infinity”.
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Before I expound infinity, it must be noted this concept is the reason for the
constant renewal of the student-teacher relationship. As with pleasure, I can get bored
with the same features over and over again. Teachers might feel the same about, say,
teaching the same material year after year, but each new set of students provides a new
encounter because of the absolute uniqueness of each student, which infinity begins to
layout.
Infinity is the idea of conceptual unlimitedness. Now, Levinas’s source for his
notion of infinity comes from Descartes262 whose description of infinity and its formal
structure (not the content) matches Levinas’s use in his description of the Other. Because
Descartes is periphery to my study here, I will simply note his influence but focus on
Levinas. In his search for certainty, Descartes takes an inventory of everything contained
in his mind and finds that there is nothing there that he could not have come up with by
himself.263 He concludes that he can only think of finite things, concepts, etc. because, as
a human being, he is a finite creature. There is one idea, however, that is not finite:
infinity. As a finite human being, Descartes has less “reality” than someone or something
that is infinite (i.e., God). Accordingly, he states “from this very fact [of being finite] I
know most clearly that I depend upon some being other than myself [for the concept of
infinity].”264 From this observation, he concludes an infinite idea (or a notion of infinity)
must come from outside himself on the basis that his own finitude could not produce it.
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Infinity is not “contained” in him, but it comes to him from without. Infinity must have
been put in him somehow, and he needs an other to put it there. That other is God
because infinity originates with God, the infinite being. Given that infinity is put in me
by God, and God exists before I do, infinity thus precedes my existence. In preceding
me, in a strange logic, infinity cannot be false “for the nature of the infinite is such that it
is not comprehended by a being such as I, who am finite.”265 Something that exists, yet is
incomprehensible is not false or illusory given that, as before, I cannot comprehend it
being a finite creature. Now, Levinas does not conclude Descartes’s classical theism, but
keeps the basic structure of Descartes’s thought on infinity, namely, it comes from outside
me, precedes me, is uncontainable, and is incomprehensible.
What makes the idea of infinity quite remarkable in philosophy is that “its
ideatum surpasses its idea.”266 An “ideatum” is the actual manifestation of an idea in
concretion. For instance, in Husserl, I have the idea of a baseball in my mind and the
actual baseball in my hands. Try doing that with infinity. Whatever manifests is, by
definition, incommensurable to the mental image I have of it. Levinas calls it “distance”:
“The intentionality that animates the idea of infinity is not comparable [is distant] with
any other; it aims at what it cannot embrace.”267 Anytime I try to conceptually grasp
infinity, I fail because “the I…thinks more than it thinks.”268 It overflows. In other
words, while I have been referring to infinity as an idea, to say infinity is an idea is not
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really all that true because an idea is something mentally containable. Same with the
face. The face of the Other is Other as “the infinite is the radically, absolutely, other.”269
They are the same, but not in the sense of sameness. Sameness, again, refers to the self
making all things like itself. The way Levinas uses “face” and “infinity” is to discuss the
same thing—humanity—in different ways. One might say he peels back the layers of
human experience, but these “layers” are not a question of negation.
The question of negation is a question of reality. To negate something is to say it
does not exist. It is a non-reality. But the face exists. It “has being,” but it does not have
being in a classical sense. Like infinity, it is “reality without reality”270 because, like
infinity, it has something I can point to conceptually,271 but by its very nature it erupts
over that pointing by constantly reinventing itself. In other words, there is no concept I
can use to adequately explain what I am experiencing because the “thing,” the reality, by
nature escapes all concepts. Like Descartes, I cannot assume that I always had this
notion in me because I myself am a finite creature. Something, someone outside of me
had to put it there. For Descartes, it is God. For Levinas, it is the Other. Yet therein lies
a problem: how can the Other, just as human as I, “put” infinity in me when the Other is
just as finite? The answer lies in the “production” of infinity.
One example of the production of infinity is the student-teacher relationship
wherein students freshly challenge teachers with new interpretations on previously taught
texts. I am reminded these are living texts, so to speak, with ever new insights I have
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blinded myself to in my day-to-day living. Because relationships involve exchange, in
short, infinity is produced with a constant dialogue, a social relationship the student
offers the teacher in return.
The Relation to the Other
When Levinas says “the idea of infinity is the social relationship”272 he means
that infinity is “produced,” or “brought about” in relationship with the Other. How is this
possible? The self does not know infinity through understanding, rather, it knows it
relationally. Yes, Descartes can argue infinity comes to me from without, but as was just
stated, infinity is constantly overflowing itself in manifestation. The “idea” is not
adequate to the reality on a one-to-one basis. Because infinity comes from the Other
outside me, my relationship “consists in approaching an absolutely exterior being”273 as
metaphysical desire approaches the Other. Infinity (and the face) is “produced” because I
do not experience it, or have the opportunity to experience it, unless the Other is actually
there. I cannot experience something unless I am present to it. The Other, the personal
other, is neither like the impersonal things I find in enjoyment, nor a set within a given
category of the world (e.g., hobbies, pleasureful things), nor a tool I manipulate to aid me
in completing projects part of a totality. When I meet the Other as Other, outside of all
preconceptions and utility, I meet the Other in what Levinas calls the face-to-face
encounter.
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The face-to-face encounter is an event whereby I interact with the Other on a oneto-one basis. No two interactions are exactly alike. Like infinity’s unlimitedness, the
face reveals itself differently each time, and not just one’s physical countenance: “the
whole body—a hand or a curve of the shoulder—can express as the face.”274 Recall the
face is a metaphor for the Other’s humanity, and Levinas adds that the parts of the body
can be an instantiation of the face. Why choose “face” over all other metaphors when the
body could suffice? Because, like a soldier or innocent civilian the victim of war, “face”
expresses the vulnerability of humanity and of self-Other interaction. Going back to
Totality and Infinity’s preface, Levinas discusses war as literal combat and as
philosophies offering theories of dominance and competing with each other. Using literal
war for a moment, consider the body. A soldier can brandish weapons with his hands to
kill his enemies. He has legs that can run towards them to fight or take flight to survive.
He has a chest to puff in intimidation or a display of dominance. The face, countenance,
does not. He might paint it, wear a protective mask, or make a grimace to frighten an
enemy, but the expression of the enemy’s face stops him. The enemy is cornered, and the
soldier raises a sword, a gun, a knife. He threatens to take the enemy’s life, and he is
defenseless against him. The only “appeal” for the enemy’s has for his life is his
presence before the soldier, and so the soldier is faced with the choice of murder. The
enemy is vulnerable to death, fully exposed to violence, impoverished of any security,
and waits for the soldier’s response. Each encounter is not as dramatic or imminently
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life-threatening,275 but the same poverty is present. As the encounter is the foundation of
any meeting between me and another, be it peaceful, violent, or something different, so
the face expresses the Other’s vulnerable humanity in a special way. The face qua Other
is one who “looks at me and speaks to me. In contrast with objects, the [the self] does not
assign the face its meaning.”276 The face presents its own meaning to me as irreducible to
any psychological, cultural, or ontological concept in its very infinitude. In speech, we
are able to see that it is language which links the self to the Other in the form of
discourse.
The face “having the idea of infinity, is discourse, specified as an ethical
relation.”277 “Discourse” is another term for conversation, a back-and-forth exchange
between self and Other. It serves as the link that connects me to the Other without
totalizing our relation, and it is of upmost importance that the “language” of discourse
does not refer to literal words. Literal words imply the concepts they gesture towards in
one’s mind. For example, “Jew” implies, or may imply, a certain set of stereotypes that
one may find offensive and thereby deserving of destruction. But “Jew” is also a human
being, and so “the formal structure of language [discourse] thereby announces the ethical
inviolability of the Other…”278 I cannot “murder,” that is, deny the Other’s right to exist
by refusing to respond to his/her face, without simultaneously acknowledging that the
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Other is in-fact vulnerable to destruction before me. Structurally, then, discourse affirms
the existence of the Other, else there would be no one to speak to in conversation. I
would be alone talking to myself. Here, discourse is the complete opposite of
enjoyment’s structure whereby I do everything in my power to grow, provide, and please
myself. Language, words, begins inverting that process towards the Other. As words, it
points us to concepts, but concepts encompass and totalize. It can also describe the
Other, but I can never fully describe her in words, so I cannot encompass her there either.
In that respect, I am not free to do with the face, the Other, as I please. I cannot subsume
the face into my world for whatever sense of enjoyment or use I feel like. I cannot, for
example, speak to my student in any way I please because it may not be conducive to
fulfilling the kinds of needs they have. I ought not consider my student a piece of clay to
mold into my likeness with words suggestive they ought not have their own ideas about
texts, the world, etc. Language forbids it and is something else.
Against Husserl’s (over)use of vision as metaphorical to how we obtain
knowledge, Levinas appeals to a hearing metaphor in relation to the face. Unlike “sight,”
which for Levinas implies a kind of domination,279 language (speech, discourse) keeps
the self and Other separate because it does not imply a power struggle. Language works
through the face in that, unlike vision, I do not “see” the face, but rather I hear it
speaking. Without words. One might say language is the face because speech is one
aspect of the face. A face “speaks” to me, not as a text or a work of art, but as something
else. Language is the aspect of the face, similar to the grammatical form of the an
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imperative, that forbids me from doing as I please. It “resists” my attempt to assimilate it
to my understanding. Take the wounded, enemy soldier. He has lost all his weapons and
armor. He is helpless. His enemy approaches him ready to shoot, and they make eye
contact.280 The enemy cannot pull the trigger. He experiences something. Yes, infinity.
Infinity is there, but it comes with something. It comes with “epiphany,” a manifestation,
or revelation.
Similar to the ideatum as the manifestation of an idea, what manifests on the face
of the Other is epiphany. Epiphany is the concrete, vulnerable “thing” I encounter that
causes me to not stay in my current understanding of something, but it has the function of
a command281 not to murder, of letting another exist. For example, the soldier assumes
his enemy must be destroyed because he wears his country’s colors, but the blood
flowing from the latter’s body strikes former, and the soldier moves from something
aggressive to something ethical. Instead of (literal) murder, the soldier wants to get him
aid. In the sense of self above, I am living from things in enjoyment. All the things that
nourish me and that I use as tools through my labor, dwelling, and primitivity of the
element (nature) are now put at the feet of the Other. But with the epiphany, what I have
is not mine, but also his. Anytime I act, use, or mentally represent things I actually
responding to the Other because there were conditions for acting, using, and representing
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that were not present before our encounter. The epiphany as command can only speak
through me because, as a separate self, the face cannot speak to itself.
I am still going to own concrete things like books, tables, and chairs, but the
epiphany of the command gives me another approach to things. They are now what I
share, or could possibly share, with the Other through language because I realize in all I
do my original enjoyment is not really mine. Because this Other exists in the world, what
I do to and for myself affects him/her, too, because how I live impacts how I “welcome”
or respond to the face. Welcoming is the passive response to the “speech” of the face. It
is a kind of “listening” to hear what the face “says” to me. Like the epiphany, when I
encounter and welcome the face it “speaks” to me, and what it says has the function of
the grammatical imperative—a verb that expresses a command. The face “commands”
something of me in its speech, which again, is not material words. What it commands of
me is not to murder.
The I has the freedom to do as it pleases, including murder, but the Other “calls
[it] into question,”282 that is, it causes the self to consider whether it should use its own
resources and choices for itself or for the Other. Another way of putting it is the whether
concepts and such the self uses to possess the world ought to be renounced in response to
the face-to-face encounter. The face speaks “do not murder me,” that is, allow me to
exist as I am in the world without your, the self’s, reduction into sameness. What I could
do with myself in making a dwelling, enjoying the sun, using a hammer to build a house,
all of that is questioned by the presence of the Other. Do I really have the right to do as I
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please? Is my existence really the most important? Are my needs my primary concern?
The self is now, as mentioned in Levinas’s opening, at war with itself. It must choose to
either respond to the face or renounce the face (murder)283 and go back to possessing the
world. It is the enduring power struggle characteristic of all being and philosophy. “To
expose myself to the vulnerability of the face is to put my ontological right to existence
into question.”284 In this way, the Other is not “given to me as…things are”285 because
things cannot testify that I might misuse my freedom. They do not call me into question.
“In ethics, the Other’s right to exist has primacy over my own.”286 Consider the enemy
soldier example. When the enemy soldier is lying on the battlefield without any means of
defense, the only “thing” that speaks is the face.
Now, “murder” is like language in that it is not material. “Do not murder” is the
epiphany the face expresses. Take the enemy soldier. His vulnerability (face), his very
defenselessness as revealed in the epiphany of for instance, his wounds, expresses a
command not to murder—let me exist, let me live as I am. In the moment one is about to
squeeze the trigger, it occurs to the shooter, maybe, that he has a life like his. We raise
families, build houses, and play baseball. His life is mine and mine his. On the basis of
infinity brought about in the face-to-face encounter, to murder the Other is in some sense
283
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to murder the self. To murder the student is to murder the teacher. As explained above in
relation to Descartes, infinity precedes all cognition and comes to me from without. It
occurs to me that when infinity is brought about in relation to the Other, and infinity is
“put” in me, I “[contain] in [my]self what [I] can neither contain nor receive solely by
virtue of [my] own identity.”287 I “contain” (for lack of better words) in me the same
infinity as he. Since he is Other for me, I am Other for him. And in this relationship, we
are responsible for each other. The student and teacher are responsible towards each
other for the formal learning event. The ethical relation is a relation of responsibility.
Responsibility and the Third Party
Responsibility is the idea that in the face’s need I respond to it in whatever way I
can.288 I am response-able (able to respond). A response can take any material form: a
cup of cool water, a loaf of bread, clothing, tending wounds, giving my company for five
minutes.289 It can also take the form of prepping lessons, holding a door, or training
myself to have a certain kind of character to benefit another.290 In all these cases,
responsibility is an overall concern for the well-being of the Other in whatever way I
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encounter him. I do not have a choice in the matter: the Other concerns me whether I
like it or not. As Levinas explains
I do not believe that [not hearing the call of the Other] is truly possible. It is a
matter here of our first experience, the very one that constitutes us, and which is
as if the ground of our existence. However indifferent one might claim to be, it is
not possible to pass a face by without greeting it, or without saying to oneself,
“What will he ask of me?” Not only our personal life, but also all of civilization
is founded upon this.291 (Emphasis added.)
In this sense, responsibility is an obligation. I am obliged to respond no matter the
circumstance, even with the openness of what the Other may ask of me. Yet, this
response is neither a categorical nor universal response, that is, I do not respond to one
Other the same way I do to another. Every situation is different and each one has his own
needs. The tricky part to understanding how responsibility works for Levinas is that, like
his entire corpus (especially Totality and Infinity), he switches between meaning
something metaphorically and something literally. Contrasted with above, responsibility
“stands behind practical morality; about the extraordinary relation between a man and his
neighbour [sic], a relation that continues to exist even when it is severely damaged.”292
Responsibility is hence the fundamental, structural orientation towards the Other that,
while taking certain concrete forms, never ceases for I am never not in the ethical
relation. Levinas says, “Responsibility in fact is not a simple attribute of [being a self],
as if the latter already existed in itself, before the ethical relationship. [Selfhood] is not
for itself; it is, once again, initially for another.”293 The radical move Levinas makes is

291

Levinas, Is it Righteous to Be?, 184.

292

Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader, ed. Sean Hand (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 2001), 247.

293

Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 96.

105
that—outside all enjoyment, representation, and utility—what makes me me is the
Other’s calling me to responsibility. My selfhood is formed by the Other and my
response to the Other because it is these I cannot assimilate into sameness. Because the
Other exists and presents him/herself to me, and I have no choice in whether I respond I
ought to respond to him or not, Levinas posits our relationship is asymmetrical:
responsibility lies solely with me—I am to give everything of myself to the Other.
This part of Levinas’s philosophy is constantly under scrutiny. Giving everything
of oneself is construed as slavery—I am a slave to the Other. Not quite because
Levinas’s language is extreme to get the reader’s attention and to probe the depths of this
giving-of-oneself. His message, his ethic, is straightforward in that he’s describing
compassion, not some highfalutin charade. Showing compassion is the root of giving
oneself and the core meaning of giving oneself. I can be kind, charitable, devoted, even
obsessed to giving my all to my furthest capabilities for the Other, but it is all compassion
—a suffering with the Other and the attempt to alleviate that suffering. The Other cannot
relieve his/her own suffering, so it falls on me, hence the asymmetry.
When I respond to the Other, I respond with my whole being because in a given
moment, I am hearing only the call of one Other. This notion of giving my whole self is
called “asymmetry”. To be asymmetrical is to be fundamentally oriented towards the
Other in such a way that I am ready to give the Other everything (in response) and
receive nothing in return because the Other might need everything I can give.294
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Consider a teacher helping a student one-on-one. The teacher may have other things on
his mind, but in helping the student (the Other), all time and attention (as examples of
response and resource) is directed to him. The teacher does not focus on himself. I give
everything to the Other and expect nothing in return. Yet, there is something troublesome
here. Say I were to have a line of students outside my door who all need my time and
attention. I cannot possibly give the same amount to all, should they have need of it. My
resources to respond are unlimited, Levinas claims,295 because they are formed in my
egoistic enjoyment. All the things (skills, etc.) built up inside me are now about the feet
of the Other, waiting for his command. But the “unlimitedness” is there in theory, in the
background. It is the notion that all I have is for the Other. Concretely, I am only able to
stay in my office for so long before I must sleep and my attention span wearies. Not only
these, but other Others have need of me. These “other Others” are what Levinas calls the
“third party”—all the rest of society. In university life, the third party may be other
faculty, administration, staff, or anyone who sets foot on a university campus.
The third party is not the singular Other of the face-to-face encounter, but all
others outside of it. The third party is society, or as Levinas says, “the whole of
[humankind]”.296 It is named as such because, while it does stand in direct relation to the
first-person me, the self, it is not the second-person “you” of the Other. The third party is
“third” because it has the grammatical function, not of a personal one-on-one “you,” but a
personal plural “you”. A “you all”. As Levinas puts it, “the third party is other than the
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neighbor, but also another neighbor.”297 The third party is not an impersonal crowd as a
bundle of others whose randomness interferes with my responsibility for the Other.
Instead, “the relationship between the neighbor [the Other] and the third party cannot be
indifferent to me” because I experience the third party as just as much in need as the
Other.298 In other words, the third party’s needs are just as important to me as are the
Other’s needs, and because of this, my responsibility is now extended beyond the
singular Other into the others of the third party. I am responsible for both such that my
responsibility is now, like a resource, shared. Yet, because I cannot share my resources
with all,299 I must decide to whom and how much I share. Hence the third party’s main
concern is the carrying out of justice. Justice is social responsibility: the concern for the
well-being of all others. These others are the third party because its concern is with the
relationship between more than two people, but is just as personal as the singular Other.
When discussing Levinas, one must keep in mind these levels of relationship because
they often intertwine and refer back to one another much like they do in the section of
Totality and Infinity “The Other and the Others” which I will now consider.
Levinas begins this section with a word on language. Language, analyzed above
as what connects me to the Other in our separation, is here posited as “the presence of the
face”.300 The “presence” of the face is the fact that the Other is in-person with me in the
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face-to-face encounter. Just as I speak to the face of the Other in responding to its needs,
so too, does the face’s presence speak back to me. The face speaks a reminder, though,
that there are other people in need of solidarity, suggesting that a potential problem with
the face-to-face encounter is forgetting the rest of the world. I can become so absorbed in
the one-on-one relationship that I forget other people exist, but the face reminds me that
this is not so, for Levinas declares “the third party looks at me in the eyes of the
Other”.301 Like the language which breaks through the the Other’s changeable qualities
(e.g., hair color), the face of the Other “speaking” to me brings to mind all the others in
the world also in need of my response. It is not as though the Other comes to me—or I to
the Other—we have our encounter, then go our separate ways. Rather, the third party is
always lurking amidst our encounter, and I am reminded that there are those others
excluded from this one-on-one relationship. I owe them something parallel to the moral
responsibility called for by the singular Other. When I share a resource with the Other
this offer inadvertently extends to all others as the third party because, difficult or not, I
can make that same offering to all people.302 That offering, which parallels moral
responsibility, is justice as it comes in the form of language.
As Levinas says, “language is justice,”303 meaning what I speak to the Other is
what I give and owe to the Other by virtue of my being a self moving towards him/her in
Desire. As it applies to all others, justice takes place in institutions because only
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institutions—like the third party—can stand outside the self/Other relationship.
Institutions, at a societal-legal level, determine what I owe the Other. Notice the
connection to “need” in the first chapter. I discussed the idea that students needed
something from their professors. Universities, too, needed to provide a situation in which
students could learn about their faith in a way conducive to either character development
or theological academics. Both were at the center of the Augustinian/Thomistic debate.
The deeper level of that debate was how students and teachers are to relate. Are they to
relate as citizens in training or scholars in training? When one manages to determine
what they need, one has the answer. The problem here is students as people have many
needs, sometimes outside of what teachers can provide (e.g., mental health). And so
universities began to offer clinics, recreation centers, and so forth in an attempt to appeal
to student well-being. What teachers owe is different.
Similar to the State, universities are institutions that determine what teachers
“owe” their students in the form of conduct codes, policies, and procedures. Such laws
shape responses, but at the personal level, the face-to-face encounter engendered by
compassion is the first event influencing my response. When the student comes onto the
scene as Other, I am drawn to him/her in a fundamental way. I feel a responsibility for
his/her existence, and this responsibility is shaped by poverty.
The Student as Poor-Other and the Teacher’s Response
It happens that the student, much like a beggar, cannot presumably help herself as
per learning.304 As the poor one, she needs me to help her. We can discuss two types of
304
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poverty: material and spiritual. Worthy of their own longer treatments, I will provide
basic definitions for our purposes here. Material poverty is generally the consistent lack
or access to basic needs: food, shelter, work, and clothing.305 These needs bridge me to
the Other because they are the concrete basis on which I connect and share resources.
Material poverty takes on a different meaning in the classroom. Colleges refer to texts
and such in the classroom as “materials,” but that is a mere coincidence. Material
poverty here does not mean for us that a student lacks the literal text in the classroom (but
it could), rather, it means that the material studied in the classroom gives something to the
student that the student would otherwise lack, and the teacher is the one who helps
provide it. What is being given will be discussed some in this chapter, but mostly in later
chapters of this dissertation. The importance for our discussion is that without the
concrete reality of learning in the classroom, there would be no institutional relationship
between student and teacher and thereby no opportunity for responsibility to arise in the
face-to-face encounter. Responsibility as assistance to another’s need is not necessarily
material in either sense of the word, yet needing assistance seems a kind of poverty. In
this broader sense of poverty, the fact that the Other (here, the student) needs help at all
suggests a second kind of poverty, namely, spiritual poverty.
Spiritual poverty is a need of assistance at the spiritual level. Specifically, it is a
state of dependence on another person for the incorporeal necessities of life (e.g.,
community, knowledge) in such a way that one cannot provide these necessities for
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oneself. Something spiritual is incorporeal—it cannot be touched with human hands. I
cannot touch the spiritual resource I have with a beggar (e.g., fraternity) when I share a
material resource. In a similar way, I cannot touch the bond between myself and the
Other, nor can the teacher touch the community one forms with one’s students. For both
cases, what I share with the Other is now twofold. Economically, I share a material
resource with the Other for the survival of the body, which in turn generates sharing a
spiritual resource for the survival of our concrete relationship. In education, the
“material” of the text or the classroom experience generates the spiritual resources of
knowledge and learning community.306
One must always be ready to relate to the Other and thereby always be ready to
give something on the basis of responsibility. This readiness to give implies that my
relation to the Other will “always be an offering and a gift” which in turn breeds
community.307 This gift, the sharing or giving of a resource as noted above, is the
primary means of relating to one’s neighbor as moral responsibility for the Other, which
is how Levinas understands poverty. Because the Other, who simultaneously reveals his/
her surplus (infinity) in the face-to-face encounter, reveals the poverty of needing a
response.308 The teacher’s responsibility for the students as poor-Others, and
responsibility is embodied in conversation, or, language.
306

This list can be added to many times, but these are the essential ones for our discussion.

307

Emmanuel Levinas, Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism, trans. Sean Hand (Baltimore, MD: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 62.
308

Many philosophers struggle how to understand that the Other can reveal, or present me with a surplus,
and be impoverished. One can think of it in relation Levinas’s rejection of Husserlian intentionality: the
Other is “invisible” to the “sight” of knowledge. There is something “beyond” about the Other that I
cannot grasp intellectually (her humanity), but I can only sense (similar to Plato’s Good beyond Being).
Yet, being human, the Other is finite, and so impoverished.

112
Section one, subsection five of Totality and Infinity, “Discourse and Ethics,” is
where Levinas discusses the relation with the Other as conversation.309 To review,
conversation is the link to the Other in face-to-face encounter while the Other remains
separate from the self according to the Other’s alterity. Language originates as the first
moral response to the Other because it is the Other’s voice originally calling to me. With
that being said, language is (again) not necessarily words, but an imperative commanding
me to respond. My response to the Other is concrete—the sharing of a material good,
time, company, or instruction. When I share my resources, I am “speaking” directly to
the Other that I do not meet her empty-handed. As the face is a metaphor for the Other’s
humanity, “speaking” is a metaphor for communication of what is inside of me. In
“speaking” to the Other, language is an expression of my interiority, for when I speak, I
become exterior—my language conveys what is inside of me immediately to the Other
and the outside world. Given that verbal language is the usual means of communication
between academic students and teachers, it is only fitting that it is the primary way of
responding to students.
Henceforth, I use the term “academic” for students because what makes Levinas
tricky to understand about teaching is that he thinks any Other is a teacher and any self is
a student. A businessman, for instance, notices an elderly woman struggling to cross the
street. His daily routine is interrupted, and he offers to help her. In the process of
walking together, they make brief conversation310 and whatever is said, he learns
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something from her about himself, herself, and maybe the world. He is taught by her.
She was the one in need, but it was really he who learned something. Similarly, the
Other, here the academic student as the poor-one, is in need of assistance from the
teacher. One kind of assistance, like a street beggar, is a monetary donation. But
teachers are not inclined to give their students financial assistance, whether they have
money or not. Rather, they are inclined to “walk” with their students through the ups and
downs of their time together. Much like the businessman literally walking with the
struggling woman, teachers guide their students through any number of crises. Nothing
happens to a student that a teacher cannot in some way respond. In this way, the selfOther relationship parallels the student-teacher relationship, except that the academic
student is the Other because he/she is receiving something from the teacher as the self in
the university setting. And like the responsibility for the Other on the basis of infinity,
the responsibility the teacher has for a student is as infinite as the command to respond to
the Other.
As Levinas has said “[thou shalt] not leave the Other alone,”311 the teacher is
unable to unbind him/herself from the relation with the student. Once the relationship is
established in the concrete, it never dissolves. After their courses have ended and
classroom interactions ceased, the relation maintains a constant over time. Students long
after graduation refer to their professors as “Doctor,” though they may be “equal” as
established adults. Teachers still offer whatever bits of knowledge they can to their
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(former) students’ inquiring minds after years of not speaking.312 Perhaps it is in their
nature, perhaps not, but the student is clearly in need of something by virtue of his/her
asking the teacher, and the teacher responds. The relationship of need demands that the
teacher fill that need with a response. Similar to a beggar asking for sustenance, the
response does not really matter whether it is the equivalent of a cup of water or a
wedding feast. The point is to respond, to give something to another. Oftentimes the
student’s concrete need is just to be heard, and the encounter with the teacher provides
the opportunity.
Yet, the teacher cannot take care to notice the features of the student (hair color,
etc.).313 This statement may be controversial in a post-modern age, but Levinas’s
sentiment is egalitarian. Allow me to explain. Much like the anonymity of the Other in
Totality and Infinity, the concrete Other remains “anonymous” in the sense that it can be
anyone. Perhaps the content of my response changes according the uniqueness of the
encounter, but the act does not. For instance, a teacher does not offer less words on the
same subject to one student simply because the student is short, or disabled, or what have
you. The same “content” is given regardless of who the Other is because the response is
given according to what the teacher can give. Some students need more assistance than
others, but a teacher—like the self approaching the Other—ought never come to a student
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empty-handed. Because knowledge is most often communicated, it is not incredulous to
claim ordinary conversation is where the student and teacher “speak,” both literally and
metaphorically, but “a teacher should not only prioritize…intellectual development, but
also must pay attention to the personal, [that is], spiritual development of [one’s]
students.”314 Not unlike Catholic higher education’s emphasis on mission and identity as
Catholic, the goal is for all students to get what they need insofar as an educational
institution and its teacher can provide it. The problem then becomes one of accessibility:
how can a single teacher make oneself available to all student needs? Levinas’s answer is
it may not be possible, and he frames it in reference to the third party explained in the
previous section.
All my attention and resources are oriented towards a singular academic student.
Unless that student is receiving private lessons, the academic teacher is responsible for a
whole host of students in the classroom. As the third party “looks” at me through the the
eyes of the Other, the single student reminds me of all the other students I am responsible
for. My resources now must be split between them. I am concerned for the well-being of
all my students. For Levinas, this shift from the Other to the third party marks the
foundation of the State, or for our purposes, the institution of the university:
In the measure that the face of the Other relates us with the third party, the
metaphysical relation of the I with the Other moves into the form of the We,
aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality.315
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Notice the face-to-face encounter makes the State possible. It founds it, underlies it.
States are built of relations, though they become impersonal and contain impersonal
elements (e.g., bureaucracies) in order to assure meeting the needs of all its citizens. The
parallel in universities is similar. Without institutional processes to speed up the life of
the university, nothing would ever get done. Imagine, for instance, analyzing every last
detail of the thousands of admission applications. Impossible. The infinity of the Other
must be “compromised” to deal with the need of getting on with university life. One
might say a kind of violence is done to the Other (e.g., academic student) being ignored
of all his/her attributes because anytime I relate a singular Other to a whole or an
institution, the uniqueness is lost in the group by a “comparison between
incomparables.”316 The complete uniqueness of one Other is incomparable to anyone
else, yet it is compared with another Other when deciding who and how to respond.
Applied to the university, how do I decide which student to respond to first? What best
helps this student? Note the teacher’s relationship with the student gives rise to the
institution of the university in the sense that without that relationship, there would not be
a university at all. Comparing Others is true even for Catholic universities, as noted by
Pope St. John Paul II in the previous chapter, whose underlying metaphysic is tied to the
dignity of the human person: all people (here, students) must be respected as made in
God’s image.317 The problem Levinas faces is just that—how to respect all of God’s
children in the classroom and the university at large. Given the overlap between he and
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the Catholic Church, it is only appropriate to incorporate a Catholic philosopher for
application of his ideas. Jacques Maritain’s philosophy of education works with
Levinas’s ethic to provide a concrete application of what is necessary to return Catholic
universities to their roots.
Maritain is a neo-Thomist, a philosopher using the metaphysics of St. Thomas
Aquinas to answer philosophical problems. He develops a philosophy of education based
on his Thomism and the liberal arts humanism of St. John Henry Newman wherein
classics and literature are generally prioritized over technical, specialized texts because
these latter ones generally do not contribute to the students’ knowledge of salvation, nor
the building up of character and good citizenship. Note the discrepancy with the
philosophy of Fr. Hesburgh. Levinas, too, does not have the detail in his ethic necessary
to put flesh on a curriculum or the classroom situation, but he does provide the structure.
To be faithful to the message of Catholic higher education, it behooves me to use a
Catholic philosopher. Maritain also lays out more systematically the student-teacher
interaction in a way appropriate to my argument.
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IV. JACQUES MARITAIN’S PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

Maritain wrote his magnum opus on education, Education at the Crossroads,318
during WWII as the Yale Terry Lectures. His thoughts on education are written about
European culture, but presented as equally relevant to American culture in describing
human nature, the ends of education, and the ideal university.319 It is not comprehensive
in laying out every detail of university or educational life, but it is a workable outline
with several key elaborations on important concepts for educational philosophy. Maritain
wants to argue for classical liberal arts education in the university because of its antitotalitarian nature.320 In this chapter, I will lay out his basic position on education and
human nature and describe what he calls the “seven misconceptions of education”. I will
then explain the norms for students, teachers, and their relationship. Next, I will further
clarify and elaborate on his educational philosophy via two of his articles on education,
and conclude with some thoughts on his vision of the ideal university.
Maritain subscribes to liberal arts education whose “highest aim…is to make youth
possess the foundations of wisdom.”321 Philosophy and theology are the highest of such
an education. Philosophy frees students from their own ignorance in awakening them to
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reason, and theology is a “rational wisdom…rooted in faith,”322 standing higher than
reason because it is supernatural knowledge of- or involving God Himself. I mention
these ideas because this dissertation is about Catholic universities, where philosophy and
theology tend to be regarded as the most important of all fields. But Maritain is, like Fr.
Hesburgh initially, talking about all universities as such, not Catholic ones. Yet, Maritain
admits his faith influences his philosophy of education,323 so one can assuredly
understand his thinking in these texts to be “naturally” Catholic. One understanding of
Catholic education is, of course, an education in the humanities.
It is important to note that Maritain has in mind children, or the student, when
referring to the “who” of education. Typically philosophers of education leave that
explanation out to the detriment of their readers, but Maritain is quick to explain that “the
job of education is not to shape the Platonist man-in-himself, but to shape a particular
child belonging to a given nation, a given social environment, a given historical age,”324
but before one is a member of any community, one is first human. One’s humanity
precedes all possible qualities about a person in concrete existence, and the goal (telos) of
education for Maritain is to become human.325
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each of us to become a man [sic].”326 And so, this principle of becoming human guides
all of Maritain’s thinking about education since it is education that “shape[s] and
guide[s]” our own personal evolution.327 His definition of “human” is the
Greek, Jewish, and Christian idea of man…an animal endowed with reason,
whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a free individual in personal
relation with God, whose supreme righteousness consists in voluntarily obeying
the law of God; a man as a sinful and wounded creature called to divine life and
to the freedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love.328
To begin reaching this perfection, one must embrace one’s education.
Maritain defines education in three ways. First, it is “any process whatsoever by
means of which man is shaped and led toward fulfillment (education in the broadest
sense).”329 Second, “the task of formation which adults intentionally undertake with
regard to youth.”330 Third, “in the strictest sense, to the special task of schools and
universities.”331 Where one finds oneself, one is always learning because human beings
are “endowed with a knowing power, which is unlimited [and one can only learn with
help] by collective experience previously accumulated and preserved.”332 In other words,
the potential for self-determination (freedom), knowledge, and doing good is locked
inside each person and cannot be unlocked without human interaction, “discipline, and
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tradition.”333 Because he is discussing human nature, Maritain adopts the first definition
above because it applies to all people, not only those in the university and youth.334 His
aim here is to discuss the goal of education, becoming human, which he does by way of
explaining seven misconceptions of education. The misconceptions skew the reception
and teaching of students in life and universities.335
Seven Misconceptions of Education
The first misconception is a disregard for ends, that is, the purpose of education.
Education is about human growth in “knowledge and wisdom, good will, and love,”336
thereby freeing the spirit to pursue perfection (sanctity). For Maritain, modernity lost its
way when its education replaced those ends for something else. He gives the example of
a doctor who examines a patient so thoroughly, he forgets the cure. The means of treating
the patient matter more than the treatment itself. People become consumed with the
means by which they get to their goal that they forget the goal. For Maritain, modern
education has neglected the supernatural goal of shaping Christian citizens, thereby
making the gospel real on earth. The means of education then exist for their own sake
instead of the sake of those higher things.
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For the student-teacher relationship, it means the teacher will be more inclined and
encouraged to focus solely on helping students pass courses to “help” them get to the
next stage before graduation. I do not mean that teachers do not have their students’ best
interest at heart, only that their interest in helping them meet the need of obtaining credits
for their courses, for instance, is overemphasized against their desire to shape them as
people and take something positive for themselves from the coursework. Maybe some
teachers are okay with this setup, but the Catholic university teacher ought not be because
of the inherently moral situation of the student-teacher relationship. A soul is at stake,
and the teacher who neglects his/her duties towards students337 is committing an injustice,
not unlike the second misconception.
The second misconception is “false ideas concerning the end”. The disregard for
ends misuses the means of education, this one misuses the goal of education. It is based
on a misunderstanding of man’s nature. Maritain has in mind the scientific idea of
humanity, the positivism of the Vienna Circle—philosophers who deny everything that is
not sensory. Here, man is reduced to the principles of scientism: anything that does not
pass through the scientific method is rejected. He contrasts scientific man with the
philosophical-religious man, someone who is able to answer and entertain questions
about God, morality, and free will.338 Unlike scientism, its main reference is not the
scientific method but metaphysics. And because it encompasses more than sensory data,
it can tell us more about our humanity. That is to say, because the scientific ignores, or

337

These responsibilities are covered below in the section “guidelines for the teacher”.

338

Maritain, Crossroads, 4.

123
better cannot answer, the deeper parts of our humanity qua creatures of God (since
scientific methodology lacks access), a scientific pedagogy alone is impoverished of a
deeper philosophical anthropology, neglecting the entirety (integral unity) of the human
person.
Students are not machines capable of absorbing only what their senses give them.
They are spiritual creatures in direct relationship with the divine. The curriculum and
pedagogy need to reflect these, else the students are neglected in crucial developmental
areas. It is the teacher’s responsibility (recall the end of chapter two) to provide such
opportunities for growth. A scientific mindset does not afford students solely the kind of
“nutrition” they need to grow. I am not saying “trying something new” in the classroom
is an issue. We all must experiment with new lessons and lectures, but to say only one
pedagogical method is acceptable is to betray our students because different
temperaments requires different approaches.
For Maritain, philosophy must consider the human “ontological mystery” to have
any chance of helping the student through one’s education.339 One cannot “build
education on the single pattern of the scientific idea of man” because it would “warp” all
the inaccessible areas of our humanity.340 One might think there are no possible answers
to unscientific questions. A strict scientific base to education “loses all human sense or
becomes the training of an animal for the utility of the state.”341 Maritain concludes,
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because philosophical anthropology “is the prerequisite” education (one needs a grasp of
what man is before educating), and man is more than matter, what guides education is a
philosophical-religious idea of man.342 Philosophical because we are concerned with
essence/nature, religious because we are related to God as His creatures.
The human being is a person, more than matter. He has intellect, will, and
“spiritual superexistence [sic] through knowledge and love.”343 Only through love can
one give oneself to another, a crucial concept for the teacher later on and the student upon
taking his/her place in the world. The foundation of love is the immortal soul, “the root
of personality,” and in which exists man’s freedom.344 This freedom separates him from
the rest of creation as a being greater than his parts. “A person possesses absolute dignity
because he is in direct relationship with…God,” and only this relationship fulfills him.345
It is his true end. Hence any humanistic education must respect this dignity, freedom, and
individuality. Having explained the nature of education, Maritain then continues to
explain the aims of education.
The third misconception is pragmatism, which Maritain jabs all through Education
at the Crossroads. His issue with pragmatism is it is all about action, which is fine
because “life consists of action,” but action has an end or purpose: “contemplation and
self-perfection”.346 Pragmatism, for Maritain, treats the human being like an automaton
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responding to stimuli, and in the process, it must admit it cannot appreciate knowledge
for its own sake since there is no proof of any truth except that something is useful.
Pragmatism makes man into “an organ of response to the actual stimuli and situations of
the environment, that is to say…animal knowledge and reaction.”347 He has in mind John
Dewey whose philosophy of education is rooted in evolution—students evolve over time
as they learn more about the world and build on their previous experience. The problem
is people are reduced to mechanical parts and pieces, and pragmatism’s rejection of
metaphysics also negates for Maritain the dignity of the human person, which he
interludes into the discussion.
Much like technological feats, students are treated as though all they can do is
respond to their senses without any recourse to higher things. I would add they are
degraded, undignified, because their inner lives are not respected as ends in themselves.
Rather, it is simply a question of “insert and eject”: put information into the student and
have them spit it out (e.g., exams) because it is useful for absorbing necessary
information. There is no way for the student to master anything except what the teacher
deems appropriate. For example, a literature course would only support the student as
responding to words on a page with the proper answers to an exam question, instead of
permitting a playful interaction wherein the student is free to explore the various themes
of a novel.348 There is no freedom, and without freedom, creativity dies.
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A short section, “the social potentialities of the person,” is a break to situate
freedom’s purpose in education. The point of education is internal freedom (selfdetermination), but it takes a second form in external freedom: social life. The
individual human is a proper social animal because one requires community to reach
one’s full potential. Society is a mass of people living together in their individual
freedoms subordinated to the common good, but these freedoms come back to him in
civil rights and the cultivation of his mind. Society thus prepares one to “play his [sic]
part in it”.349 That preparation, like the secondary form of freedom, is the secondary aim
of education. The primary aim “concerns the human person in his personal life and
spiritual progress, not in his relationship to the social environment,” which leads Maritain
into the next misconception.350
Sociologism is an acceptance of the promise of social conditioning for education.
For Maritain, however, education is not a read-and-respond, or read-and-react activity. It
is a process fully endeavored to bringing out the highest possible good in man. Education
is not concerned with adapting a man to social conditions, but in “making a man, and by
this very fact in preparing a citizen.”351 People are formed in social relations, so any
person’s education for oneself is thereby educated for the State and others. Yet education
is not about “bookish individualism,” rather the “inner center” where conscience lives is
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the core around which education and the liberally-formed citizen rotates.352 Being a free
person is to feed that inner center with material worthy of developing the individual into
a good citizen. Social conditioning cannot do that because it has a preconceived notion
of freedom—environment, which functions as a kind of determinism—to which every
one must submit. There is no room for uniqueness. Maritain seemingly shifts here from
general education to school education, but school education as it impacts the student as
man, not university lessons. Social conditioning used as a recourse to fitting students into
their surroundings is a cop out and irresponsible. The student is an individual within a
larger community of learners. There will be common ground and separation between
them. Some learn alike, etc. Still, the teacher must attend to all students to whom one is
in charge.353 Even when students choose to go along with what society (people as a
whole) dictate is worth pursuing, what is wrong, etc., they do it of their own accord.
When something like the student-teacher relationship encourages this mindset in its own
ways, a grave mistake is made in the Catholic university. The misconception associated
with universities themselves is the next one, intellectualism.
One might say it is the “bookish individualism” to sociologism. There are two
forms:
…A certain form of intellectualism seeks the supreme achievements of education
in sheer dialectical or rhetorical skill—such was the case of classical pedagogy…
another form of intellectualism, a modern one, gives up universal values and
insists upon the working and experiential functions of intelligence.354
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Maritain does not elaborate on the first form because he assumes it is inherent—
intellectuals know how to use big words. He elaborates a great deal on the latter. The
modern form, exemplified by science and technology, forces students to develop premature specialization. Such specialization is necessary for advancing through life and
one’s career, but when such things inhibit one to make even generalized judgments about
things, something has gone wrong.355 Students cease to become people and live their
lives. There is no longer any semblance of the human, but only of a robotic appendage in
the workforce. Religion and leisure are then reduced to mere side-exercises that take up
our labor because the overemphasis on technical training eliminates the exploration of
higher things.
The American 1940s had not yet set up an educational system where that was
taking place per se, but the student demand for more job training was certainly present.
Democratic government is dependent on liberal education precisely because it offers the
kind of freedom democracy needs to flourish: only free citizens can elect a free
government. Maritain’s major concern with intellectualism is that it breeds an overly
technical, an overly specialized kind of citizen who cannot reflect on life’s many issues in
order to gain the best life possible. He says, “how could the common man be capable of
judging about the good of the people if he felt able to pass judgment only in the field of
his own specialized vocational competence?”356 What really matters for the average
citizen is the ability to adapt to life changes since overly-specialized education prevents
355
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people from “adapting themselves to new circumstances and mastering them.”357
Maritain is not suggesting we do not need chemists, engineers, and electrical line
workers. Rather, he is concerned that too much focus on one thing inhibits the
broadmindedness necessary for promoting freedom.
These forms of intellectualism are today in our students’ obsession with social
media and streaming services. Instead of pursuing character-building activities, or deeper
pursuits, students are relegating their time to “recovery” from work with mindless
entertainment. Not quite intellectualism, but the connection here is they are focused only
on their specializations in school or work. Nothing else happens. This reality is a
devastating blow in the student-teacher relationship because it assume teachers are only
good for one thing: job training. But teachers, like anyone, have lives outside of work.
They are not automatons focusing solely on one aspect of human life, nor are students,
because life is larger than labor. When this mindset sets into Catholic higher education,
the spiritual damage done to both parties could be tragic. Opposite intellectualism, there
is another misconception that carries weight to the opposite purpose.
Voluntarism also has two forms corresponding to each form of intellectualism. The
first form emphasizes the will over the intellect in the form of the practical over the
abstract.358 That’s well and fine considering the object of education is to make man
moral, but when it lapses into “making intelligence subservient to the will [via] the virtue
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of irrational forces [passion]” disaster can ensue.359 Maritain gives the example of “Nazi
training, schools, and youth organizations, in smashing all sense of truth in human
minds…making the intellect only an organ of technical equipment of the state [sic].”360
The will is not meant to serve technocracy, and again, we return to technical
specialization, here as the second form of voluntarism. As the second form of
intellectualism over-emphasizes the intellect to the detriment of the will (by which
Maritain means moral education), the second form of voluntarism does the opposite: will
(moral education) over intellect (intellectual education). The trouble with this form of
voluntarism is that it shapes the will according to feeling, or sentimentality. All that
matters is the “will to believe” and not the actual content of belief.361 The will is warped
or misinformed according to the feeling the State or school wants to instill in its students,
not any kind of universal values.
The connections to the student-teacher relationship are more explicit here than in
the other forms, namely, because Maritain addresses schools in the first form. What
matters more than moral intelligence is a will to power. So long as my will directs me to
my ends, what does it matter what my ends are? Without the ability to engage in thought,
students’ passions will carry them away. Teachers may be forced to instruct students in
ways contrary to faith, hope, love, and truth, thereby risking the spiritual and moral health
of themselves and their students.
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Maritain then makes an odd move for his emphasis on the intellect. On the one
hand, he lauds intelligence over the will because “its activity is more immaterial and
universal,” but he also lauds the will over the intellect for “it is better to will and love the
good than simply to know it.”362 As is the case with Aristotelian ethics, between these
kinds of voluntarism and the other misconceptions, education is a question of balance.
Not too much will, not too much intellect. Maritain even says, “the upbringing of the
human being must lead both intelligence and will toward achievement, and the shaping of
the will is throughout more important to man than the shaping of the intellect,”363 because
man is a social animal. Accordingly, the student needs as much of an all-encompassing
education as possible, we are met with a dilemma, the seventh misconception—the notion
that everything can be learned in the form of two paradoxes.
Maritain writes, “what is most important in education is not the job of education,
and still less that of learning.”364 Students ought not expect life skills to be taught in
universities because that’s not their job; the job of the Catholic university is to prepare
their minds to face the world’s challenges. Virtue cannot be taught any more than how to
approach a woman for marriage. Morality is crucial for student development, but taken
as prudentia (practical wisdom) the classroom cannot properly teach it because it is “an
inner vital power of judgment developed in the mind and backed up by well-directed will,
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cannot be replaced by any [intellectual] learning whatsoever.”365 Only experience can
“teach” prudence, and experience often involves suffering, memories, and choices. What
matters most in life is “intuition and love,”366 the things that give the deepest meaning to
human existence. Neither of these can be taught proper, but again, the first paradox of
education is that, for all its structure, education itself needs be concerned with these two
above all.
The second paradox is the relationship between what Maritain calls the educationaland extra educational spheres. By “educational,” he means those immediate institutions
that actively shape youth into properly functioning human beings, “namely the family, the
school, the state, and the Church.”367 The irony is that the family emotionally woundsand schools overwork us.368 He does not provide examples of the State and Church, but
one need only use one’s imagination. Really, man is set against the world to survive in
harsh conditions using “energy, love, and good will [to] quicken his heart.”369 The extraeducational sphere are the informal institutional, or non-institutional, activities that
educate. Relationships, work, pain, laws, “the inspiring radiance of art and poetry,” and
the cultural coloring of things with liturgy.370 This list is not exhaustive, but one can see
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how seemingly all things are educational. Extra-educational reality gives, Maritain
thinks, man the opportunity to pursue the transcendent “call of the hero” which goes
beyond “social habits and moral regulations…toward the infinite Love which is the
source of being.”371 The teacher is the impetus for this hero’s journey, which Maritain
takes up in the student-teacher relationship.
The deepest, most important things in life are not things that education (schooling)
can teach. Education is there to prepare us to receive them, and sometimes receiving
them means one must first recognize them. The teacher instructs the student in such a
way that the soul is shaped to know when these things happen. Study is proper when
oriented to these ends. It is quite a mysterious process, one Maritain does not explain. I
would venture that living life is the ultimate education, to never stop learning, growing,
expanding, and filling up with things only a fully-formed person can know and love.
Maritain clarifies in no uncertain language that university schooling is only a partial
education, “the beginnings and the completed preparation of the upbringing of man
[sic],” and it is not the university’s job to shape all of one’s humanity because, as
demonstrated in the seventh misconception, that’s impossible.372 Students are not fully
formed coming out of college, they are only partially formed in the—ideally—acquisition
of universal values. “Our education goes on until our death,” and it is schoolingeducation that is concerned with “knowledge and intelligence.”373 The teacher is the
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great communicant of knowledge and formation of the intellect. Maritain actually
mentions children here, whom education and pedagogy is properly directed, but the
principles he uses I find are rather universal. For instance, truth is at the root of teaching.
We do not preach lies, willfully, nor do we tolerate prejudice. Students are at the mercy
of the teacher whose authority they accept without question. Because students do not
have yet the ability to completely judge for themselves, the teacher has the utmost
obligation—out of a sense of love—to “respect in the [student] the dignity of the
mind”374 and prepare the student to think for herself with basic building blocks. It is the
university instructor’s job to shape the students’ minds as much as the elementary school
teacher’s the child.
The shaping happens through the “instrumentality of truth,” a phrasing that one
initially balks at out of fear for one’s dignity, but which Maritain clarifies to mean
purifying “the powers of desire, will, and love” in order to “gain control of [one’s]
tendential dynamism.”375 Dynamism is the ability to act, the active principle in a living
thing. “Tendential” refers to the tendency to move towards ends. In other words, people
move in given directions from desire, will, and love, but truth rightly orders one’s
pursuits. It is the teacher’s job to shape those pursuits in students. What matters most
here is moral education, but not the way voluntarism has it in the will. By “moral
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education,” Maritain means prudentia, living well. As stated above, the schooling system
cannot provide prudential wisdom, but it can shape the way prudential wisdom is
received.
This shaping has gone astray in the time since the Land O’Lakes Statement. It was
replaced primarily with a utilitarian mindset that preferred to treat students as currentand future consumers towards education. It also encouraged an independence of learning
on the polar opposite end of sociologism. Instead of the social environment controlling
pedagogy (and being the pedagogy), the inner life of the student has full reign without
any reference from without. The learning is almost completely self-directed in the sense
that Catholic universities went with the flow of American culture instead of against it,
meaning the slow decrease in a belief in absolute truth, rightness and wrongness, and
moral boundaries. Students are left to themselves to figure these things out. Teachers act
more as gatekeepers for grades and promotions rather than guideposts in sorting through
one’s life. Granted those are tall orders for anyone, but teaching here is understood as a
vocation, a calling, and not another job to pay the bills. The student-teacher relationship
requires some kind of learning beyond the classroom.
On this note, for the sake of teaching, teachers ought to know something about a
student’s psychology in order to “avoid deforming or wounding them”.376 Maritain goes
on to say that students need instruction in matters that make social life function in order
to better equip the intellect for thought. And so, the paradox of man’s education between
educational and extra-educational spheres is, for Maritain, resolved. Concerning the first
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definition, the process by which one is shaped and led toward fulfillment, education
wants “the uprightness of the will and the attainment of spiritual freedom, [and] the
achievement of a sound relationship with society.”377 These things are dependent on the
four institutions above and bear directly on moral education (the will). The intellect and
knowledge, however, are the responsibility of the university and only indirectly affect the
will insofar as they shape moral education and its reception.
Maritain’s overarching concern with the seven misconceptions is that technology is
slowly taking over all things educational in all three of his definitions. One cannot go
through life without encountering a technological feat that does not somehow influence
one’s actions. This feature is not necessarily a bad thing. I think Maritain would agree
vaccinations and open heart surgeries are good things. The point is how technology
infects the human soul. Technology makes things easier for us to the point we become
entirely dependent on it for everything, including happiness. It isn’t balanced out with
anything else, it just finds its place in life and stays there. When we want it out, we find
it hard to quit. Cell phone addiction is one example. Another pertinent problem is the
lack of creativity in day to day life.
Technology has done a great deal of good for humanity and permitted creative
endeavors in all fields (e.g., photography) to blossom into respectable arts. That’s not the
kind of technology we are referring to in pedagogy. As described above via sociologism,
et al., technology is the kind of thing inhibiting students from tapping into their potential.
Why bother breaking down a complex novel’s plot when you can just view a video? Or
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why bother learning something for fun when you can make money with minimal
technical effort? The technology is more anti-human than it is actual aid to the world
(e.g., anesthetics). Teachers do not have the opportunity to influence students when they
are pushed away from classical liberal arts sources, among others, and even when they
are not, teachers are pressured for research reasons not to devote the time and energy to
student development. The current state of the Catholic university must come undone and
rebuild itself on this student-teacher relationship in order to regain its integrity, faith, and
morals to better influence Church relations and be an influential source of hope in
society. The student is embedded in all of these things from the beginning, but has an
intimate, special relationship to the teacher: the teacher has the strongest influence and
directs the affects of the student’s will.
The Student-Teacher Relationship
Maritain breaks up the student-teacher relationship into three sections. First, the
“dynamic,” or causal-interactal factors in the relationship. Second, the “basic
dispositions” to be cultivated in the student. Last, guidelines for the teacher in fostering
those dispositions.378
1. Plato, the Dynamic, and Personhood
Before broaching the student-teacher dynamic, one must first deal with Plato’s
Phaedo, wherein he argues that all knowledge exists in the soul, the soul having
contemplated the divine Forms before birth. Having a body, and therefore passions, one
is not freely able to contemplate the Forms at whim, but must encounter a teacher to re-
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awaken this knowledge within. The teacher, however, does not actually teach anything.
Rather, “the teacher only awakens the attention of the student to those things which he
already knows, so that to learn is nothing else than to remember.”379 And for those souls
that have never contemplated the Forms, the teacher then becomes a strict authoritative
figure whom the student must completely depend to have any sense of anything.
Instead, Maritain adopts Aristotle’s tabula rasa, the notion that the soul is a blank
slate at birth. In order to form the soul, the teacher must exert him/herself on the student
to cause transformation. “Teaching is an art; the teacher is an artist,” but not a sculptor
per se for the student is not “inanimate clay”.380 Rather, the teacher as an educator is like
a medical doctor practicing the art of medicine. As medicine deals with a living body and
a doctor “exert[ing] real causality in healing a sick man,” so education deals with a living
soul and teacher exerting a causality in healing a sickness of the soul.381 Maritain does
not elaborate on the nature of this sickness. Given his tendency for emphasizing freedom
and intellectual knowledge, one might reasonably believe it is the dual sickness of
enslavement (not thinking for oneself) and ignorance. And as a medical doctor assists
nature with attaining equilibrium by healing the body with natural remedies (e.g., herbs
and diet), the educator is a “minister” and education the “art of ministering, an art
subservient to nature.”382
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Unlike Plato who thought knowledge pre-existed in the soul, the soul has a “vital
and active principle of knowledge”.383 Knowledge is not ready-made, but readydiscovered by the “inner seeing power of intelligence”.384 Maritain never defines this
inner seeing power, suffice it to say one might call it the logos. Yet, the logos is also in
Plato’s epistemology, so it is difficult to say what Maritain means considering his strong
disagreement on the origin of knowledge. Given his later ideas in the text, what is
actually being educated is that mysterious “internal vital principle” which one might call
the mind or the soul, occasionally the intellect. Maritain overlaps Levinas here with the
rejection of Platonic/Socratic remembrance as knowledge. Knowledge is something
other and only comes to me from without, just as the Other comes to the I from outside
itself. Now the student-teacher dynamic can begin.
What matters to Maritain is “from the very start [the inner power] perceives
through sense-experience the primary notions on which all knowledge depends,” and can
then move forward “from what it already knows to what it does not yet know.”385
This aspect, this “inner vital principle,” of the student is what "the teacher must respect
above all”.386 The medical doctor’s imitation of nature in treating a patient now reflects
onto the teacher’s imitation of nature in one’s instruction. The teacher is meant to
propose ideas, both familiar and unfamiliar to the student’s mind, for his/her
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consideration. In the latter situation, the teacher is offering material to the student whose
“minds is perhaps not strong enough to establish” on its own. Hence Maritain’s
statement of moving forward from what the mind knows to what it does not. His point is
that the intellect, like the body, has a natural way of doing things. For the intellect, its
activity is growth in knowledge and experience (i.e., education), but it needs guidance
from a mature source. The teacher is that mature source necessary to this growth, albeit
secondary, propelling it upward to the heights of prudence. It happens in one of two
forms of education.
The classical education of punishment and strict rules damages a student’s inner
life. Of course, it paradoxically shapes some souls to be even more spontaneous in
seeking the truth because their inner rebel rebels against the injustice against it. All
things made docile, though, work to no end because it makes things too easy for the
student. There must be a friction between students and teachers. Not too light, not too
heavy.
Progressive education actually respects the integrity of the student. “Pestalozzi,
Rousseau, and Kant” all recognize that the “principal agent” of education is not the
teacher, but the “inner principle of activity, the inner dynamism of nature and of the
mind” of the student.387 Of course, progressive education in this vein is too rationalistic
and does not give way to the forces of life within, nor to the point that the teacher is “a
real cause and agent”.388 A secondary one, for the teacher cooperates with nature, being a
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“real giver whose own dynamism, moral authority, and positive guidance are
indispensable.”389 It is for this reason that the teacher is essential in any setting,
classroom or not. The teacher provides direction the student could not otherwise obtain,
especially as per using one's spontaneity.
Contemporary Catholic higher education tends to permit the student to follow one’s
own instincts on what one wants to learn and how one thinks about the presented issues
therein. I do not see anything in principle wrong with this approach. Each person has a
unique way of learning and things they are genuinely interested in. There needs to be
some leeway in how students ascertain certain issues if the Catholic university does not
want to be accused of “living in the dark ages” and similar rebuttals. But the trouble, as
with the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL), is the freedom goes too far. Students are almost
permitted to think anything they want at the behest of the teacher. My elaboration above
on the “independent student” coming out of LOL is an embodiment of this kind of excess
freedom. Of course, teachers process and challenge what students say, and it is here the
direction is provided. The issue is this freedom is encouraged—believe what you want so
long as you do no harm—by the broader culture, and the Catholic university does not
usually push back. Levinas would add that the student pushes back against what the
teacher offers in the exchange (discourse), but ultimately resolves the tension in working
towards community in a shared world. In this situation, the student exercises her
freedom.
389
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The freedom (spontaneity) of the student is not animalistic instinct. It is “the
spontaneity of a human and rational nature” without a pre-determined end save for where
reason directs it.390 The fragility of freedom is its misuse, and students are mostly
unaware of how best to use their reason and for which ends to aim. The student cannot
develop his/her own capacity for using freedom responsibly without the teacher’s aid.
That is to say, students without a teacher are left to their own instincts. They are no
better than animals foraging for food. For that reason, the student’s right to be educated
comes with the moral authority of the teacher—“the duty of the adult to the freedom of
the youth.”391
To really get at what Maritain means here one needs his distinction between
“person” and “individual,” which ordinary language confuses for the same thing.
“Personhood” refers to the spiritual existence in the soul of a human being and is the
aspect of oneself that directly relates to God. “Individuality” in Maritain’s Aristotelian
sense refers to the matter that makes up one’s body, thereby allowing for differentiation
between members of the same species. Maritain says that each of these is distinct
because they require different kinds of development. The personality is developed
through “mastery and independence of [one’s] spiritual self,” individuality developed
“toward the letting loose of the tendencies which are present in me by virtue of matter
and heredity.”392 It is easy to confuse the education of these. Because “personality
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means interiority to oneself” it grows larger the more reason and freedom overcome
passion and instinct.393 In contrast, individuality is the “material ego,” the aspect of
oneself that tends towards the irrational, the passions. When the ego becomes the center
of the universe, it is “in reality scattered among cheap desires or overwhelming
passions,” unfree to come and go as it pleases.394
Maritain reminds us that education is centered on the “development and liberation
of the individual person”.395 This emphasis is in direct contrast to those who would
falsely reduce education to the “freeing of the material ego,” what he calls the
“anarchical” conception of education.396 The problem with the latter freedom is that it
dispenses all necessary self-sacrifice, denial, and asceticism towards perfection, by which
Maritain means love. The more loving one is, the more fully human. Becoming human,
embodying one’s humanity, is a lifetime endeavor. Placing the material ahead of the
personal is to change students into animals, leaving them to the sway of their instincts.397
Then there are those educators who confuse personality and individuality thinking
they are separate. Unlike the anarchical conception of education, the despotic conception
is the opposite—it wishes to destroy the individual and make copies of one personality
for all, a kind of dictatorial control. The student is made into a product. Again, one sees
the totalitarian theme running through this work. Supposing nature, the principle on
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which education rests, is to be followed out, then all of education as an art (technē)
“consists in inspiring, schooling and pruning, teaching and enlightening” such that the
ego is de-centered and the personality’s “spiritual generosity” and ascent to higher things
—especially love—increases.398 Having explained how students and teachers are to
relate, Maritain now moves to discuss the dispositions to be cultivated in the student.
2. Student Dispositions
Knowing that the student is a creature of spirit and matter, to become human is to
become perfected “by knowledge and by love, and [being] capable of giving [one]self” to
another and to God.399 The freedom at root of the educational project is only
accomplished with a teacher who can instill discipline and knowledge. Coming out of
this spiritual nature, “the principal agent” of education, Maritain then lays out what he
sees to be the five essential dispositions for the student’s proper development.400 Like the
seven misconceptions of education above, these dispositions can be distorted and must be
carefully cultivated.401
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The first and second regard truth and justice. “The love of truth…is the primary
tendency of any intellectual nature.”402 By “intellectual nature,” Maritain does not mean
the intellectual vocation of the philosopher or theologian. Rather, human nature as
rational—humans are of the intellectual nature, like angels, and so have a preference for
truth over other animals. “Second, the love of good and justice, and even the love of
heroic feats, and this too is natural to the children of man [sic].”403 Maritain does not
elaborate; given his emphasis on moral education, it is understandable. Note that the love
of truth is primary and justice secondary, matching his preference for contemplation,
freedom, and self-perfection (all intellectual by nature) as the first goal of education, and
citizenship (justice) the secondary goal of education.
I must note that a synonym for the “face” in Levinas is “truth”. The Other is
“truth” to the effect that the Other makes possible knowledge.404 The Other is also
thought of as being “true” because I am in the service of the Other, just as Maritain sets
up the student-teacher relationship to be one of service (the teacher aiding the student
towards love and knowledge). Recall, too, the notion of justice as language for Levinas.
What I owe the Other is how and what I speak, and speech is part and parcel of being a
teacher speaking to students. The student-teacher relationship is thus characterized by
justice working in the background and in the foreground as one of the concrete goals of
education.
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Third, in regard to existence. What is the fundamental orientation of the student
towards his/her own existence? Maritain answers “simplicity and openness”.405 It is a
joyous, humble life whereby one accepts the “natural limitations of existence” and is
happy to be alive.406 The enemies of this openness are pride, egotism, and “unhappy
experiences” wherein one’s philosophy of life is colored by bad memories. Maritain
gives the example of a student “with a damaged ego, who was forced at least to wonder
why he was living” because of things that prevent him from letting things happen
(openness) and living without inhibitions (simplicity).407 Maritain clarifies these sorts of
inhibitions as inferiority complexes “bad beginnings in education” that seriously block
the full maturation of the student.408
Fourth, regarding work. After the fundamental stance towards existence, “the sense
of a job well done” occupies the student’s psychic life.409 One must not mistake Maritain
for suggesting a hard work ethic. That’s important. Rather, he is “speaking of something
deeper and more human, a respect for the job to be done, a feeling faithfulness and
responsibility regarding it.”410 A kind of obligation towards one’s work being done in an
excellent manner. It is not simply showing up and doing one’s job, but of caring enough
to put the right effort and craft into one’s work activities. Instead of writing a book report
405
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in a haphazard manner just to turn it in, writing a thoughtful analysis to benefit one’s own
mind and the reader is much more healthy and instills the satisfaction of good work.411 It
builds up the kind of discipline necessary at the beginning of this discussion. Last,
Maritain writes “the fifth fundamental disposition is the sense of cooperation, which is as
natural in us, and as thwarted too, as the tendency to social and political life.”412 He
gives no other explanation presumably as it summarizes his concerns about justice above.
Levinas also has social cooperation as the basis for social responsibility and politics.
Having explained the inner makeup of the student, Maritain now discusses the
appropriate behavior in the teacher.
3. Norms for the Teacher
Following the dispositions above, the student’s inner life will be freed to pursue its
own just ends. Thus, the first rule for the teacher is to free the student from his/her “bad
energies” in order to make use of “[one’s] own measures” for doing good.413 Bad
energies are things that frustrate one from obtaining a desired end. In other words, the
passions are at war with reason and virtue. The teacher must sift through these both to
reach the student’s natural talents, encourage their building up, and then release them
upon the world in the form of instruction and the creative production therefrom. It is
better to pursue and do good rather than only avoid evil because “the real art [technē] is
411
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to make the [student] heedful of his [sic] own resources and potentialities for the beauty
of well-doing.”414 Note again that Maritain emphasizes the practical, moral outcome of
education (any definition), not the intellectual.
The second rule is to awaken the spiritual within the student. “Spiritual” in
Maritain’s philosophy refers to the intellect and will. These are the “preconscious
spiritual dynamism” of the person.415 Something that is preconscious is something that is
hiding beneath consciousness, the aspect of the psyche beneath conscious activity.
Maritain does not use “subconscious” to avoid confusing the reader with Freud. Freud’s
subconscious is animalistic and irrational. It prefers “instincts, latent images, affective
impulses, and sensual tendencies” to the former things above.416 Instead of training man
to live from his vitality, his inner nature, psychoanalysis trains men to take seriously the
“wildness and automatism” that motivates brutes and beasts.417 In so doing, man
becomes one, but this way of life is—like the subconscious—beneath man’s dignity. He
was called to something higher. That something, in this part of the conversation, is the
intellect and the will.
The intellect and will are not, for Maritain, something one is immediately conscious
of during the day. I go about my life matter-of-factly and do not always have readymade
answers to questions. Underneath consciousness, the intellect is putting pieces of
414
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information together and the will is deciding what to do with it all. That is not to say one
is not in control of one’s actions, nor that intellect and will do only these things. Only
that these things happen without my awareness. Maritain is pointing out that this
dynamic relationship between consciousness, will, and intellect is the entrance to the soul
where “knowledge and poetry…love and truly human desires” lives.418 It is the teacher’s
job to tap into that spiritual center and elevate it to the student’s consciousness against the
technique of Freudian psychoanalysis.
The intellect and psychoanalysis involve exploring the depths of oneself, yet the
disorder of Freud’s psychology is that it makes the personal impersonal. The student is a
human being, not a mass of atoms and passions. There is personhood, there is
spirituality, a sensitive spirituality needing formed into a whole man or woman for the
sake of oneself and society. The best way to influence the student, Maritain says, is to
“[keep] personal contact with [him/her]” for it brings “the comforting assurance of being
in some way recognized by a human personal gaze, inexpressible either in concepts or
words.”419 That is to say, the student remains a person, not an object for merciless
violence.
Focusing on a training of the Freudian subconscious with techniques of
manipulation and suggestion would damage the student’s inner psyche. It would focus on
rote memorization of words, concepts, and methods rather than creativity, imagination,
and sheer love of learning. Again, the “preconscious of the spirit” and the liberation of its
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resources is what any pedagogy ought to do.420 Instead of “pressuring” the student to be
someone he/she is not via the implied specialization of Freudianism, the teacher ought
better to focus on the “aspirations of spiritual nature” in the student, the things the student
longs for and the logos within longing for expression.421
Although Maritain and Levinas take issue with the subconscious,422 control is the
main issue they have with it, not the existence of the subconscious itself. The
subconscious plays a role in virtually every human exchange, but it does
not control every exchange. Oftentimes the subconscious is activated when triggering
mental-emotional wounds, which surface in defense mechanisms. A teacher, for
example, whose methods are questioned by a colleague may lash out and project false
opinions about said colleague to defend oneself against “attack”. Really, no attack was
present, and it was an honest assessment given for the teacher’s benefit. When teaching,
the teacher may be reminded of said remarks and triggered all over again. The teacher
needs enough self-control to put his/her issues aside when dealing with students, not just
for the sake of one’s integrity, but because responsibility demands it. Recall the
discussion of asymmetry in chapter two. Even triggers can be ignored or suppressed in
this classroom example with use of the free will, and that is precisely the point: the
teacher, the I, is not the center of the educational universe, and my freedom to do as I
please is called into question. The dynamic between I and Other, student and teacher, is
420
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the center of the educational universe. I have a responsibility to “be there” for students
and the subconscious gets in the way, but it does not control my actions.
Nor are the best equipment, facilities, scholarship, and information relevant. What
matters is the “awakening of the inner resources and creativity”.423 Anyone can have a
fancy learning environment, but devoid of personality, it is meaningless. Teachers are the
ones caring for the souls of the student. They nurture the students’ inner impulses for the
questions and topics that concern them without prejudice. It is not the teacher’s job to
scold or isolate students for their interests. Rather, the interest tells the teacher something
about the student’s inner life. There are no wrong answers here. All avenues of thought
are acceptable because they liberate the mind. “What matters most in the life of reason is
intellectual insight or intuition.”424 “Intuition” is a complicated term for Maritain, suffice
it to say it means the mind’s ability to grasp and know it is grasping being. It is a
conscious awareness that I am grasping something intelligible.
It is an insight the teacher cannot teach, but what the teacher can do is focus his/her
energies on bringing out that intelligence buried within the preconscious spirit. The
student is grasping something about the world in his/her own way. But it needs
cultivation, like a field of crops, to properly sprout and bring forth fruit. Instead of rain
and sunshine, the teacher listens and coaxes the student to risk vulnerability “to those
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spontaneous poetic or noetic impulses” because these are the kinds of things one's peers
do not often support.425
Maritain emphasizes sense-perception here in the acquisition of knowledge and the
freeing of intuition. Once I pick up something in the world via my senses, my intellect
then does something mysterious—Maritain himself claims he knows not—to it through
“imagination and a kind of spiritual feeling” in order to grasp it.426 Students typically do
not understand what it is that is going on in the world, nor themselves, so liberating the
intuitive power is accustoming students to understanding both. An example is found in
literature. Students are not given random bits of facts and opinions. They are given a
text whereby they are required to engage the mind of another person. Memorization and
such will not help. They are literally picking something up in the text they are not fully
conscious of, but their spiritual unconscious is. Much like the world, this literary text is
also coming to them from the outside, and it offers problems they must deal with. It is
the job of the teacher for sorting through this mess and helping the students bring forth
what is growing inside them. Thus the third rule.
Maritain’s third rule for teachers is fostering the unity of mind, body, and spirit.427
Mind and spirit have been spoken of regularly up to this point. He emphasizes the body
now with reference to manual labor. Workshops are places where the body works so the
mind relaxes. Intelligence is not limited to the mind and spirit, “but in [one’s] fingers,
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too”.428 Man’s rationality and physical labor are congruent. One need not choose
between them.
Something peculiar about Maritain’s approach in adding physical labor is actually
part of a larger curriculum plan associated with Mortimer Adler and the Great Books
program. It would begin with students learning college material around fourteen with
those desiring master’s degrees obtaining them around twenty. Physical labor, really
handwork (e.g., carpentry), is added to distract the mind from intellectual things in a
healthy way by keeping it preoccupied in non-academic ways. These things are part of a
whole curriculum dedicated to educating the entire human person.
The plausibility of this aspect of the curriculum is untenable. For one, it is not
something students typically need as they find other ways to be active (e.g., club sports).
Second, the kinds of skills offered in such a class can be found all over the internet. Any
Google search will yield enough webpages for students to find what they are looking for.
Maritain had no way of knowing about the internet, but the point is still sound. Physical
labor is also not quite the kind of job college teachers do, and secondary school teachers
already offer such things in their specialities (e.g., home economics). University teachers
would be better to put their energy elsewhere. Nevertheless, the fullness of education
resides in engaging the body the same as mind and spirit, but “education and teaching
must start with experience”.429 It is this latter point Maritain underscores.
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Experience is the source of knowledge and “modern methods” in education are
wont to disregard rational impulses due to a despising of logic and concepts.430 Maritain
differentiates his philosophy of education because he embraces reason and abstraction,
the primary ways of reaching higher truths. Recalling the seven misconceptions for a
moment, all of those ideas were unbalanced in some way. Too much to the left or right.
Maritain’s point here is that you need both. The teacher must always start from
experience because reason, at least its ways, may be foreign to students coming to certain
material for the first time. They may not understand the workings of reason (e.g., logic),
but they do trust what their senses give them. We begin with experience and end with
reason, and “education must inspire eagerness for [both]”.431
What this unity ultimates means is the educational process needs to remember unity
is at its core. Unity of mind, body, and spirit results in the freedom Maritain argues is at
the core of education. It is the teacher’s job to encourage the student to bring these three
together so as to “overcom[e] the inner multiplicity of [one’s] drives”.432 Note the word
“multiplicity”. As humans, we have many desires, instincts, thoughts, passions, etc. that
compete in us for our assent. “Unity” implies “oneness,” so for Maritain when the three
aspects of man’s nature are united, there is no internal conflict. One is freed from
irrational tendencies and able to do what one pleases. It is an extremely difficult task
requiring “tears, sweat, and blood,” and the atomization of modern life, evidenced in our
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schools, does not help our students.433 Maritain uses modern science with its emphasis
on specialization as his example. Rather, one needs a solid epistemology to bring order
to one’s teaching, but more importantly a vision for how to help students obtain wisdom.
Wisdom is “above any field of specialization” because it is universal and speaks to
man’s heart his desires.434 A vision for leading students to wisdom is necessary for
education and teaching to work together with all their other constituent parts. Without it,
man is unfit to enter society as a prepped citizen. The liberal arts education Maritain is
arguing for is meant to prepare students for the real wisdom (prudentia) to be found in
adulthood, that is, with life experience. The preparation happens with “a universal and
articulate comprehension of human achievements in science and culture,” the kinds of
things a generally educated person ought to know.435 Once more, Maritain is not against
technical training in the workforce—he advocates for it in this section and elsewhere.436
What he is against is the notion that technical training is all there is or is the highest kind
of training in education for life or school. To say that is to completely ignore the very
core of human nature and never be freed enough to take one’s place in society because
one never learned how to think.

433

Maritain, 47.

434

Maritain, 48.

435

Maritain, Crossroads, 48.

436

“Whatever [one’s] particular vocation may be, and whatever special training his vocation may requires,
every human being is entitled to receive such a properly human and humanistic education” in “Thomist
Views on Education,” in The Education of Man: The Educational Philosophy of Jacques Maritain Edited,
with an Introduction, by Donald and Idella Gallagher, ed. Donald A. Gallagher and Idella J. Gallagher
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976), 69.

156
The fourth rule is perhaps the most straightforward given the previous rules’ layout.
It states that teaching ought result in the pupil’s “mastery of reason over the things
learned”.437 In other words, mastery of material by assimilating it into one’s soul. “What
is learned should never passively or mechanically received, as dead information which
weight down and dulls the mind.”438 Learning is active, learning is dynamic between
student and teacher. The teacher presents ideas for the student to consider, and the
student grapples with it for his/her own benefit. Teachers need be aware that they do not
lead students into a pit without giving them a shovel: “…to raise clever doubts, to prefer
searching to finding, and to pose problems without ever solving them are the great
enemies of education.”439 Students do not have the wherewithal to escape from
metaphysical knots without the proper knowledge, and the teacher’s job is to provide
them paths to answers so they can find them on their own accord, essentially “digging”
their own way out. This liberation of the mind is more about building up one’s mental
powers than any kind of trained specialization.
What matters most is what one is building up. Liberal education, the freeing of the
mind, is less about possessing knowledge and more about “the development of the
strength, skill, and accuracy of man’s mental powers.”440 In order to build that power up,
the material one uses matters, namely, “those things which are the richest in truth and
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intelligibility.”441 The latest fad philosophy text will not do. It requires something that
has made a profound impact on the human race. Maritain compares material that
provides “knowledge-value” discussed here now and “training-value” for the mind.442
Training-value is more about rhetoric, holding conversations (think small talk), and
knowing various facts and opinions. “Information” about the world. It prefers a mind
that is “quick, clever, ready to see pros and cons, eager to discuss, and to discuss
anything…regardless of what is thought about, what is discussed, and how important the
matter is.”443 Maritain is not attacking people who possess such things. Certainly the
more one reads the more readily one might understand where a discussion is going.
Rather, Maritain is thinking of shallow-mindedness here. It is the “talkativeness” of
such people he abhors because there is not any real knowledge attached to their words,
just empty syllables. These people cannot hold a conversation to save their lives because
their education has not prepared them in things of “inner value,” only things useful to
their professions.444 They are dilettantes.
It is a shame that many a modern professor falls into this category. More often than
not professional interaction, while courteous, is vapid and lifeless. People hold their true
thoughts back so as not to offend or “push too hard” and the conversation dies from lack
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of interest. Honesty is not appreciated at the expense of political correctness. Whatever
is worthy of discussion is avoided because it might make someone uncomfortable. These
attitudes are the opposite of knowledge-value and only further attest to the dropping rate
of literacy even among undergraduates. Maritain quotes Yale University president,
Robert Hutchins, as saying “our university graduates have far more information and far
less understanding than in the colonial period.”445 Whether that is true or not is not the
point. Hutchins’s words ring true to the spirit of his times and ours, that is, students are
not grasping material the way they ought. They only memorize what they need to pass
exams, get grades, and get on with their lives. There is hardly any consideration for the
inner life or the life hereafter. What matters is the fragmented interaction is now ordered
and random learning is put into a coherent system with enough openness for variation in
teaching method, lesson prep, and student creativity. For example, students do not
necessarily know what is expected of them, nor do teachers always inform. Maritain lays
out what is required of each party so they converse without pedagogical interruption.
Teachers get caught up in institutional expectations (e.g., fulfilling outcome
requirements) forgetting they are there to “heal” their students of what pedagogically ails
them. With these in mind, Catholic higher education today implicitly assumes teachers
will “do their jobs,” but not necessarily serve students in their vocations because of the
increase in research. It is, however, a calling to serve students in the manner above. Not
anyone can do it. Anyone could teach a theory of justice and truth, it is quite another
embody it. Here, teachers go a step further than the average citizen as moral exemplars, a
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description found in Ex Corde Ecclesiae, where students are learners of more than just
material: they are learners of lifestyle.
To summarize, Maritain’s first rule is freedom for the student via use of one’s
insights for doing good. The second rule is to awaken the intuitive, spiritual powers
(reason and the will) within. The third rule is promotion of unity between mind, body,
and spirit and the teacher’s vision for wisdom. The fourth rule is the mastery of material
through reason. With these dispositions and rules in mind, I will now explain several
more key features of Maritain’s philosophy of education before moving onto his vision of
the university.
Thomistic Principles and Education in the Humanities
Maritain’s Thomist Views on Education was written for the National Society for the
Study of Education, and his Education and the Humanities446 for the centenary lecture of
St. Michael’s College in Toronto. Their inclusion is to further clarify his views on
progressive education, student-teacher relationships, and “the implied hierarchy of
values” present in education to make the succeeding chapters clearer.447
Values matter to Maritain because they give order to the inner universe of man.
Charity is the highest of all virtue (moral action) because it “love[s] God and embraces
all men [sic],”448 and wisdom is the highest of all theory because it “knows things eternal
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and creates order and unity in the mind.”449 Maritain has a notion called “infravalent
goods”. These are things which we are allowed (in Maritain’s Thomism) to pursue as
ends-in-themselves because they help us attain higher, or “supravalent” goods. For
example, artists are permitted to pursue paints and paintings because they are necessary
for them on the way to transcendent truth, say, exemplified in an icon or holy work of art.
The painting is an end in itself for a higher end, a lower good for a higher good.
Applying the same notion to contemplation, a key notion for education at all levels,
Maritain distinguishes between pagan and Christian love. Aristotle’s contemplation is
“purely intellectual and theoretical” according to Maritain, but Christian contemplation
“superabounds in action” because it is founded on charity.450
The value of contemplation in education is that it inspires action. The education
process, for Maritain, is structured such that I move from lower things to higher things,
more base things to more complex ones. He overlaps with progressive educators like
John Dewey on this point, for he does not reject pragmatic approaches to education, but
pragmatism itself (especially scientism) rejecting metaphysics.451 Moving towards higher
things—that is, greater forms of knowledge (philosophy, etc.)—inspires deeper forms of
contemplation, resulting in greater deeds for the good of society.452 Contemplation
inspires action, but it is a contemplation rooted in “God and the deepest realities in man
449
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and the world,” not a random set of “highly developed and specialized, but chaotic,
instruction.”453 And so the action is rooted in love and not, say, political gain. The mark
of contemplation and the best educational process, according to Maritain, encourages
contemplation in the sense of “both critical activity and a kind of thirst and anguish
whose reward will be the very joy of perceiving truth,”454 but that joy only comes about
in the student-teacher relationship, hence Maritain’s elaboration.
The notion that students ought to be co-creators with their professors in the
classroom, as per the Kinshasa Statement’s recommendation, is crucial to the unfolding
of contemplation. Contemplation is not something done solely on one’s own but as part
of an academic, intellectual community. Even scientists need lab assistants, and
philosophers need interlocutors. I do not suspect these notions are absent in other
philosophies of education, but what makes it special is it leads to citizens who are more
capable of heroic acts. When motivated by love, the human soul expands. It is no longer
focused on the egoistic concerns of a Heideggerian self or the intentionality of Husserlian
consciousness, nor is it worried about appearing lofty to one’s peers in research. Instead,
the soul (the student) wants or is more inclined to serve and the student is first motivated
through the encounter with the teacher.
Teachers respect their students first with love, the genuine care for their well-being
and highest good. Second, with authority, by which Maritain means “not arbitrary
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power” (do as I say!), but “intellectual authority to teach and moral authority to be
respected and listen to.”455 The relationship is such that students recognize the right of
the teacher to speak and be heard concerning the necessary communication of
knowledge, and the teacher recognizes the right of the student to question such lessons
for the higher good of knowing truth. Like Socrates, the teacher does not have the final,
ultimate say, but defers to God and all goodness. The learning process is more of a
journey on rocky ground than a train ride through the countryside: the teacher is
acknowledged as the expert leader, but students find things not even the teacher knows.
It is here that teaching has for itself the most general of purposes in “teaching how
to think,” which ultimately means contemplation.456 Maritain relates that thinking to the
concept of good citizenship in preparing the way for democracy. It is in democracy that
thinking for oneself is encouraged as an expression of the free world and man’s freedom
in the cosmos. Institutionally, only with a proper upbringing in the classroom can
students see the value of contemplation in relation to the outside world: education is
neither “a stronghold of the established order nor…a weapon to change society.”457 The
point of contemplation leading to knowledge is vetera novis augere, or, expanding the old
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by means of the new.458 Education is not a quest to destroy, except perhaps ignorance,
but to grow and nurture seeking truth in all ways. Most necessary, however, is the
teachers’ oneness of mind, by which Maritain means mastery of knowledge. Teachers are
no more effective when they do not know what they are speaking of than when they are
unprepared for a lesson. How can one expect an orderly soul in the students when not in
the teachers? Granted, these specific issues warrant more individual speculation than I
can give here, and even the best teachers have days where lessons are winged than
carefully planned. Maritain’s point is that the universe is orderly, knowledge is orderly,
and the soul is to mirror them, but it can only begin the process with a guide who also has
some semblance of inner unity.459 He admits this process would be easier were
departments to have more interdisciplinary ventures, but that the current educational
institution makes it impossible. “[Teachers are] faced with overburdened schedules and a
much too heavy number of teaching hours…It is preposterous to ask people who lead an
enslaved life to perform a task of liberation, which the educational task is by essence.”460
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But as Maritain has said before, education is a lifetime endeavor. Schooling “is
only a partial and inchoate agency with respect to this task.”461 That does not mean one
ought forego it. The humanities are a major institutional means by which students
become more human because they incorporate non-technical (non-training) knowledge.
Students are not reduced to their utility. They are respected as beings who are able to
know things “which are are worth being known for their own sake,” Maritain citing truth
and beauty.462 Such things shaped Western civilization.463 Paradoxically, it is not the
material itself that shapes one’s humanity,464 but the process one moves through because
of it. Maritain has his own curriculum,465 and the content does matter (e.g., classics over
a contemporary bestseller list), but what matters more is how it is utilized. It is better to
read, for instance, one of Dante’s cantos with precision rather than all of Paradiso for the
sake saying one read Dante. One canto, or a series of them, can contain more wisdom (or
potential) than a great deal of skimming and summarizing one might encounter in another
pedagogical approach.
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One still needs the material, however, as the process cannot take place without it.
The schooling-educational process shapes the student, but it is the material that initiates
and shapes the student. Course material can just as easily be used for propaganda as it
can for character formation, technical training as for training in citizenship. The student
cannot become part of something without some kind of handy guide. The thing about
liberal arts education is the guide, aside from the teacher, is the content of the
coursework. What I teach my students is going to influence them down certain paths
directly or indirectly, or maybe not at all, but the material is now lodged in the
subconscious. I am not in charge of how students interpret material insofar as I cannot
control their freedom, but I do use the material to point out to them certain facts and
figures about the world, God, and their relationship to both. The process matters, but I
think the material matters as much. It is dangerous business choosing texts—the soul
depends on it.
It is used to be that liberal education was to prepare young upperclass people for
State rule. Now it is preparation for life. Democratic societies permit more
socioeconomic inclusion than ever before, and Maritain has no problem with that466
because it represents the superiority of the free world over against tyranny. “[Liberal
education] must henceforth be made available to all…in the very measure in which
democratic civilization is to survive.”467 This survival can only come about when its
citizens have the opportunity to thrive, and thriving comes about when people reach the
466
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core of their humanity (love and truth) in studying humanistic texts. The promotion of
humanism is the promotion of democracy, for Maritain, hence citizenship being the most
important secondary aim of liberal education. Citizenship is undermined by two
opposite, yet equally bad treatments of its young people.
First, the university student is crammed with the “entire universe of knowledge
which no individual adult can master.”468 Slowly, students absorb small bits of
information over time without any connection to anything else. Maritain calls it
“encyclopedic inculcation”.469 Students are neither masters of any material, nor of
themselves. They are a “reduced simulacrum,” a copy of something else and not a
person.470 The consequence is over-development, and thus a kind of indoctrination
ensues.
There is, however, a tension in this mistreatment. While liberal arts education
points out it is better to, for example, study one canto of Dante in-depth than studying all
of his corpus or even a single book with shallow appreciation, there is a sense in which
the entire universe of knowledge is desirable. It comes out in curriculums like the Great
Books program of which Maritain was an advocate. These kinds of study programs are
meant to expose students to as much of the human race’s contributions to knowledge as
possible. The only reasonable way to get through it all is to cram. Only a special kind of
student, however, can keep up with the pace because the material, while deep, is also
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covered at a fast rate. So, to argue that it is good for all people to be educated in this way
is to assume they can follow Dante on fast forward. It may be that students are simply
ill-equipped to handle college, but universities admit them anyway because they need
tuition money to remain open. These issues are related to my dissertation, albeit I am not
at liberty to comment. I am pointing out liberal arts education schools need to take into
consideration how they expect students and teachers to interact with these concerns in
mind.
Second, the student is thought to be wholly other from the adult, and so is treated as
a delicate flower incapable of wrestling with difficult matters. Stimulation, not
instruction, is preferred to active engagement, much like Montessorian pedagogy.471
Maritain calls it “nursery accommodation”.472 Teachers and students do not exchange
ideas, but converse in a manner consistent with an Epicurean salon (“oh, how
delightful!”) without any confrontation. The mind is never formed, and the student is
merely a mockery of a person.473 The consequence is sheer absence of character, and
thus education never really begins, personal or professional.
Liberal education is not made for specialists because not all students move on to
upper level scholarship. Most students will learn the basics and take their place in society
like an ordinary person with strengthened natural intelligence courtesy of the intellectual
virtues, the qualities of character that allow one to think for oneself. Their formation
471
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begins in institutional learning, but the application happens over one’s life. Enjoyment of
“truth or beauty through the natural powers” is the goal of the formed citizen, and this
enjoyment comes about through mastery of the material. The student is the “principal
agent in the educational process” because the student is the one learning, and without
proper instruction, the student would lead oneself astray of truth.474 Students would trip
over themselves unable to differentiate between passion and reason, unable to think a
coherent thought, “a pre-required condition...for genuine citizenship” in any free state.475
Education teaches one how to think, and main problem with contemporary democratic
education is sociologism (the fourth misconception), the notion that students are sensory
beings who respond to stimuli and drives. It treats man like homo economus, a notion I
will discuss in the succeeding chapter, a being who is made for production.
Labor is not the summation of human existence. It is a necessary component
because it aids man in pursuit of perfection, but it is not his ultimate end. Leisure is the
main activity by which man “can be within himself and listen to God within himself.”476
It is the freedom to pursue one’s own personal interests that expand the mind and its
powers. With the onset of workaholism, leisure has significantly decreased. I will take
that topic up in chapter five, but for now I will simply note Maritain’s conclusion that
“human wisdom is in jeopardy if it does not tend to a higher wisdom, that God gives in
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love, and which alone can truly set man free.”477 With wisdom in mind, I will turn to the
final portion of this chapter, Maritain’s ideal university.
Maritain on the Ideal University
University (college) education differs from high school in that it offers
specialization and a concrete hierarchy of courses from the lowest in “spiritual
universality” to the highest.478 Maritain gives us a sketch of his curriculum in what he
calls “orders”. The first order is “the realm of useful arts and applied sciences” (e.g.,
engineering, commerce), the second order “practical science” by which he means those
which require art (technē) or ethics (e.g., law, medicine).479 These courses and fields are
at the bottom because they contain the least universality to the human race. Not everyone
can be a lawyer, engineer, or medical doctor, but they must be included in the curriculum
because they are still part of the collective body of human knowledge. They are apt to
make the most money, yet “everything would be warped if the aim, incentive, and
dominating concern of the teaching were directed towards success in the experiences of
life and in money-making.”480 The university does not revolve around training for wealth
or income. Rather, it revolves around the goals of the third and fourth orders.
The third order, “the realm of the speculative sciences and fine arts,” is essentially
the liberal arts.481 It details all of the knowledge we have of man and his achievements in
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human history. Fields like psychology, language, mathematics, et al. These, Maritain
says, are “the very core of the life of the university and the very treasure of the civilized
heritage.”482 They prepare us immediately for the final order, that of philosophy.
Maritain emphasizes that this order is the highest because it contains the most universal
knowledge, namely, all the fields of philosophy (metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy,
etc.). As a result, it is “the highest animating center in the architecture of teaching”
because without it none of the other fields are possible.483
For teaching, he thinks of these orders as “cities” (polis), miniature communities
that serve the larger “State” of the university. The first order concerns itself with
“practical domination and utilization of matter”.484 The second order the “maintenance
and improvement” of human life.485 The third order “pure knowledge concerned with the
intellectual ends of human life.”486 The final order with “intellectual ends of human life
which are reached by grasping the trans-sensible realm of Being, Spirit, and Divine
Reality, and the ethical realm of the aims conditions, and rational ordering of human
freedom and conduct.”487
Maritain continues his philosophy of the curriculum asking how can students
actually acquire the intellectual virtues of their specific fields. Essentially, he answers
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that each of the cities have to work together to support each other’s goals. All fields aim
for knowledge of some kind, and all fields need some consideration of ethics for proper
action. Without either, they lack integrity. His solution is core classes, albeit he does not
say that outright. Rather, he has in mind putting together specific committees of
professors in each city to help students recognize connections between their own course
of study (specialization) with the universal fields.
Interestingly, Maritain does not think theology courses are mandatory because one
cannot force religion on another. Theology ought to be in the university, however,
because it is a science, and no university worth its name would exclude theology on this
basis.488 Maritain is, of course, referring to secular universities, but even religious
universities ought to instill religious teaching “distinct from the one given in religious
seminaries, and be adapted to the intellectual needs of laymen,” the position advocated by
Fr. Phelan noted in chapter one.489
Teaching is the core of the university for Maritain, contrary to modern educational
philosophy’s belief that it is research. “In the nature of things, the object of universities is
the teaching of youth and not producing books and articles and endless contributions, or
making some scientific, philosophical, or artistic discovery.”490 Research belongs in
separate institutes, similar to think tanks without political agendas. It cannot be entirely
488
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avoided. Professors produce original thoughts in their lectures and conversations with
students and peers, but that is not the core of their vocation. Forming souls is the call of
the university professor. Writing articles and books is a wonderful thing; its impact on
the student body is felt when students cannot receive the complete attention they need to
master material. State universities today encourage professors to phone-in their teaching
in favor of research articles, articles which will receive probably less than a handful of
glances. Teachers are already taxed from other avenues (faculty committees, etc.), and
research adds an unnecessary dimension to their work, for the student’s soul is molded or
destroyed by the (in)attentive professor. Because the teacher’s task is to first care for the
student’s learning, and therefore the inner life, universities must respect the dignity of the
human person, both faculty and student. Their bodily and intellectual health depends on
it, but universities cannot provide everything for the person.
To provide growth in the spiritual life, the religious life here, Maritain advocates
for “centers of spiritual enlightenment, or schools of wisdom,” where in laity may attend
retreats and seek spiritual refreshment.491 Masters of various Catholic schools of
spirituality (e.g., Jesuits) would provide rest and instruction in spiritual matters. Maritain
thinks these places complement research institutes. He does not say how, nor whether
they are or should be connected with any universities, but one can see that these centers
focus on one’s relationship with God and research institutes intellectual labor, which like
anything, can wear the soul down.
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With the brief consideration of spiritual centers, Maritain concludes his thoughts
on the university and liberal arts education. His concern through this ordeal of laying out
the whole of education is “the needs, exigencies, and rights of youth.”492 Young people
need the utmost care of their souls in navigating a complex and uncertain future. The
teacher is that care, but can only serve students when university structure supports it.
Maritain noted that students “appear close to the goodness of nature as [Jean-Jacques]
Rousseau dreamed of it.”493 Quite a feat to overcome, for supposing Rousseau is correct
(people are good by nature but corrupted by society), education would have the task of
(re)edifying the goodness of the human spirit. It is what Maritain argued all along. I will
now argue such a task as per the student-teacher relationship.
Such argumentation has not been done before. Levinas has not been brought to
bear on any conversation concerning the Catholic university. St. John Paul II and
Maritain are used constantly in the battle for liberal arts, but not in this way to this extent.
I am essentially arguing through them that a relationship makes the university possible,
albeit a specific dynamic in the student-teacher relationship. When university
stakeholders (administrations and boards of trustees) do not respect this dynamic, the
university begins to whither from the inside out. It must be reformulated. Here, I bring
together all the elements in this dissertation into a coherent line of thought arguing for a
new approach to the Catholic university, making use of older wisdom by means of the
new.
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V. THE STUDENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP IN THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY

Both thinkers have a pre-cognitive approach to human depths: Maritain with the
spiritual preconscious, Levinas with the affective turn. Each converge on human
responsibility for the Other with emphasis on the student-teacher relationship. Levinas’s
epistemology, for instance, is bound with his ethics. The Other and our relationship
makes all knowledge possible. Consider the science professor illuminating the students’
intellects with knowledge of chemical interaction. They only know of such things
because of the professor’s presenting it to them. For this reason, Levinas does not have
an explicit epistemology because he thinks it is already bound up with the Other. Even
then, Levinas does not deny that being (ontology) is a thing, only that it is secondary in
importance to the ethical relation. Levinas points out something about humanity beyond
mere data and words on a page, something mission statements cannot quite capture in the
face of the Other. Maritain, paradoxically, has the same notion, except he finds it in a
Thomistic metaphysic that allows for Levinas’s infinity in what he calls dignity—being
made in God’s image and likeness. In essence, Levinas provides the groundwork for
relationship (ethics), most basically as self-Other between any two people, yet in Maritain
it is the concrete application of this ethic in the university via students and teachers.
Their philosophies of religion understandably have their differences. Levinas’s
orthodox Judaism remits anything of the mysteries of Christianity, whilst Maritain’s
Catholicism builds off Judaism’s textual traditions. Whereas Levinas’s philosophy is
open to God in the self-Other relationship (God is between us in the response), Maritain’s
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educational philosophy is moving towards knowledge of God outright. The response to
the Other and the response to the course material are both free choices, that is, spiritual
acts. One is not encumbered by external force in choosing how or whether to respond.
Both philosophers are moving in the same direction of spiritual responsibility for the
Other, oneself, and the third party. These notions are embedded in their respective
religious philosophies, and so cannot be ignored.
Part of what it means for a university to be Catholic is to adopt the Church’s
philosophical anthropology, that is, what it means to be human. As I have argued
throughout this dissertation, to be a human being is to have dignity. This dignity
presupposes a certain ethical relationship which manifests in Levinas’s philosophy and
takes form in Maritain’s philosophy of education. The ethical relationship consists of a
self and a singular human Other having an encounter wherein each other’s needs and
desires are simultaneously recognized and responded to. This same ethical relationship
founds all others, including institutional ones, because it is from this one-on-one
relationship that any relationship is possible. For example, the student and the teacher are
only known as such because of the institution of the university, and the university only
exists because of the simpler self-Other relationship. A would-be learner without a
teacher is just a would-be learner, and a teacher without a student is a guild master.
Granted, Levinas and Maritain are correct to say we are all “students and teachers” of
each other in life, for instance, the elderly woman teaching the businessman something as
they cross the street in chapter two. When the Catholic university goes astray of this base
self-Other relationship, more specific ones are necessarily affected because when the self
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is abused, the Other is abused, and their relationship is abused. There is no dignity to be
found here except in research and power, the wounding mentioned in chapter three.
Thus, the necessity of restoring the Catholic university to its philosophical-relational
roots.
The modern Catholic university has an egocentric orientation much like
Heidegger’s ontology. Dasein is oriented towards itself and only when threatened does it
appeal to the Other for its survival. A similar move is made in Catholic higher education.
The appeal to service may be a genuine desire to help others, but it is often for the
notoriety of the school—competing for more volunteer hours to appear more marketable,
turning charity into profit. Nowhere greater is this attitude found than in the business
model of the university which contains a Heideggerian spirit. I am not arguing there is an
explicit Heideggerian influence in university life, rather, that the Heideggerian spirit of
the self pervades the university structure in its “intentionalities” about its own existence,
which I will discuss as this chapter progresses. In order to address the proposed remedies
for the Catholic university at the end of this chapter, I want to explain how Husserl and
Heidegger fit into this larger conversation about Catholic higher education, not just as
preludes to Levinas, via an analogy.
The collective mentality of the Catholic university is its consciousness.
Consciousness is directed towards objects, intentionality. The Catholic university’s
“intentionality” is what it is about, or what it is directed towards, which makes the
university’s “life” meaningful. Like anyone, the university has ends and ideas and
personality. How it constitutes itself is part of its uniqueness, but like a person mirroring
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humanity, a university is still a learning institution. Yet, institutions also have identities.
Much like someone who loses her identity (or aspects of it), the Catholic university loses
its identity when it loses certain intentional states, rather, certain kinds of intentional
states. The debate in the first chapter about the concrete direction of the curriculum
(Augustinian/Thomistic) reflects such intentional states: should the Catholic university
be directed towards character formation, academic success, or something different? It
mirrors an individual person’s consciousness in shifting her life focus from one vocation
to another.
Moving ahead to Vatican II and the student crisis in demanding more material than
(neo) Thomism, when the Catholic university focuses on non-faith based or non-faith
inspired outcomes it “swings and misses” its ultimate goals, in a manner of speaking,
much like the baseball player example in chapter one. The “sight” the university sets its
“eyes” on is towards an end not Catholic in nature, thus understanding itself as friends of
secular universities because they seek the same things: power, prestige, and pleasure,
which I will elaborate on later. The Catholic university’s “sight” is adequate to its
intentional objects because its interaction with the world has prompted a radical shift in
its self-image, hence its lost identity. Just as Heidegger picks up Husserl’s notion of
phenomenology and builds on it, so does Fr. Hesburgh pick up the times, the spirit of the
Church in Vatican II, and the status of American Catholic higher education to transform it
into something else. Heidegger’s main thrust, again, is generating personal meaning for
oneself through projects, the same notion Hesburgh expresses when he says the student
and teacher are autonomous entities free to make up their own minds about things
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concerning Church faith, morals, and values. I can apply this Heideggerian mentality to
the Catholic university.
The American Catholic university becomes aware of itself as a potentially
autonomous agent in the world against all authority (Dasein) to actualize its goals as
concerns its concrete existence (care), much like the single individual actualizing his/her
goals. In breaking free from authority, as in the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL), the
Catholic university—because of its separation from the Vatican—becomes aware of the
possibility of its own non-existence (anxiety) through the possibility of bad choices (e.g.,
finances). There’s a self-consciousness about itself that the Catholic university “knows”
it can cease to exist because, like a human life, it is finite. Instead of waiting for things to
happen, the Catholic university opens itself to new possibilities in its freedom
(projection) and finds things meaningful when interacting with new “friends” in secular
schools and State resources (understanding). Still, the Catholic university knows it is put
into a world not of its choosing (thrownness)—it did not choose to be in America at that
specific time in its special circumstances of the revolutionary 1960s. It was able,
however, to receive the things it needed for its use (disposedness) such as donors for
endowments. Here, the American Catholic university thought it was discovering its
authentic self in “doing what it had wanted,” no longer disconnected from its true self
(fallenness) in autonomy. The “Old World” mentality of the traditional Catholic Church
in Pope Leo XIII had “caused” the Catholic university to lose its identity before it even
realized what that identity was, and the reason for this loss was it misunderstood how to
receive the world (mood) in the projects which allow the university to inhabit the world
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in a meaningful way (totalities). In other words, the post-Vatican II openness of the
Church is what Fr. Hesburgh, et al., had wanted for their schools all along because of the
freedom it permitted its scholars to adopt in their studies and teaching. It also allowed,
officially, schools to pursue things other than strictly character-driven ends, like social
justice. Consider the Augustinian/Thomistic debate in the first chapter.
The Augustinian-Bonaventurian model is predicated on character and faith
formation as it accords with a pastoral understanding of theology. Students are shaped as
a potter molds clay in instructing on how to best live as Christians. It fits the model of a
traditional liberal arts education with the student being an apprentice and the teacher an
exemplar. The Thomistic model, however, pushes systematic knowledge of theology
understood as an academic discipline. The student is an apprentice of a kind, but more in
the lines of a worker. The teacher is a master from whom the student learns a
professional technique.494 This latter approach is more akin to Heidegger/Hesburgh
because it turns the world and the university into something for which I can succumb to
my will, similar to the spoils of war.495 Recalling Levinas’s distinction between literal
war and ideological war, I also apply it to American Catholic higher education. After
Vatican II, in the wake of LOL, there is a “war” over how much and to what extent
orthodoxy or liberalism has priority. It takes the shape of pluralism and restorationism as
established near the end of chapter one.
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Having explained the philosophical relationship between phenomenology and the
history of American Catholic higher education, I will now explain these positions. Then,
as promised in chapter one, I will offer a new approach between restorationism and
pluralism called “neo-restorationism” to give shape to the kind of university I am
proposing an argument.
Restorationism and Pluralism
Peninsulas are strips of land jutting out into open water with a thin piece of land
connecting it to the rest of the continent. The Catholic university is treated as such by
restorationists. It “juts” out into the water to send off its ships (people) to go to all
corners of the world affecting it, for example, with its research and robust teaching. They
make exchanges of scholars and graduate students who promote their ideas. Numerous
citizens may also well come from all over to heed a university’s mission and message,
and to that end, restorationists understand the relationship of the university to the Church
as an evangelizing agent. Evangelization is the spreading of the gospel message.
Universities have great potential to influence society with the Christian message, they
need only restore their ties to the Vatican as a branch of the Church, not remain a separate
entity. This restoration provides better access the Catholic intellectual tradition and
humanities, which in turn motivates society to change its ways with a good example. For
Maritain, the change happens in active citizenship, and in this way, restorationism is a
call to a kind of orthodox Catholicism.
Numerous campuses today (Franciscan University of Steubenville, Christendom
College, Aquinas College, et al.) have an Old World feel to them in their loyalty to
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Church teaching. I am not in any way arguing against Church teaching, but these schools
have a kind of “unquestioned excellence” feel to them. One feels like there is only a
single “Catholic” way to do everything, and in a sense there is to the extent Catholic
theology covers all of creation. For example, one could have a “Catholic candy bar”
when arguing about the “being” of the candy ultimately coming from God, but that’s
hardly necessary. What is necessary, among other things, is whether there is not a
Catholic way of teaching or researching. Restorationism ultimately says “yes,” arguing
the Church, having access to the fount and fullness of truth in Jesus Christ, supplements
all inquiry in uniting all fields under faith and reason.496
Teaching would have a “Catholic” feel to it when that teaching comes from the
spirit, the mood or motivation behind it. The “spirit” of what is being taught is just as
important as the content. For example, a secular humanist teaching chemistry is not
necessarily the same as a Roman Catholic teaching chemistry. One would argue
chemicals are here to give us life, or take it, and the other would argue chemicals
combine to give us life because a loving God created it so. Same content, different
teacher and different spirit. In this way, there can be a “Catholic chemistry,” and so
anything could presumably be classified, rather “restored,” as “Catholic”.
On this note, the number of subjects in restorationism is markedly broad, albeit an
emphasis on the humanities. A classical liberal arts curriculum is preferred because of its
universal appeal (subjects which apply to all people) and cultural tradition. Teachers are
taught to be available to students as much as possible, no matter their academic situation.
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In this way, they embody the exemplar status of the teacher as one whom to imitate in
service towards others. But more importantly, from a pedagogical standpoint, teachers
teach from the Catholic intellectual tradition, the collection of texts by and about Catholic
philosophy, theology, and all fields. Teaching serves to inculcate the intellectual tradition
in its students, who then carry it on to the world and their own families. Still,
restorationism has its weaknesses. For what’s been said about its value, there is an
opposing standpoint in pluralism.
If restorationism is a peninsula jutting into the ocean, pluralism is a peninsula
whose land has been flooded over by said ocean creating an island. The island has ships
(people) going out into the world, but also the mainland (the Church) as though the
mainland were foreign to it. Pluralism is the idea that the Catholic university ought to
dialogue with the world in such a way that the world is welcomed into the university with
all its cultures, ideas, and ways. The Catholic university for pluralism is a kind of
playground where Catholicism is bounced around as a guiding idea, yet open to other
traditions’ inputs. I say “guiding idea” because, unlike restorationism, the Catholic
university is not an evangelizing agent for pluralism. Rather, it is an opportunity to be
part of the world stage with the research grants, prestige, and power amongst other
universities. Students may come from all over the world, not to hear the message or
receive the mission, but to partake in something worthwhile for gaining experience and
employment. Pluralism fully embraces the laicization of Catholic schools laid out in
chapter one, citing it is necessary for schools’ survival to have laity in charge of budgets.
Accordingly, it also embraces the secularization of schools with the idea that “open
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borders” (island example) are the future in the globalized world. Pluralists hold the
university is for research and topping rankings lists. Citizenship is understood as being
tolerant, “globally minded,” and generally engaging with ideas not one’s own for the
purposes of assimilation of other (non-Catholic) cultural values. The Catholic university
ought to be “pluralized” in order to adapt to society. In this way, the Catholic university
becomes one university among many because its mission is identical to that of secular
schools.
Many Catholic campuses now (Creighton University, Duquesne University, et al.)
have a “modern” feel to them. Not just the technology which all schools have, but the
architecture, art, and “presence” of the campus. There is almost a kind of trendy feel to
it, a doing of what (other?) top-ranked schools are doing to fit in like the new kid on the
playground. One does not sense Catholicism, apart from maybe the campus chapel. It is
not so much a situation of “nothing is sacred,” as it is “where is the sacred?” The kind of
“openness” to which pluralism subscribes makes it seem like there is nothing Catholic
about anything except one’s personal faith. The question of whether there are Catholic
teaching methods and research is left up to each Order to decide for themselves. To
universally assert a Catholic appreciation or approach to either, including things like art,
would undermine the kind of open-mindedness pluralism embraces.
For pluralism, teaching only has a Catholic flavor insofar as it serves a pattern.
Catholics “say” and “do” certain things, so anything thereof is considered Catholic, and
thereby acceptable to anyone looking on (e.g., going to Mass). The name “Catholic”
would cover a number of teaching approaches, including both the secular and expressly
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Catholic conviction towards chemistry as above. Because said knowledge is religiously
“neutral,” it does not matter how one approaches it. What matters is that the material is
taught at all. On this note, pluralism embraces a wider range of coursework and colleges
because it accepts the student demand for more professional training. Liberal arts are
included for general education requirements, with the appropriate majors, but are
surpassed in importance by the professional schools, demonstrated by the amount of
funding received (or not) and the usual budget cuts coming to humanities departments.
When liberal arts are around, there is usually a dearth of non-Catholic texts well outside
the Catholic intellectual tradition,497 not for the enlightenment of the students per se, but
for the larger mission of education for global citizenship. Pluralism holds that to engage
the world is to make students ready for it, but to the extent teachers are willing
themselves to engage the student. Research is prioritized over teaching because research
promotes greater affluence for the university, in order to build its prestige. Teachers are
thought more of as generic employees who fill a void in teaching gaps or a prestigious
researcher who can bring funding and notoriety to the school than a person to whom the
student should emulate.498 The only “tradition” passed on is the one the student chooses
to adopt. There is not any reason to prefer one over the other. And so one can conclude
pluralism and restorationism have their own set of problems.
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The latter has a kind of isolationism that makes it vulnerable to “attack” from the
outside world, namely, a lack of engagement with non-Catholic sources breeds weakness
because one method (e.g., one kind of philosophy or theology) cannot necessarily handle
every threat to the faith or Catholic education. Even the Church Fathers read the Greeks.
On the other hand, pluralism’s breadth is so wide it is practically meaningless. What is
the point of describing oneself as Catholic if/when Catholic morals, values, and theology
are constantly undermined by the very same institution? One side is too small, the other
too large. Again, these have their strengths, but it would take too long to pick apart each
and every one. One quick method is to remind the audience of Pope Leo XIII.
I established in chapter one Leo, in his Longinqua, has a major concern that the
American Catholic Church is substituting democratic principles for religious ones as the
sole foundation of morality. In his follow-up tract, Testem Benevolentiae, Leo lays out
his worries over Fr. Isaac Hecker’s liberalism laying ground for clergy to make their own
decisions within their orders. The same spirit is prominent in Hesburgh’s wish for more
freedom to make choices about his own university. The pope’s concerns mirror the
second kind of war Levinas discusses in the battle between two or more rationalistic
systems of philosophy until there is one thing left: sameness. Granted, Leo probably did
not want “sameness” in the sense of war, but there is something of a desire for Otherness
in that the Church needs to remind herself she is not of this world. The same mindset
applies to the American Catholic university.
The paradox is “pluralism,” in the sense of permitting multiple worldviews in a
respectful academic atmosphere, is actually sameness in disguise because it tends to shun
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the very view it claims for its basis (Roman Catholicism) and reduces all things to nonCatholicism (e.g., economic values). Because pluralism holds Catholicism is open to
many different kinds of religious expression in the world,499 all expressions are permitted
in a kind of hob glob of grayness—everyone blends so as to be unable to tell each other
apart, hence sameness. Meanwhile “restorationism,” in the sense of maintaining,
respecting, and restoring the moral and religious authority of the magisterium, is actually
Otherness in that it rightfully deviates the boundaries necessary for sameness and
Otherness to exist. That is to say, “X is Catholicism, Y is not.” Restorationism allows
Catholicism because, as just stated, Catholics are not of the world and need to protect
their dignity. When something non-Catholic is “permitted” on campus and in the
classroom, it is done for obvious pedagogical reasons (compared to, say, a political
agenda). In a way, both positions are and are not allowing Catholic and non-Catholic
things on our campuses, it simply depends on the intention of the ism. Pluralism,
however, is a post-Vatican II version of the adoption of Protestant values in the way LOL
goes about its rejection of “authority of whatever kind”.500 In this way, the road is paved
for the Catholic university to behave as a business.
Fr. Hesburgh revealed his plans for the Catholic university in his speech on the
university as a corporation. One characteristic of businesses is to seek to maximize
profits and reduce losses. This mindset gets transferred into the quest for power as an
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elite university. One way it behaves as a business is to treat the person as homo
economicus (economic man, or, person), an idea developed by philosopher Gary Eberle.
He contends that a university treats its students like customers where “everything and
every person becomes monetized, and human beings are of value to one another only
insofar as they may financially benefit one another.”501 The higher educational
community witnessed the economic value of students amidst the coronavirus pandemic as
schools were shutting down or eliminating entire departments due to loss of income from
student tuition and room and board. No students equals no pay. In particular, liberal arts
programs were hit the hardest because their market value is perceived less than their
professional counterparts (e.g., nursing). One way to counter this trend is to argue that
liberal arts offer “soft skills” professional programs only dream of, but that only
maintains the conversation in professional language. There must be a third way of
talking about theocentric humanistic education and the structure of the Catholic
university.
On this note, having explained these two positions, I will explain and concretely
apply the student-teacher relationship in what I call “neo-restorationism” to American
Catholic higher education as a stepping stone to rehabilitating the modern Catholic
university.
Neo-Restorationism and Application
If restorationism seeks to restore faithful obedience to Vatican decrees, and
pluralism is an openness to outside influence and self-autonomy, then neo-restorationism
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is the faithful observation of magisterial teaching whilst engaging the world (i.e., nonCatholic sources), seeking the fullness of truth. It does not exclude texts on the basis of
their being controversial, nor does it exclude classics because they are old or possibly
boring. Like pluralism, neo-restorationism is open to truth wherever it is found, except
unlike pluralism it does not abandon its history and tradition for a (con)temporary trend.
Like restorationism, it adopts orthodox theology502 understanding the university as a
branch of the Church, but unlike it neo-restorationism is willing to consider new insights
to the throwing away of old.
For example, modern scientific discovery has eliminated the need for many a
speculation about the orbiting of the planets, and so our relationship with God is still the
same on the one hand (e.g., we need a Savior), and different on another (e.g., we are not
the center of creation). Granted, this example is by now an accepted law, it was not
always the case, nor is it the case now that many Catholics are up on contemporary
scientific study. Neuroscience, robotics, and technology are all pushing the limits of
traditional philosophy and theology. Thomistic metaphysics is hard pressed to offer
solutions to increasingly difficult problems, such as the question of whether sentient
artificial intelligence would warrant personhood. Neo-restorationism has no problem, for
instance, accepting machine-personhood when there is evidence for it. The Lord’s
creation is a wondrous, mysterious thing ever-saturated with His presence, and we are
called to complete it through our labor. Restorationism, given its traditionalist leanings,
would hesitate to accept or probe such claims. Pluralism would heartily accept it, albeit a
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bit quickly because of its vast openness. Neo-restorationism slowly contemplates,
digests, and discerns the truth as a philosopher does, yet is as a child on her father’s lap
awaiting a story or instruction. Curriculum design serves as a fuller explanation of the
kind of attitude I am describing.
Certain sectors of the Catholic higher education scene503 have a preoccupation with
the Great Books program, a curriculum designed to take students through the history of
Western thought with texts that have withstood the test of time. In other words, they are
worth reading today because they teach invaluable lessons, can be read over and over
with new insights, and contain ideas which thinking people generally consider. I am in
favor of the Great Books because they encourage our students to lead moral lives, live
good citizenship, and have faith. The problem is these same sectors are advocating Great
Books at the expense of good, or great, contemporary ones. They are fearful of an
ideological takeover should anything outside this aspect of the Western canon be taught.
What’s more interesting is there are any number of texts in complete disagreement with
basic Catholic theology, a point necessary to make considering the majority of Great
Books advocates are practicing Catholics.504 One need not be a member of any belief
system to appreciate good literature, the nub is whether the text serves to build character.
Essentially, as long as the book is edifying, it is permissible.
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The irony here is the only way for texts to be determined “great” is for time to pass
and people to read them. It does not account for potential greatness here and now. There
is also an increased paranoia recently about non-Catholic texts because of the “culture
wars” brought about in recent decades for fear anti-Catholic bias, sentiment, and agendas
seeped into Catholic universities. I do not deny the seriousness of this issue, but I want to
focus on the course material in relationship to Catholic identity and hence the university.
Typically, the Great Books reflect Catholic identity because, given their age, they have
shaped it over the centuries. To read these texts is to read what the great philosophers
and theologians read; it is to think as they have thought. Of course, in their day, any
number of these texts were also “new,” so they had no way of knowing whether or not
succeeding generations would take these texts seriously. Not only these, but they wrote
and conversed just the same. How can a Catholic like St. Thomas Aquinas read his
contemporary heretical counterparts, or the pagan Aristotle, and not be afraid of losing
his faith? The situation then is not really any different now. I am not advocating a
delving into just any text for its own sake, but these philosopher-saints (among others)
were reading pagans and heathens while correcting and adapting their positions to the
Catholic faith. A contemporary example is found in a controversy at Franciscan
University of Steubenville.
Any Catholic professor will teach, or can teach, any material from a theologically
orthodox stance. Consider English professor Stephen Lewis at Franciscan University of
Steubenville (FUS). In January 2019, Lewis was set to teach The Kingdom by Emmanuel
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Carrère, a blasphemous text in “an advanced English seminar”.505 He had taught it
previously without controversy, but a school donor got wind of his course and
immediately threatened to cease all donations, prompting the administration to strip
Lewis of his Chair and chance to teach his course. The Catholic higher education internet
was awash with cries for his reinstatement because, on top of being an affront to
academic freedom of speech, one would think a Catholic university is the place where
one ought to study something blasphemous with fellow Catholic teachers and peers so as
to know how to go about addressing it outside the university. As Aquinas read and
appropriated philosophies, we, too, carry on the Catholic intellectual tradition by reading
those same “forbidden” sources and appropriating them as such.
What Lewis represents is the kind of position I’m supporting here: be Catholic and
teach what you like because any truly faithful Catholic professor will never willingly
teach something without charity. It reminds us of the Catholic University in the Modern
World’s principle to “[confront students] with values which, reaching beyond man’s
mortal limitations, challenge a more restricted view of reality.”506 It is not an excuse to
do what one likes in the sense of unlimited freedom. Rather, it is a call to responsibility
for oneself as an educator and responsibility for one’s students as spiritually
impoverished beings. Pluralism says to teach whatever one wants however one wants,
that is, in whatever spirit one prefers. Restorationism says teach classics (e.g., Great
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Books) in a spirit of charity to the exclusion of everything else. In the context of neorestorationism, teach what you want because faithful Catholicism507 is a presupposition.
It combines the unlimited choice of texts in pluralism with the heartfelt compassion of
Christian charity in restorationism. The student is the one we are to serve, not an
administration or third party, but I can still see some difficulties in justifying material like
Lewis’s course.508 One difficulty is the Catholic university’s right to determine its own
curriculum on the basis of self-autonomy, albeit not in a Hesburghian mode, which I will
touch upon in a moment. First, I want to discuss the third party’s role in the studentteacher relationship.
The third party, to remind the audience, is not the individual Other opposite the self
in the face-to-face encounter. The third party is the “plural you,” the “everyone else”
outside of the personal relationship, albeit the third party is not impersonal because it is
comprised of all the other personal yous in the world. As I am responsible to the
individual Other, I also have responsibility to the third party because it is as in need
(impoverished) as the Other. My material resources are strained because I only have so
much to give to any one person or party. My main spiritual resource, however, is
responsibility, the justice I owe the Other and third party in my response to their needs.
Justice takes the form of language, namely speech, because it reaches out to the Other as
507
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a bridge (and thereby as a resource in shared communication) without reducing the Other
to sameness. The self and Other remain separate (remain themselves) while in
communication, and this speech is justice because I minimally acknowledge the Other’s
existence (what I owe the Other) when my material resources are dried up. The same
situation applies to FUS in the curriculum debate.
Throughout this dissertation I am using the student as the Other challenging the
professor’s sense of sameness. They encounter each other in the classroom with the
course material as their “bridge,” their language or means of communication. Everyone
else—administrators, donors, etc.—is outside their relationship. A serious dilemma arises
when debts owed to multiple parties are in contradiction. For example, teachers are
responsible to their students, but also responsible to administrators for fulfilling their
contracts (e.g., courses are in accords with university standards). In the case of Lewis
and FUS, administrators owe something to their donors, which causes a potential rupture
in the student-teacher relationship because both demands (teachers and donors) cannot
respected. It then becomes a question of priority.
The administration’s (third party) role is to keep the primary student-teacher
relationship in check so as to maintain the integrity of the university, but recall the third
party is present in the eyes of the Other: the teacher is reminded of all the outside
obligations to the student when gazing at the student because the student would not be in
the classroom without staff, administrators, etc. The teacher is aware there is something
going on beyond the classroom when teaching in the classroom. That there are forces
present making concrete learning possible. The university is founded on the student-
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teacher relationship, but it is also larger than it, and these third parties are not impersonal.
Like the Other, they have a right to recognition, but they are recognized in the institution
of the university. Outside the institution, they are pretty much useless. Recognition,
however, is predicated on language.
The third party is bound by the same standards as I am. The language I speak, what
I communicate, is reflective of the kind of institution it is. A language of religion and
ethics reflects a Catholic university compared to a language of hatred and violence as in
the Nazi-training schools Maritain references. Language also reflects relation: how I
speak is indicative of my responding to another’s needs. My demeanor in not giving a
snake to someone who asks for a fish “speaks” to my character. With this idea in mind,
administrations are caught between a rock and a hard place: they promise to uphold
donor wishes and the dignity of the university. When these promises collide, a choice in
priority is made. Neo-restorationism, being about orthodox theology and charitable
teaching, is applied here by reminding the third party (administrations, etc.) why the
university exists at all. They gave a snake to Lewis (really, all the faculty) and a fish to
the donors.509 These kinds of choices favoring third parties are all too common as faculty
consistently face budget, curricular, and departmental cuts. The language being “spoken”
here is that faculty and students are second-class citizens to the desires of the
administrations. How can universities prioritize themselves over the parties they service?
The tension here is more than this dissertation can handle, but I only wish to touch upon
it on the grounds it can aide our ascent back to authentic Catholicity.
509
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So, there is a paradox here. The Catholic university is simultaneously free to
determine some aspects of her being, and unfree to decide others. It is similar to
marriage. When practiced rightly, spouses are in a freely giving, loving relationship of
their own choosing. They choose to be with each other and none else, but they also have
individual lives. They are not joined at the hip and must still take responsibility for their
individual actions. The Catholic university is in a similar situation.
Having explained neo-restorationism and its application, I will now move onto
discussing the ways in which teachers and students are independent in the pluralist
Catholic university to further explicate neo-restorationism’s proposals.
On Independent Teachers
Student and teachers are autonomous. There’s an aspect in which this is true outside
of LOL even without its official position. Students and teachers must be free to make up
their own minds on things in order to truly live. The point of restorationism’s Vatican
authority model is that we are not free to violate the moral law in life (and expect to be
good people) as we are not free to violate certain conditions for belonging to a group and
expect to be called a member (e.g., the Catholic Church). Authority is part and parcel of
being Catholic as it is anything else. One must accept the rules of baseball if one wants
to play and practice if one wants to play well. One must accept the laws of a given state
if one wants to stay out of prison, etc. For teachers to teach what they want when they
want (within the parameters above) at a Catholic university, there is no violation of
academic freedom because, again, as marriage places limiters on what one can and
cannot do inside and outside the relationship, the Catholic Church has a different
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understanding of academic freedom. Academic freedom is not the freedom to teach,
believe, promulgate, etc., anything one wants, but to teach, etc., what one believes is the
truth in light of the Church’s understanding of theology and ethics. I will explain what I
mean.
It is possible to be a Kantian and be Catholic. Typically Catholics follow some
brand of Aristotelian-Thomism because it is built into the Church’s catechism. Yet, a
Kantian has as much of a claim to be Catholic as another. The faith within the Kantian
burns with the same truth and light, albeit in a different way. Instead of relying on
Aristotle for metaphysics, et al., the Kantian relies—among other things—on formal
logic. Coming to the same conclusions about theology, again in a different way, there is
no reason for exclusion from the Catholic faith no matter how atypical a Kantian may be.
It is the same Faith, or as St. Paul says in reference to gifts, many parts but the same
body. So the issue also applies to authority and the Catholic Church.
The Church does not say that a professor need be a card carrying AristotelianThomist, only that one conform to the standards of the Catholic Church’s morality and
theology. Again, this form takes many shapes as the body has parts. The complaints over
against Vatican authority are exaggerated because people do not understand how Vatican
authority works, including over its schools. It’s not unlike running a “tight ship” in one’s
home when everyone is scurrying about living their lives. Imagine the lives of the
students running about in a school. The students, like the teachers, are free to accept or
reject whatever they please, but they do so at their own peril. The Church, as ECE points
out, cannot force anyone to do or believe anything one does not want to do or believe,
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else one is not acting freely and therefore lovingly. Yet, things like Kantianism offer a
different route to the same conclusions: Church authority is the same, individual learning
is the same, the moral teaching is the same. We do not shun philosophies because they
are different or philosophers because they are eccentric. The Church has always
welcomed wisdom wherever it is found. It can be found in many places, and there is
wisdom in having an overarching authority.
LOL’s issue with authority is like a child throwing a temper tantrum because she
cannot have her own way: “I want my freedom and I want it now.” Given my own
humanity, I completely understand Hesburgh, et al.’s complaint: one should not have to
wait for a higher up to approve every move one wants to make. One must be able to live,
but wanting to buy a lawnmower is not the same as jettisoning 2,000 years of apostolic
succession. Arguing students are autonomous in LOL means, once again, not that they
are free to agree or disagree with Church teaching (they are), but free to decide for
themselves what is right and wrong. Again, the Levinasian “war” makes an appearance
in the form of the Levinasian self.
The self organizes the world in economy (resource management). Goods are higher
and lower according to how well they benefit me. I reduce them to their usefulness and
claim them my own. I am the emperor to my world, and my inner life, psychism, is
reducible to all things pleasurable. I take in pleasures from my use of things and my
living from them. Knowledge can be pleasurable in this way, reading books and writing
articles for the sheer joy of pursuing wisdom. My soul is nourished by all the spiritual
nutrients, so to speak, absorbed in intellectual work. The contemporary vision of the
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Catholic university, however manipulates this pleasure for the good of the university’s
image.
The university, in organizing the world, reduces the professor to his/her research
with teaching a secondary consideration. The “resource” of teaching is a secondary
consideration because it does not add to the market value perceived by ranking reports,510
the kinds of things which promote schools to the wider public. Higher ranks means more
attention, which in turn brings about more applications, more admissions, more students,
and more money, and more money means more power because money influences one’s
ability to do things (make choices, etc.) in higher education. Teaching is treated as a
necessary evil to the upkeep of the school because students literally need educated in the
sense of Maritain’s third definition of education and schools need tuition to pay their
debts. Teaching surveys at the end of courses are offered to maintain standards and keep
considerations for promotion legitimate. Research produced and conferences attended
are also tallied for promotion with top journals also noted. All measurements are
quantitative and any subjective measurement is held strictly in abeyance for the purposes
of objectivity, eliminating any kind of debate on quality of research, teaching, or potential
upholding of the school’s mission.
Many universities support a teacher-scholar model to that end: teaching and
research are competing for the attention (the mood, attitude, consciousness) of the teacher
to the point something has to give, and it is usually teaching because research does not
write itself. There are many methods for “teaching without teaching” or without
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instruction, such as group work, flipped classroom, and numerous in-class projects. It is
done so the teacher-scholar can dedicate more time to research publications. It does not
mean the teaching is actually “bad” or that the students do not take anything positive
from such lessons. Here, however, we see the teacher-scholar’s inner life characterized,
not by love and pursuit of wisdom, but by the “love” and pursuit of publication. Levinas
tells us, “enjoyment is the ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life,”511
and when the contents of one’s inner life are all research-oriented (as far as university
life), the pleasure of being a teacher dies and becomes homo economicus—economic man
(person)—noted at the end of the two previous sections.
Economic man is dedicated to all things productive. His (her) life is characterized
by a constant increase of work and product to the pleasure of one’s employer (think
overtime) and the detriment of one’s well-being. People work themselves to death to
keep their jobs, or make the money necessary to pay their bills, or both. The joys of
teaching and learning have been replaced by the “joy” of survival. Here, I am only as
good as what I produce, and what I produce is not for myself or my students, but for the
greater good of university image as it is demanded of me. Because I am pushed to my
limit, I no longer enjoy the process of being creative and forming young lives. The very
thing supposed to give teachers dignity is the very thing used to dehumanize them. The
independence LOL affords students and teachers has returned to haunt them. Because
they are free to do as they please, administrations are as well, and they have no reason to
treat students and teachers with dignity as per the Heideggerian spirit.
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Notice how Levinas’s concept of need is also manipulated. Need is not mere lack,
but something that requires filling within me. For example, I need the sun to nourish my
skin, which in turn nourishes (fills) my inner life in pleasure. Teachers no longer need to
publish because they have something important to say to their peers (they need to share
it), but they publish to stay alive. They are required to publish material to keep said jobs,
and their labor is no longer a source of happiness but of necessity.512 Paradoxically,
pleasure is still taken in the satisfaction of the need. A successful class or published
article is just as enjoyable as any, required or not required for one’s job security. These
instances of success contribute to the sense of oneself as a teacher-scholar, and since
selfhood is formed in enjoyment and labor for Levinas, it is formed in a manner outside
ipseity.
“Ipseity” is, again, his term for absolute uniqueness. I am not merely the
“individuation of a concept,”513 but existing wholly in myself, and for Levinas it is in
enjoyment. My being is characterized by pleasure such that pleasure “equals” me, and
because the pleasure is mine alone, my self is formed. One might consider one’s research
belonging only to one in the sense one labors alone. My article is my publication. In
order to get pleasure, however, I must welcome the world into myself. Welcoming is
receptivity to things in the world, and the world contains “elements” (nature). Elements
immerse us in their presence and being, so too, the teacher-scholar is immersed in his/her
work (labor) in the concrete environment of the university. Before I even reach
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intentionality, these things are in place. It maneuvers around Husserlian intentionality by
undercutting it—absorption of- and being in one’s environment does not place my
consciousness in any intentional relationship. Things are just there and I enjoy them in
sensibility, my mode of enjoyment which allows me to enjoy. Sensibility is the manner
in which I feel things. When I enjoy things in a variety of ways, I am not thinking, and
these things are not objects of thought (hence they are without intentionality), but
teachers are engaged in thought whether or not it is pleasurable. Both are immersed in
something, and the point is the “elements” of the university do not always give me
pleasure the way they ought. Something happened to how I relate to them, and I am
arguing it is the changing of the student-teacher relationship.
These changes to the selfhood of the professor as a teacher-scholar are not new to
the university landscape, but a pluralist Catholic university takes advantage of them in a
special way, again, as towards advancing the university’s “intentionality” and projects, or,
totalities. These totalities encapsulate the ipseity of the teacher in the grandiose schema
of the university’s mission, except, unlike marriage with the freedom to be oneself, the
schema of the pluralist school is to use the teacher as a scholar for the strict advancement
of the university’s desire for elitism. Freedom is twisted from responding to another’s
need to responding to an impersonal demand.
What LOL forgets in the midst of laying out independent students and teachers is
that the people make up the university, not the prestige, power, and labor, etc. Marriage,
for instance, is an institution and itself is a relationship, not a building or physical
construct. It is constituted by people as is the university with the exception of the
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authority (charter) to grant legitimate degrees. Specifically, it is the student and teacher
who make the university, again, because without them the university ceases to exist.
Anyone can “grant” a degree—all one must do is print one off of a computer—but not
anyone can earn the degree. The earning comes through the labor, and the labor is the
classroom experience exemplified by Maritain.
Having explained how teachers and students are independent in a pluralist Catholic
university, I will now explain the proper relationship between them in Maritain’s
classroom as an example of neo-restorationism in the university.
Identity Crisis and Dignity
Again, the existential situation of Catholic universities mirrors Husserl’s and
Heidegger’s philosophies. Note the tension with university interests. Christianity
worships Jesus Christ, and He teaches us to serve our neighbor. The corporate “interests”
of the university may not align with this love of neighbor, and so the university must
decide between God and mammon. Universities, as pointed out in chapter one by Alice
Gallin, often choose things because their existence is on the line. Building a new sports
complex or making some kind of deal with a local sports team often engenders some kind
of financial reward necessary for the university to survive. One could call it “existential
anxiety,” so the university projects itself into the future in risky endeavors. Once settled
in the world, Catholic schools cannot help which markets they are “thrown” into, but they
can help how they use things for own purposes. Once more, note the tension. To follow
Jesus is not to use in a selfish way, but to share in a community. Of course, Catholic
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schools must make “use” of things to get along in the world like anyone, but the spirit of
Heidegger’s philosophy is to abuse rather than assist.
Perhaps the most pressing issue for Catholic universities is identity. Noted by many
a Catholic scholar, Catholic schools do not know who they are and what they are about.
Mission statements only go so far in helping schools figure out who they are because, to
live up to their potential (whichever way one understands it), they must take action and
put their ideas into the world. And action breeds character. Not living up to their
identities puts them in a state of fallenness, inauthenticity. The universities are not living
a Christian life so to speak when they are distracted by the allure of power, prestige, and
pleasure. More on these in a moment.
In becoming fascinated with such things, schools tend to associate themselves with
projects having nothing to do with their missions. The school’s mood is how it
understands what it is doing. In buying land, for example, the university may understand
itself as fulfilling its mission somehow or it may understand itself as a corporation. All of
these examples are of the Heideggerian means by which Catholic universities construct
themselves. When combined, schools enter into projects of totality, neglecting their most
essential components: the students and teachers. Hence, Levinas and Maritain are
necessary to correct the path Catholic universities are walking, beginning with a turn
towards liberal arts again and a de-centering of technical training.
Researchers have projects set up in the world for themselves and for the benefit of
others. The complexity of why and how these two interact is a bit too psychological for
this dissertation, but I want to establish there is some component of otherness present. A
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study, for instance, on alternative cancer treatments could benefit potentially millions of
people. Yes, the fame and (academic) fortune of the study for the researchers could be
profound, but they do not do it solely, or at all, for those reasons. They do it for the
benefit of others. The fame, etc., is only secondary. This example is the kind healthy for
researchers in labs and in libraries because it keeps the ego (self) in check. The Other
and the third party (all others) are “present” by being the focal point of the study.
Levinas, of course, is much more radical. I do not think he would have a problem
with cancer treatment studies, but he gives us exaggerated language in his late work
describing the self as a “hostage” to the Other.514 His notion of education therein is the
absolute discipleship of the self to the Other. I think it is only fair to criticize Levinas on
this point, at least for formal academic education, because the student as Other must be
free to respond to me, the teacher, in order for a real relationship to take place, one not
predicated on fear or humiliation. When teaching, I agree with Maritain who coincides
with Levinas, that the professor is at the call of the student. Schools are not places of
indoctrination or intolerance, but neither where anything goes. There has to be concrete
instruction with an actual authority figure in the classroom. The intersubjective
relationship underlies formal teaching, but making the teacher a hostage of the student
does not make sense.
Herzing University is one example of a university with student-teacher relational
principles of this kind without the spirit of Catholicism. It is a career university focusing
on training students for careers in IT, computers, business, and nursing. They also offer
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general education courses in the humanities to demonstrate basic proficiency in aspects
essential to a well-functioning student (writing, etc.). Herzing features a software
program known as “Beacon,” a student-retention system focused on reporting studentteacher interactions for the sake of the wider academic community. Its purpose is to keep
tabs on misbehaving students and potential academic troublemakers. Whenever a student
consistently does not participate or turns in substandard work, the teacher alerts the
Beacon program which then alerts the necessary campus parties (e.g., academic advisors)
of the student’s performance. This process is meant to clarify and hold accountable the
students and teachers for their actions. It provides the university with grounds for
disciplinary action while documenting the teachers’ efforts to engage the students.
The above are reasons for why this retention software is in principle a good idea,
but what makes this program inefficient is the overt handholding mechanism. Students
who need that kind of attention to that extent are questionably ready for college. It is not
to say students who need the occasional “boost” are unworthy of an academic education;
it is to say it slows down the educational process in that teachers have to take an extra
step in their work. Instead of emailing said student(s), possibly informing the department
chair, and moving on, they now must log their interactions. Perhaps it is the age of legal
action motivating such behavior, but students too immature or bothered to learn ought not
be pushed into maturation when they are not ready. Granted students who refuse to work
cannot be themselves forced to work. My point is the Levinasian ethic needs help—the
“Catholic” part of applying Maritain’s philosophy—because the teacher, in responding to
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the spiritual poverty of the student, cannot force him/herself on the student and do the
work for her.
The student cannot demand a new lesson because she dislikes the content.515 An
understanding, open ear on behalf of the teacher is welcome, but outright takeover is not
the same thing. Levinas means of course I am “captured” by the face, the vulnerability of
the Other in becoming a substitute for her, or, putting myself in her place to the point of
my own annihilation. Such empathy, while heroic in some ways, is unnecessary. Notice
I am not advocating we turn away from Levinas’s base ethic, only his more extreme
versions. In the classroom, the teacher cannot efface him/herself to the point of nonrecognition. In theory, students can teach themselves any number of things, but that
raises the question why have a university at all. What’s at stake, really, is dignity. How
can the teacher respond to the students’ needs and maintain one’s dignity? Businesslike
universities do not help the question because they are responsible for the destruction of
said dignity in undermining the student-teacher relationship. An answer might be found
in family life.
Take a man out of work, and his family almost succumbs to debtor’s prison. Being
sorrowful he could not provide for his family, one could describe him as “undignified”.
Work somehow made him a man and shaped his humanity. When he finds an open
position before his savings runs out, he suddenly becomes a new person. His dignity is
restored, returned to him. How does this happen? It is not this dissertation’s place to
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assert how in great detail. I will suggest that dignity is Imago Dei (being made in God’s
image and likeness) and also respect for the Other. The difficulty is how the self “gets”
dignity, and because Levinas structures the self according to its relationship to the Other,
one might say dignity is found in intersubjectivity. Recall the shared world of the beggar
in chapter two. Here, the man “found” his self-worth, or dignity, with the Other’s offer of
a job, a shared world. His dignity was bestowed on him by the “teacher” of his employer
with he being the “student” in the educational structure of the self-Other encounter. This
dynamic occurs in the concrete classroom in the form of dialogue.
Having explained how the identity crisis in Catholic higher education leads to an
infantilizing and undignified student-teacher relationship, I will move onto the three
intentionalities of the Catholic university uprooting said dignity, which hold the Catholic
university back from its rehabilitation.
Intentionalities: Prestige, Pleasure, Power
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Husserl’s intentionality enters the conversation
as per educational institutions’ “experiences” in their directedness towards objects,
manifesting as Heidegger’s life-intentionality of the ego. One might even recommend the
specific “consciousness” of a Catholic university to be the mission statement, the object
towards which it orients itself and what “fills” itself. Yet, intentions and intentionality are
not the same thing. Catholic universities have good faith in expressing their concerns,
goals, and oaths in written form, but the choices they make and how they fulfill those
promises do not always match. In light of the Land O’Lakes statement, consider how
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they manifest in contemporary Catholic higher education as aiming towards power,
prestige, and pleasure, not faith, hope, and love of neighbor.
The main concern in all of these intentionalities is pluralism’s freedom to determine
its own ends. The intentionality of power combines prestige and pleasure in a way that
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, so I will explain those first. Prestige culture
is predicated on high university rankings, not money as most reflections would have it.
Money makes the university go around because it keeps it “in business,”516 but were it
not for prestige, the conversation about the perils of contemporary Catholic higher
education would not exist. University rankings, such as the U.S. News & World Report,
promote the university to as many parties as possible making it more readily available to
the general public. The more people know about a school, the more likely the school is to
attract students, thus causing the ranking to increase even more in various categories.
Prestige is hotly predicated on rank, but also publications. Academic journals are known
for being gateways into high-level academic circles and jobs. One example is “the
Nature effect”: a single publication in the extremely prestigious journal Nature would
give a natural scientist more clout than ten articles in any other journal. The reason for
this phenomenon, on top of high article rejection rates, is that journals give attention to
one’s paper and work. The more prestigious and widely read the journal, the more widely
known the researcher. It is the equivalent of “signaling” in actual nature wherein one
animal will gesture to another that it is more physically fit (e.g., by jumping high) than
another. The same situation happens in the university: without a prestigious publication,
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no one will see your work, and so your publication is basically useless in the market and
worthless to the school. Thus, the intentionality of prestige—the consciousness of the
university—is to make it appear that one school has better ideas, better faculty, and is
better overall than others according to where they publish and how often. These
indicators give schools the freedom to move through the market as they please, but these
markets are complex as seen with the intentionality of pleasure.
The intentionality of pleasure is most often reflected in sports, a “pleasurable”
activity. American universities spend hundreds of millions of dollars per year on college
athletics with only twenty-four in the entire nation raising a profit.517 The obsession with
sports leads one to question what the purpose of a university is without the learning. One
might venture to say it is to use sports as a minor league system for the regular
professional levels, yet why would universities keep them when so few are earning
revenue? The reasons vary too much for this dissertation, but among others is the
pleasure and freedom one gets in having a prestigious team. With a popular and wellformed team, the university once again signals to other schools that it can promulgate its
will by attracting the best athletes in the country. Winning games and championships
further proves the school’s dominance, attracting more resources (grant money, etc.) and
donors. Therein, the belief that one is contributing to a winning team boosts one’s ego to
the point sports take priority over academic matters. Like animals, it is another signal to
schools of a university’s ability to freely determine its own ends, except—unlike the
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professoriate who make use of research facilities on campus and gain their own fame—
there is a strange notion of “success by association”. One actively gets pleasure from
victories earned by one’s respective team, except one does not actually earn said
victories. It's a kind of piggy-backing off the team’s energy, as if to say, because I root
for them I’m somehow connected to them and thereby deserve their success and use it for
bragging rights. For example, every year the NCAA March Madness tournament results
in a vicarious victory for fans resulting in an increased level of prestige for the school for
its basketball program. What it has to do with academics is pretty much nothing.
Without sports, one might say a team’s followers enter a kind of Levinasian il y a from
chapter two, where they believe or fear there is nothing outside of sports and its
community in university life. That there is a horror to the existence of the school itself
outside of sports and pleasure. An odd phenomenon given collegiate sports are only
popular in the United States and plenty of universities exist without them. So, sports
exist for the intentionality of pleasure in the school’s creation of its own ego.
These intentionalities lead to and combine to form the third and final intentionality
of power. Power here concerns control more than anything else, and with power comes
responsibility. To lead a school “beyond boundaries,” to uncharted educational waters,
requires a certain amount of maturity and discernment. The amount of choices one can
make with power is immense and cannot be exhausted here. For our purposes, I want to
briefly touch on power and the ability to choose one’s destiny, or autonomy. As stated
above and many times in this dissertation, autonomy is a key issue in the development of
American Catholic universities in the twentieth century exemplified by Fr. Hesburgh and
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the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL). Autonomy (power) manifests in a resistance to
Vatican suggestion or recommendation for more orthodox theology and a heeding of
moral principles to spread or at least maintain the Christian message. The idea of
choosing one’s own path is very appealing because it is human nature to want more
leeway in how to make use of one’s resources and express oneself as one desires.
Making use again of the marriage image, a Vatican connection limits what one can do: I
cannot use my paycheck and such for anything I want because I must use of it for my
spouse and children. When single, however, I can spend my money as I want; when
universities are not “about” anything, they are “single,” and free to do as they please.
Modern Catholic universities like this idea because it means they can leave the nest, a
normal human trait if but universities were human. Being composed by people, however,
they can make “human choices” and insist faculties, students, and missions be oriented
towards certain ends rather than others.
For example, faculty are no longer forming citizens, they are researchers who
happen to teach for a paycheck. Students no longer take pleasure in learning and
becoming whole people (as whole as possible) but in leisurely activities elevated to the
level of godlike status. And so with power, the point of the Catholic university is no
longer being a beacon of Christ’s light in the world, but a harbinger of secular values and
goods. It’s a competition on the university playground of “anything you can do I can do
better”. Catholic universities lose their identities because they try to become “like the
other kids,” their peers, in order to fit in and have a say in higher education’s affairs.
Instead of embracing their own identities (e.g., Jesuitism), though, nothing is influenced
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because they’re exactly the same: How can a Catholic university be in relationship with
“other” schools when the name “Catholic” has nothing, or almost nothing, to do with its
original meaning? There is no Otherness. As the student-teacher relationship produces
infinity in constant dialogue, there is not any production of infinity here (chapter two)
because Catholic schools merely imitate others rather than express their uniquenesses.
For instance, Jesuit schools do not promote the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, a model
for classroom pedagogy, rather, they permit their faculty members to make up their own
methods. Insofar as there exists multiple ways of teaching and learning, it is not really a
problem. The problem is the spirit of the root cause, which is again the thirst for
autonomy: to make one’s way in the world. Prestige and pleasure contribute to power as
the fulcrum around which power rotates. The ability to choose one’s place in the sun is
founded on the ego’s desire for self-preservation, the same situation Catholic schools
found themselves in post-WWII. In order to attract more students, as noted in chapter
one, schools adjusted to and embraced secular values (e.g., professionalism) negating
their own Catholic identities. Thus, Catholic education needs a stepping stone, an
intermediary to help it reclaim its roots. Maritain’s philosophy of education begins this
reconstruction since it represents the Catholic pedagogical application of Levinas’s
intersubjective ethic.
Having explained how the three major intentionalities work to push Catholic
universities away from themselves, I will now further explicate how these intentionalities
form under Maritain’s sociologism misconception with reference to outcomes-based
education and are challenged by holistic education.
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Sociologism, Outcomes, Ignatian Pedagogy, and Self-Encounter
Of all the misconceptions of education, sociologism is revisited by Maritain more
than any other. Rooted in a philosophy of behaviorism, again, sociologism treats the
person as a mechanistic command-and-response vessel. One is merely a stimuli to be
given impulses to memorize and act on command. The human being is nothing more
than a machine that does what I want when I say. One is a complete product of one’s
environment, predetermined by all environmental factors. How these environmental
factors come about is not discussed, nor is it of any interest to Levinas or Maritain. The
point is the exterior, in this case the environment, educates me, and in this education my
selfhood is formed by others.
Specifically for Levinas, environment is anything exterior to the self be it rocks,
food, or a house. The option to consume such things—whether literally in the mouth as
food, or as a skipping stone for my pleasure, or adopting a house for shelter—is always
present to things “not me”. Another person, however, is the exception because of the
face-to-face encounter as explained in chapter two. Once more, the encounter is a unique
happening whereby I interact with another person in her humanity and vulnerability. This
humanity is sacred, and so I cannot just do as I please as I do with everything else
(houses, etc.). In other words, she calls my freedom into question, that is, my ability to
choose is checked with relational boundaries. I cannot “murder” her, that is, prevent her
from existing as she is, and so her humanity is respected in welcoming (receiving) her
existence in discourse. Discourse, or, conversation is the main content of our interaction.
The language (literal words, also gestures) of discourse reaches out like a bridge to the
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Other such that she remains herself and I remain myself. Although she is exterior to me,
I have access to her world through discourse and so new possibilities for knowledge
come about. She shares things with me of which I previously had no understanding, thus,
with Maritain’s pedagogical support, I grow and become more fully human.
Similarly for Maritain, environment is learning environment: the exterior that
admits of all the people, places, and things I encounter. In the context of his third
definition of education as formal schooling, we begin to see once more how the layers of
life itself and university learning parallel and influence each other. Like Levinas, he
holds life is a learning endeavor because of all the things one encounters and learns
through experiences. To say I am a strict product of this learning environment, however,
would be to say I am the same as my experiences. Surely one is not the same after any
number of both unique and ubiquitous experiences, but Maritain’s point is that one is not
bound by anything external to oneself in choosing how to respond to these experiences. I
may have responded to the face a thousand times, but one day I choose not to for any
number of reasons.
Unlike sociologism, students have a will that permits them to choose how they will
respond to their situations (inwardly or outwardly) without any pretense or coercive
influence. Students are not free when they are at the mercy of their environment, as
though their environment has control over every aspect of their inner lives. It does not.
The will is a mysterious part of the human person in Maritain’s philosophy that is the
core of freedom where choices are made and which can never be fully corrupted to the
point of no return. Maybe some moral philosophers would debate this point, but what
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matters is freedom and the will are the base principles of action because with freedom I
can choose my activities (energeia) and direct them with the will. Maritain does not
attempt to explain how this process works, instead he takes it for granted in the process of
explaining the student-teacher relationship. His philosophy, then, is a reflection of what
happens when the seven misconceptions of education, or violations of human dignity, are
removed from the learning situation. What follows is a respect for the dignity of the
student, teacher, and student-teacher relationship as it would play out in non-totalitarian
learning environment.
As previously mentioned, sociologism aligns with the homo economicus philosophy
of the modern Catholic university in treating people as products. The theological
educators of chapter one understood this problem, but they lacked the fundamental
approach to the student and language.518 Should American Catholic higher education
return once more to the question of what is best for the student, and not best for the
administration, it would have the same problems Phelan, O’Connell, and Murray were
articulating in their arguments for college and university level theology within the current
frameworks for how to think of Catholic higher education. Hence why Levinas is a
necessary addition to the conversation, but he alone is not sufficient to guarantee the
Catholicity of any Catholic university. It needs Catholic theological underpinnings, both
ethical and intellectual, hence Maritain.
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Before commenting on him to close this chapter with remedies for the Catholic
university, I will comment briefly on the outcomes model as promised in chapter three,
and the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm as promised in chapter four.519 The outcomes
model of learning matches the spirit of sociologism and the modern Catholic university.
Outcomes are goals assigned at the beginning of a course or program for the learner to
obtain by its end. For example, “applying ethical theories to business analysis” is one
possible outcome of a course on business ethics. As the means of obtaining this end are
near infinite, there is no one style of teaching in outcomes-based education (OBE). So
long as a mere attempt is made, the outcomes could be conceivably achieved. Because
achievement is predicated on quantitative analysis (e.g., exam scores), students are more
easily compared to others and classified according to grading scales. The question is not
“did the student grow?,” rather, “did the student reach a certain score?” which implies the
student now has knowledge. The results are proof for the administration, teacher, etc.,
that learning took place whatever tole the teacher played. OBE sees the teacher as more
of an overseer, one who need not have input in the learning process should one not wish
it. Researchers who would prefer, opposite those above, to do nothing but research and
not teach have the option of sitting back and allowing students to pursue knowledge at
their benefit or peril. Granted there are benefits to this approach, namely, forcing
students to take responsibility for their learning and consequently their lives. The OBE
model often utilizes skills, as mentioned above, to “secure” the goodness of education,
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but to not learn in an OBE setting is to put one’s job potential and future on the line.
Interpersonal, professional, and life skills are part and parcel of OBE’s desire to measure
everything. One obtains a skill when one is able to demonstrate it in a concrete capacity
for the course or program. Achieving the outcome obtains the desired results, and the
results are usually these skills in order to go out and make a living. These skills and their
attainment are not entirely opposed to the holistic education of something like the
Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, except the latter is more about making a life.
The Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm (IPP) is an open-ended learning model
consisting of five steps ultimately leading students to faithful citizenry. The first step is
context or where students existentially find themselves. Learning is more than just rote
memorization or the conquest of a goal. It is an encounter with an external source to
oneself and exchanging resources in discourse. Students are not always ready for said
discourse due to personal and intellectual holdups, so teachers are aware of needs,
concerns, and obstacles to learning. Often these inner struggles are rooted in the second
step, experience, which is an interior feel for someone or something. Experience in the
IPP is more than just something which happens to me. It’s a grasping of what I encounter
—how does it affect me? how does it affect others? why does it affect us in these ways?
Affect plays a major role in the encounter, and this question of affect is key to the third
step: reflection. Ignatian spirituality is predicated in large part on the dialectic of good
and bad spirit. Without going into too much detail, good and bad spirit are akin to angels
and demons. St. Ignatius believes they guide us behind the scenes (the spirit of things)
towards God or evil. Reflection is the main way we tap into experiences, be they
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intimately personal or academic, by going over how such experiences make us feel. How
one feels or responds to something indicates one’s inner reality. When dissected,
experience and feeling give way to deeper insights, such as personal and universal
sources of meaning. When answering questions, for example, students realize they are
implicated in the answers, and so the meaning changes according to how deep they are
willing to descend. Once an answer is settled on, the fourth step begins.
“Action” is the interior change brought about by a considered encounter with an
outside source. It can be as simple as a change in attitude to a lifestyle alteration. There
is not any limit to what one can or cannot do, the point is the student walks away
changed. Thus, the final step in evaluation, the process of asking how the rest of the
process went. It goes beyond intellectual recollection and contribution because
evaluation considers the whole person, not only one or two outcomes. Students ask how
well they learned and how the process can or could be better executed. This evaluation
incorporates mind, body, and spirit, hence the IPP’s classification as a form of holistic
education, much like Maritain’s pedagogy. Yet, what makes the IPP particularly suitable
for dialogue with Maritain is the notion of docta pietas, that is, learned devotion.
Learned devotion combines faith and study, another way of speaking about faith
and reason in Ex Corde Ecclesiae, orienting the student towards God. It is not opposed to
pastoral concerns at the expense of a rigorous academic education for it is in academic
studies believers obtain the necessary credentials to change the world. It unites the
Augustinian/Thomistic debacle in chapter one by putting into practice the argument
favoring neo-restorationism. OBE, however, need not apply a convivial care for one’s
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students so long as there is demonstrable proof of knowledge. The IPP adds an extra but
necessary step for Catholic education by including the intersubjective element because
Catholicism naturally concerns itself with charity. Educational practices as these are very
much in favor of a rigorous academic upbringing clearly not opposed to pastoral theology
even building it into the curriculum. Fr. Claude Pavur, too, has argued in his book In the
Spirit of St. Ignatius that authentic Jesuit education (docta pietas) is the 16th century’s
version of “best practices” ordered with philosophy and theology at the head of the
curriculum.520 In accords with the IPP, theology is knowledge of one’s Creator, and
philosophy is the handmaiden helping one attain it. Without these “captains” to guide the
ship of Catholic education through rough pedagogical seas, she would sink in a hapless
Charybdis beneath the waves of secularism.
At the relational level, classical liberal arts education is trying to prevent spiritual
alienation from oneself, others, and the world. The IPP puts the student into dialogue
with all these things, and the teacher is the guide who must in-turn respect the process
and the student him/herself. The gospel, aside from containing the message of faith,
prohibits mistreatment of the neighbor. Surely the student is our neighbor, the one in
need established in chapter two, and we teachers the stewards of their care. It is the
teacher to whom the student comes with problems, complaints, and questions. What
makes Levinas and Maritain cooperate is their conviction that the Other is my neighbor
and my teacher. In the university, the classroom teacher is the agent whereby the student
“encounters” oneself, experiences oneself as Other, and works out one’s relationship to
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oneself and one’s place in the world.521 On the one hand, dynamism is the power within
the student to direct oneself towards ends of one’s own choosing. The student could
choose to abandon any sense of service or building up of one’s locality for one’s own
purposes. Here the student is potentially ignorant of the best ends for oneself, or refuses
to pursue them.
On the other hand, in being open to change (formation), the self-encounter is like a
mirror where one sees one’s virtues and flaws and reflects how to best begin overcoming
them. In the university, this process does not happen without any contact between a
student and classroom material at the behest of the teacher. Teachers force students,
usually through the threat of poor grades, to read texts and write papers they normally
would not think or care to read and write. Yet, most often students find themselves better
for having “suffered” through difficult material. Recall the discussion of the production
of infinity in chapter two. The student’s Otherness challenges the teacher’s own
interpretations and teachings in dialogue, a giving and receiving of information between
sameness and Otherness, except here it is within the student’s own psyche. The student is
having a conversation with him/herself through the material, the author of the texts, and
the teacher. In this exchange the real work of formation begins.
It is important to note that I am, again, marking the teacher as sameness because the
teacher is a “fully-formed self” so to speak. The teacher went through the process of
learning how to think and act as a responsible citizen in the Christian faith. The student
is in formation and also an arrival who disrupts this selfhood via said dialogue. It is easy
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to speak this way philosophically, but in the classroom, it is not that simple, and here we
see why Levinas needs Maritain: the roles reverse. The teacher is Other to the student,
too, challenging the student’s own thoughts whilst building up their knowledge base.522
The vantage point is different, but the situation the same. The student and teacher learn
from each other.523 Students and teachers are interacting in such a way that there is a
discourse whereby a learning community in the classroom is created. It is not the
Heideggerian/Hesburghian/Thomistic model’s version of learning how to be a
professional in some capacity. Rather, it is akin to the face-to-face encounter, a stepping
stone away from OBE, related pedagogies, and their institutional structures.
Having discussed examples of what’s wrong in outcomes-based education, what’s
right about the Ignatian Pedagogical Paradigm, and dignity in the student self-encounter,
I will now turn to Maritain in applying his pedagogy to rehabilitate the Catholic
university.
Maritain and the Medicine for Catholic Universities
In essence, the rehabilitation of Catholic higher education has at least five
components, which I will briefly elaborate below.524 First, the re-situation of dignity in
students and teachers through their personhood, not homo economicus. Maritain’s
philosophy pits the care of learning against the external interests of the university
(prestige, etc.), and so doing resituates the understanding of what it means to be a
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university. Second, the non-totalitarian nature of education by which we mean the
freedom to be oneself, albeit in a Christian context. Totalitarian education prohibits the
becoming fully human requisite of a theocentric-humanistic education. To become
human, an exemplar in the teacher is an utmost necessity to aid the student’s lived
understanding of faithful citizenship, which can only happen when teachers are free to be
Catholic in a Catholic university. Third, theology at the heart of the university. While
“more theology” is not the only aspect of education, it is certainly the core of a Catholic
one supported through the strange agreement between Fr. Hesburgh and Pope St. John
Paul II. Fourth, intellectual labor and growth go together. Labor is not simply a matter of
technical skill, but interior development. The more character, or close to character one
has, the more adaptable one is to the changing marketplace and world. One is not
dependent on a certain skill that may be outdated or underused with the creation of new
technology.525 Last, learning itself takes precedence over all other activities. There is a
place for sport, high academic achievement (to the point of fame), and a university
“living its own life,” but not to the point of heresy or a theological double life. One
cannot profess Catholicism and make institutional choices antithetical to it without
compromising one’s identity, ethic, and faith. Helping professors help students as they
are in themselves is the only way up and out of contemporary Catholic higher education’s
obsession with itself. It was made for God and neighbor, not the ego.
Skilled-based education is, again, not something Maritain is opposed to when
appropriate. I remind the audience he does not despise Dewey’s pragmatism when it
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genuinely helps education (e.g., encouraging action), what he despises is scientism
because it limits spiritual insight or rejects it. Outcomes and skills-based education do
the same thing at a relational level: they give students the concrete knowhow they
actually need, except they can develop these skills any time in life,526 but students may
not be able to pursue projects of personal interest in the same way. One example is, of
course, his notion of contemplation. Going inward to consider deeper truths about
existence and oneself necessarily leads the student to greater insight about God as both
are God’s creation. This insight (similar to the reflection pillar of the Ignatian
Pedagogical Paradigm) lifts one to creative heights in becoming a person for the Other,
one who always responds to the plight of the Other.527 In the Catholic university, the root
of action and response is charity, which the teacher first demonstrates for students in
giving of his/her resources. Of course, even the teacher is limited in knowledge, but there
is a respect for him/her as the expert and authority. It is questionable how much respect
is shown teachers today given their apparent secondary status in the university. As I said
before, universities expect and prefer research over teaching, yet the Catholic
philosophical-anthropological principle (being made in God’s image and likeness—
dignity) overrides any kind of disrespect shown towards teachers. A Catholic university
could prioritize research, except we are back to the problems of homo economicus which
Maritain outright avoids. Instead of reducing the teacher to a publication machine, and

526

Employers prefer on-the-job training so their workers know how to do their jobs right.

527

Reminding us of the Jesuit maxim to be a man (woman) for others.

224
the student to a necessary evil for employment, proper respect phases into contemplation
around democracy.
Historically, the Catholic Church has not always supported democracies. It was not
until Vatican II and the rise of Western autocracies that the Church “conceded” that selfrule is not a bad thing. Maritain anticipates such a position in his education lectures.
Freedom for Maritain, as outlined in chapter three, is self-determination—not the
freedom to do as one pleases, but the freedom to do what is right of one’s own accord.
Thus Maritain’s association of liberal arts and democracy. The essence of liberal arts is
to promote freedom (the free man), and freedom is promoted in democracy, which in turn
promotes the free citizen. It is not to say one is not “free” under monarchy, etc., but that
there is a certain inner movement present when the two align. Liberal arts education has
a goal of inner freedom, democracy of exterior freedom. One can freely elect one’s
officials, impeach them if necessary, and challenge unjust laws. There’s a freedom
present to do as one wishes within the limits of moral and civil law. The same is true for
Maritain's theocentric humanism: freedom to think as one likes when one likes. There
are, however, dangers to both. The election of unsuited officials to public office and the
election of poor ideas to guide one’s life. Both result in totalitarianisms of government
and spirit, hence the revolving of university education around wisdom (philosophy and
theology) mentioned in chapter three. The goal, of course, is to become fully human, and
for the Catholic university humanity is fully embodied in Jesus Christ. The remedy
Maritain brings is to unite all three streams of education528 from chapter one into one
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whole by putting the faculty in charge of pedagogy.529 Recall Pope St. John Paul II’s
words from Ex Corde Ecclesiae: “Christians among the teachers are called to be
witnesses and educators of authentic Christian life” (§22). When the university supports
such endeavors, the faculty have all the more joy living their vocations similar to leisure.
When not, we phase back into homo economicus abusing both student and faculty.
The problem is whether university education teaches (trains?) students to seek truth
and right or a utilitarian end. No question there is some utility. Any major can be used
for any number of jobs given the right combination of student personality and third party
skillset (e.g., internships), but then the utility is not the goal, rather, it is the labor market.
The issues with liberal education are actually issues with the global market economy. If
the market was structured in such a way that American student loans were not worth $1.2
trillion crippling student confidence in living a healthy life, then the liberal arts would not
need defending. They would just be part of life, and that is Maritain’s point. Liberal
education’s end is leisure because leisure does not simply mean “freedom from labor”.530
It means freedom from economic collapse, freedom to self-develop at one’s pace, not the
pace of the economy. Granted anyone could lose work at any time, but that kind of
anxiety cannot breed a free citizen because fear is never free.531 Catholic universities add
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to the anxiety when they lack faith in the liberal arts’s power to breed truth for we know it
is the truth that sets us free. To actively enjoy and take pleasure in truth (alongside my
obligation to others) is the gold standard of the free citizen. The Church always defends
the theological truth against heresy, and when this material is not communicated in any
meaningful way,532 citizenship is impeded either through encyclopedic inculcation or
nursery accommodation.533 Simply knowing facts is not enough to warrant thought, and
the lack of information does not produce mastery of material, hence the student is not
free. In lacking the “meat” to chew, Catholic universities nurture students for survival
instead of self-propelled learning and adaptation. Their role as the principle agent of
learning is shrunk. The remedy, then, is to concretely teach not only Catholic theology
(and all arts) at a deeper level, but in a manner consistent with the dignity of the person—
neither homo economicus, nor totalitarianism both of which uproot dignity.
The dignity of the student begins in his/her personhood. As per Maritain’s mention
of Plato, the student is not a representation of some abstract ideal in my mind or the realm
of the Forms. The student is a concrete being, a person, immediately in front of me
making a moral command on some aspect of my being. In the classroom, it is my
attention and full effort to communicate a lesson. Until the student's inner life is touched,
learning generally does not happen except on a surface memorization level. And then,
fear of punishment over not “learning” damages potential for contemplation on the
matters at hand. Education is about freedom, the spontaneity to grow at whim according
532
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to one’s interests and the demands of the teacher for the course, a delicate balance
between person (spirit) and individual (matter)—what one wants to learn and what one
needs to learn. Upsetting this balance are the extremes of anarchical education and
despotic education mentioned in chapter three. Anarchical education focuses solely on
the individual’s ego similar to Heidegger. It eliminates any notion of sacrifice and denial
of oneself to benefit others or one’s education. Despotic education is the opposite,
negating the individual in making all like copies similar Heidegger’s sameness (as called
by Levinas). Student docility towards love of truth, justice, and good are completely
destroyed following a philosophy of homo economicus. Doing work exceptionally well
for its own sake or for one’s personal development is a foreign concept as labor means
only, or almost only,534 the profits necessary for survival. Charity (compassion) for the
Other is wiped out, negating the teacher’s very existence.
Without charity, humanistic teaching and learning are not possible because
personhood matters is intertwined with the course material and relationship. Teachers
often present material from the heart, offering their truest thoughts on sensitive,
controversial matters not to hurt students, but to help them grow. Confrontation with
difficult subject matter can aid students in dealing with many of life’s inner blows (e.g.,
setbacks) as far as character development is concerned. Students need the charity of the
professor to help them understand, as much as possible, “how life works” outside the
classroom, that there is more to life than earning a paycheck. It is the freeing of bad
energy necessary to awaken the spiritual within. As with the Ignatian Pedagogical
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Paradigm, Maritainian pedagogy fosters unity of mind, body, and spirit, the core of any
holistic education. Pope St. John Paul II puts it as “combin[ing] excellence in humanistic
and cultural development with specialized professional training” (§23). Specialized
training is not the enemy, again, except when it is the center of attention. Marquette
University, for example, in nearly eliminating all of its core classes in the humanities to
take a professionalized approach is an affront to holism, not the inclusion of some “skills
courses” or business majors. The latter can certainly benefit from a humanistic education
helping young businesspeople understand the value of human life, placing it above even
the desire to make as much profit as one can. Pluralistic positions, however, imbalance
holistic Catholic higher education to despotism or anarchy in the quest for prestige,
power, and pleasure, the opposites of mind, body, and spirit. These latter traits provide
the foundations for the Catholic university in three ways: 1) a collective body of
knowledge is grown and propagated in accords with the Catholic intellectual tradition, 2)
there are tiers of knowledge with philosophy and theology at the top, 3) teaching is the
core of the university because of its responsibility for the students’ faith and citizenship.
Having laid out the basic return to orthodox Catholic higher education via Maritain,
I will conclude with a response to objections and cleaning up of loose ends in my
argument.
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VI. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In a sentence, Catholic education is the ethical relation of the student and teacher in
a mode of faith in accords with the teaching authority of the Holy See. Its primary
purposes are to form morally upright citizens in the Catholic faith with an eye to their
personal development as pertains their private and communal pursuits. I want to
conclude this dissertation with responses to common objections to my position and
thereby clean up argumentation. First, I will summarize the argument. Then, I will
explain what this Catholic university looks like. Next, I will respond to major objections
and dialogue with several other fields whilst clarifying my argument. Finally, I will
survey where this research takes us.
Summary
Chapter one was a brief summary of the major players, documents, and
theological controversies surrounding the nature of the Catholic university with emphasis
on the American university. The documents discussed therein were, of course, written for
all Catholic schools, and apply to the United States. Longinqua and Testem
Benevolenciae respectively considered Pope Leo XIII’s concerns about democratic
principles replacing morality and theological liberalism. These issues are tied to the
Augustinian/Thomist debate on the purpose of the Catholic university and theology’s
place in the curriculum. Augustinianism argues theology ought to be more of an
apologetic to help the faithful defend and live the Catholic faith, whereas Thomism
argues theology ought to be more of an intellectual enterprise. This debate arose in part
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because of increased lay interest in deeper theological matters. The laity’s needs were not
being met in course material, nor were many teachers prepared to offer new lessons. This
turn of thought lead to a pre-cursor to the Land O’Lakes Statement in Fr. John Tracy
Ellis’s Catholics and the Intellectual Life, which spurned material poverty and “ghetto
mentality” as the root causes of Catholic laziness in pursuing academic greatness.
Coupled with it are neo-Thomism’s unsatisfactory record with lay desires for serious
consideration of affectivity and experience in their studies, and secularization (later
laicization) of Catholic schools to the detriment of Vatican relations.
The actual Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL) is the major milestone in separation
from the Vatican. Its very first sentence declares the full modernity of the Catholic
university with the following sentence absolving itself from any and all authority outside
academic community. Even philosophy is described as “imperialism” and ought not
interfere with the goings-on of other fields. The student-teacher relationship is brought to
the fore in describing students as autonomous in a way akin to the authority-free Catholic
university, free to decide for themselves what is right and how. Students will think what
they want anyway, but teachers are given free rein so as to teach anything they like
without reference to Catholic faith, morals, or values. LOL represents the broader
definition of Fr. Hesburgh’s vision of the Catholic university. He takes it a step further
arguing for a state charter whereby the Catholic university is separate from the Vatican as
a corporation. Professionalization (academic excellence leading to research production)
is the heart of faculty activity. Teachers are teacher-scholars whose job is to output high
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amounts of scholarship, not instruct youth in how best to live and learn. The documents
following LOL, though, disagree with him in several key ways.
The Kinshasa Statement holds the same basic positions as LOL, except it affirms
Church authority. The Rome Statement mentions the student-teacher relationship founded
on three principles: trust, students as co-creators of knowledge, and the application
therein as creating charity. Nowhere in LOL is charity mentioned. The Catholic Church
in the Modern World supports academic excellence, but drops the “modern” aspect of the
university. Last, apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae lays out the basic structure of
the Catholic university as concerns academic excellence, its mission, the student-teacher
relationship, and the purpose of Catholic education. In particular, students are
“apprentices” to the moral exemplars of the teachers who are understood to be more than
mere instructors in their fields. They are bastions of virtue who lead and guide students
along the ways of life, not only academic knowhow. It significantly contrasts with LOL’s
take on teachers as independent from the mission and integrity of the school, teaching
absolutely anything at any time, with students being as autonomous, free to guide
themselves along whichever path they see fit.
Thus, we conclude the first chapter with reference to restorationism and
pluralism. Restorationism hearkens us back to a pre-Vatican II relationship with the Holy
See on matters of doctrinal and moral authority, maintaining the Catholic university is
part of the Church. (I used the image of a peninsula to illustrate my point.) Franciscan
University of Steubenville most keenly represents this position. Pluralism, however,
represents an interpretation of post-Vatican II relations with the Holy See, holding the
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university is entirely separate from the Church, doing whatever it pleases when it pleases
it in a spirit of complete independence. (I used the image of an island.) Any number of
schools are pluralistic, Duquesne University referenced as one example. These
distinctions in orientation towards the Vatican end our historical chapter and lead us into
the philosophies used to argue in favor of the student-teacher relationship at the
foundation of the Catholic university. I will be briefer in my treatment of these here.
Chapter two introduces Emmanuel Levinas’s self-Other relationship. Edmund
Husserl’s creation of phenomenological method is predicated on his concept of
intentionality, the idea that conscious experience is directed towards objects in the world.
His student, Martin Heidegger, picks up this idea and applies it to human existence (the
experience of being alive on earth) as concerns the self’s making its way in the world.
Levinas, then, studies with both and strongly disagrees with the place of Husserl’s
intentionality in the experience of the human encounter and with Heidegger’s overall
project to reduce other people to nodes in my quest for self-fulfillment in the “totalities”
of my life projects. In particular, Levinas notices both Husserl and Heidegger forget to
discuss the role of pleasure. Levinas’s organization of the self, without reference to
others, is thus predicated on enjoyment of life and “finding one’s place in the sun”. The
problem with this layout, however, is that other people exist. For Levinas, the encounter
with the Other (the one who is not me) tosses this organization of my world up in the air
because I am now forced to make room for her.
The essential ideas flowing from this encounter are metaphysical desire, the face,
and infinity. Desire is the longing for relationship with the Other. Once encountered, I
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have an insatiable longing for the Other such that I want to be associated with her for
reasons Levinas does not fully explain,535 partly because it is connected to his idea of the
face. The face, for Levinas, is the vulnerable, bare, impoverished humanity of another
person irreducible to representational knowledge. It is what I encounter when my daily
tasks are interrupted by a person in need (e.g., a beggar catches me off guard). This need,
however, is infinite in nature because my needs are constantly overflowing from one
moment to the next, and I am never satisfied. I fill my stomach, but I later become
hungry, etc. At a relational level, the Other is in constant need of response to fulfill her
needs, both material and spiritual, however they manifest. My obligation, then, is to ever
respond and be ready to respond to the Other in any way I can. What complicates this
encounter is the “third party” or everyone else outside this one-on-one relationship
between self and Other. The third party can also be considered society. All are privy to
the relationship insofar as they are readily available to receive anything I have to offer. I
can easily choose to provide anyone else what I am offering to the individual other. The
question of sharing resources is a question of justice—who deserves what? How do I
decide? These questions directly connect to- and impact the student-teacher relationship.
The student is conceived as a kind of beggar, one who is at the mercy of the
teacher responding to her needs. It may sound like a power dynamic: the teacher has the
“power” to do as she pleases over the student. That is true at a certain level, but ethics
being what it is—a check on power—the teacher will not be inclined to respond in some
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ways over others.536 Given what the teacher provides is knowledge, or a means to
knowledge, the primary response is to the student’s spiritual poverty.537 The student has
some immaterial need requiring fulfillment—skills (vocational) training, thirst for
knowledge, or some life goal education can be the means to accomplish—and the teacher
responds to that need in the classroom and outside it in things like office hours. These
settings provide the opportunity for conversation (the bridge between my sameness and
the student’s Otherness) and relationship to take place. If not, teachers and the
universities risk “starving” the students of wisdom. Hence, a liberal arts education is the
best means to obtain such an endeavor.
Jacques Maritain, in chapter three, champions the liberal arts education cause
arguing it is the best means by which to combat political- and pedagogical totalitarianism.
In short, education itself has three definitions and is at root about shaping citizens,
obtaining wisdom, and becoming human. The first definition is any (lifelong) process by
which I learn. Second, the shaping of young people, specifically as it applies to the
family. Last, formal schooling. The definitions intertwine in our analysis and in life, but
all are susceptible to what Maritain calls the seven misconceptions of education. I will
not rehash their meanings, only provide the names: disregard of ends, false ideas
concerning the end, pragmatism, sociologism, intellectualism (two forms), voluntarism
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(two forms), and the idea that everything can be learned. These misconceptions inhibit
learning and prevent human development because they damage the inner life of the
student, preventing its growth. Right education frees the student in spirit to pursue ends
of her own choosing as pertains to love of truth, justice, and good. The guidelines for the
teacher’s behavior and interior disposition are found in freeing the student from bad
energy (frustrations) and helping them make good use of their talents. The teacher
awakens the spiritual, of which Maritain means the intellect and will, by fostering unity
of mind, body, and spirit.
This internal unity inspires in the student a deep contemplation about the world
resulting in action, doing good for the neighbor according to one’s abilities. A respect for
proper authority engenders preparation for democracy, the best form of government for
liberal art learning because both champion the freedom of the individual.538 Education,
thereby, nurtures both seeking truth and preparation for life as one adapts to new
situations over one’s life with the base love of knowledge one gains in liberal learning.
In turn, these motivate good citizenship, that is, participation in society in morally and
legally acceptable ways (e.g., voting). Adding the Catholic university into the
conversation, good citizenship embodies faithful citizenship539 whereby students are
educated in the morals, values, and faith of Catholicism. Two inhibitions to citizenship
are encyclopedic inculcation (no depth of soul from too much information) and nursery
accommodation (no depth of soul from lack of information) because students are not
538

Not freedom in a Libertarian sense, rather, freedom in the sense that I can explore my talents and
become what I am meant to be within a Catholic philosophical anthropology.
539

Including the good, of course.

236
trained in enjoyment of truth and thereby becoming agents of their own learning. How
can students learn when presented with overwhelming or underwhelming amounts of
information? The goal of this process is leisure because when able to pursue one’s own
interests, culture is created, and culture on a sociological level founds civilization. And it
all starts with the student-teacher relationship or students would not learn in such a way
so as to take their place being productive in society. They learn the beginnings of a
productive life in the Catholic university. Maritain’s ideal university is the collective
body of human knowledge coming together to serve the human person for the above
reasons. Teaching is the core of the university because it shapes student character, which
in turn breeds good citizenship, but research is reserved for special institutes.
Branching off his idea of the university, chapter four reintroduces the concepts of
restorationism and pluralism with an eye to resolving their dispute in neo-restorationism,
the idea that a Catholic university can maintain its ties to the Vatican (and thus remain
Catholic) by hiring for mission such that teachers can teach what they want since they
will do it in a spirit of Christian charity. This discussion leads us to consider the idea that
teachers are “independent” in the sense that they have dignity as persons existing outside
the university. Once members, however, this dignity has gone aside in that harder and
harder demands are made on them for purposes of production, etc. to the point of
burnout. This situation in turn creates a crisis of identity: Are Catholic universities
places of research, teaching, both, or something else? There is a tension in the studentteacher relationship for how much the teacher is to respond, thus reminding us of the
tension in the Levinasian third party and the question of justice. This question prompts
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us to look at the (unjust) intentionalities of the Catholic university in prestige, pleasure,
and power. Catholic universities have for many decades now focused on higher national
rankings from sports teams to research article output to the detriment of teaching,
learning, and the health of its professoriate and student body. It filters into a return
discussion on sociologism, the most pernicious of the misconceptions because it reduces
the student to a biological organism reacting to its environment. As the goal of any
creature is survival, Catholic education adopted an outcomes-based assessment strategy
pitting heartfelt learning against checking off boxes in a businesslike pedagogy. Ignatian
pedagogy and the notion of self-encounter were offered in opposition, reclaiming the
student-teacher relationship as a personal-spiritual encounter. We concluded with the
proposed “medicine” for the Catholic university in a return to said relationship,
theocentric-humanistic education with theology at the heart of the university, the coupling
of intellectual labor and personal growth, and finally learning first among all university
activities. With this summary complete, I will now respond to objections.
On the Way to the Ideal Catholic University
One might ask how much I, or anyone, can reasonably do about today’s major
educational issues. I do not deny the seriousness of this objection. It is common for
teachers to reach out multiple times to students in an attempt to engage them and the
student simply does not respond. There is a realistic limit here for responsibility. When I
say “infinite responsibility,” I mean classroom responsibility. The learning, the teaching,
the interaction. For example, entire classroom lesson preps can fall apart when a student
asks a question related to course material catching the teacher off guard. Typically we
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want to structure our courses, our days, our years according to a schedule. But life has a
way of happening that it all falls apart, or can fall apart. The teacher is not responsible
for the students’ behavior, but the teacher no question influences it. Classroom control is
a thing, but structurally it comes back to the I-Other relation and how these subjects
integrate.
The essence is that teaching is not a day job, something you can take off like a coat
at the end of a long day. It follows you. You answer emails, phone calls, write
recommendations, grade papers all after hours. You can pay the bills, yes, but not with as
much comfort (usually) as many other fields. You are responsible for others even after
you put your office hours in. Notice the interaction between the concrete and abstract. I
am speaking about a broader relationship (I-Other) in the context of a real student and
teacher using concrete examples. Here presented is another reason why Levinas and
Maritain must be able to work together to get Catholic higher education back on track.
It may be argued against me that a question bearing directly on my use of Maritain
and Levinas is that it is a superfluous step in the process of reimagining, reexamining,
and restructuring the Catholic university. What is needed is, after all, a return to the way
things were without “bringing the pope” back into the schools so that the faculty are free
to think what they think and students to believe what they believe. We are not “in the
Dark Ages” after all. We must continue to drive forward the process of progress for the
benefit of all.
To this objection I reply it is exactly what Fr. Hesburgh and his party was arguing
from the beginning. They say schools are only good when they are “free” from
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authoritative strictures, and these strictures put on them by the Vatican deplete their
energy stores such that they cannot but explode in defiance of their being placed in
theological “boxes” so to speak. As I dissected section 8 of the Land O’Lakes Statement
(LOL), the student-teacher relationship is not Catholic there because it does not uphold
Catholic morals, values, and theology. These are essential for a university to call itself
Catholic because it is what is taught, and what is taught is predicated on a relationship
because without relationship teaching does not occur. The Catholic university was only
in the “Dark Ages” when it lost its identity as a result of such rambunctious testimony of
false leaders to the power and freedom over one’s own conscience. No doubt it was
Protestant in its roots, but I related it Husserl and Heidegger because of the
phenomenological manifestation of greed in the quest for prestige, power, and the
pleasure of being admired by one’s peers. “Bringing the pope” into the Catholic
university isn’t any different than making room for the moral authority one claims by
default in professing Catholicism. It is not like the pope is ruling with an iron fist. Pope
St. John Paul makes this clear in Ex Corde Ecclesiae.
The notes on Canon Law which he quotes are not saying one cannot have nonCatholics, only non-Catholics of poor lifestyle choices and Catholic theologians who do
not support Church teaching. The latter is their mirroring the concern of the 19th century
American bishops in commanding Catholic parishes to erect Catholic schools to negate
any Protestant and therefore salvific quandaries. Recall Pope Leo XIII worry over
theological liberalism. It all comes true in the American 1960s. Progress came to a
screeching halt because the inverse became reality: being Catholic at a Catholic school
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was no longer relevant or tolerable because “orthodox” or “traditional” Catholic theology
(even on basic matters) meant a “closed mind” to all other points of view, the erectors of
LOL believed was against the spirit of Vatican II’s openness to dialogue with modernity.
What Levinas and Maritain can help us do is redirect those old energies into renewal by
establishing what the problem was all along: the ethical relationship in the studentteacher relationship to effect the university would not exist without it and that these
parties are universally affected and effected by every decision made by administrations
and their boards. Adjust to the student-teacher relationship and you are indirectly fixing
the entire institution because no decision affecting it is without notice, similar to how
changes in water quality can be detected by even a single drop.
In this way, Levinas and Maritain are a mediating step in the process because they
directly affect and effect the social and institutional structures making the university
possible at all levels—student, faculty, staff, administrative. As pointed out in chapter
two, Levinas’s I-Other relationship is abstract, yet takes place in concrete socio-cultural
settings as Maritain’s philosophy establishes. One might wonder why would I exclude
English residential colleges or German research universities from my study, aside from
want of space. The answer is because the student-teacher relationship is universal.
Misconduct at an American university would be misconduct at any university, and we
Catholics do believe in absolute morality. For example, slapping a student for missing a
question is wrong in any culture, and totalitarianism in the classroom (e.g., propaganda)
is unacceptable wherever there are learners. These socio-cultural settings—England and
Germany—may also be Western, but surely no one would agree that violence of the
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mind, body, or spirit is morally upright against a student anywhere at anytime. Moreover
the violation of the student’s soul, an offense of dignity, is more apt at Catholic schools
because they take the soul seriously. One example of a violation against the student’s
dignity is, again, LOL for reasons described above.
LOL continues to have a powerful influence on American Catholic higher
education.540 Its authors knew precisely what they were doing in articulating their vision
of Catholic higher education. There may be some innocence as per their interpretation of
authentically living out the decrees of Vatican II, but as chapter one has shown, there
were all sorts of educational rifts bubbling to the surface. Vatican II seems more of an
excuse than anything else to implement said document. Proof of this claim is Fr.
Hesburgh’s presence at the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU) on
behalf of the United States. His ideas were eventually rejected given the documents (the
ones analyzed in chapter one) coming out of the IFCU’s congresses. LOL may not be a
comprehensive document, but that does not make it any less important.
Actions
On this note, one may object to my “mediating step” by asking what actions can
actually be taken to ensure, as much as possible, the Catholic university embodies neorestorationism? Or, how do we get it on the horizon to the reality of 21st century
education? Short of reaching into the souls of administrators and actually changing their
wills, I will offer seven suggestions. They proceed from the least likely, yet logically
possible, to the most realistically possible.
540
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First, whether separate or in combination, administrations and university presidents
simply fire everyone impeding the Catholic mission. The extremism of this position is
merited only by its possibility. Presidents cannot really “fire” anyone without due
process, that is, a serious investigation into the perceived wrongdoing of a faculty or
administrator. Nor can administrators outright fire each other without the same process
and a vote. Rather, firing is more of a dramatic institutional reset akin to the mental
meltdowns students face at the end of the semester. The problems arising here are
numerous: Who would fire themselves? Why would they do it when no one can stop
them staying? Perhaps the reasons why are akin to the second suggestion in repentance.
Instead of plain leaving, one might recommend administrators repent of their ways.
Acknowledgement that faculty play a crucial role in making the university work as a
university (as an institution of learning and training in life) would provide the faculty
with more power to do things, such as hiring whom they want to hire without needing
administrative approval.541 One might even consider, in conjunction or instead of the
aforementioned suggestion, removing some administrative positions altogether with the
phenomenon of administrative bloat. What happens here, in this case, is the faculty
would not so much receive more power or freedom, but the administrators would behave.
Again, little or no interference with departmental goings-on.
The third suggestion follows the Shimer College model. Shimer was a small, fouryear liberal arts school north of Chicago and has since been combined with North Central
College. It was famous, in part, due to the workings of its internal government—the
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faculty and students had a vote approving or disproving administrative decisions.542 It
actually worked in saving the school from initially being sold before its eventual financial
breakdown. The point is faculty and students can shape the school according to the
Catholic mission in ways higher-ups cannot. The distinction between this suggestion and
the previous one is a difference in relationship: the second puts the responsibility on the
administrators, the third on the faculty and students.
The fourth suggestion offers a third way for neo-restorationism to take shape. Over
time, influence of the religious Orders and their charisms have waned. Instead of strictly
giving faculty and maybe students more say in university affairs, turning the tide over to
the Orders themselves will set the Catholic university on sure path to academic and
spiritual success. Rather than emphasizing secular values, religious Orders by default
flourish in spiritual atmospheres. The introduction of spiritual practices and their benefits
has a spiritual effect on the whole school. There is a presence about Catholic schools
who embrace authentic Catholic spiritual practice different from their nominal
counterparts. And this idea of praxis is in accords with Catholicism’s understanding of
the spiritual life as per lifestyles. People with religious personalities “feel” different than
those without. And so, with the universities returning to their charisms’ roots, religious
Orders and faculty could work together in shaping a curriculum in accords with Catholic
faith, morals, and values.
The fifth suggestion, instead of requiring religious Orders to participate, simply
desires to mold the curriculum into something Catholic compatible. I return to the
542
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Stephen Lewis situation at Franciscan University. A faithfully Catholic professor like
himself is capable of filtering blasphemies in the classroom completely out or in an
edifying spirit. One example is modeling how to read “bad” literature in a charitable
spirit. The teacher exemplifies how to approach a text in such a way as to maximize
one’s time spent and the content received. It is not always possible to do these things
effectively in a curriculum designed to promote a political agenda or something other
than the faithful building up of character and religious knowledge. The desire for
controversial or contemporary material reflects, however, the desire for curricular change
in the 1950s and 1960s as evidenced in chapter one by students demanding more
humanities courses.
Supposing the students and faculty are unhappy with any of the suggestions above
or the problems underlying them, a sixth alternative is a mass faculty strike. I am not
sure how it would work at a larger school given the size of the endowments, but smaller
colleges might fare better given their faculty size. As we see with the coronavirus
pandemic, no students equals no money. Accordingly, no faculty equals no class. If the
coronavirus can severely mitigate the future of many lower and middle-sized universities,
imagine what faculty united under the cause of any and all things mission and identity
can accomplish. Granted there would need to be serious planning and such, but the
principle idea has promise even with anything and everything receiving a protest these
days.
The final and perhaps most obvious of ways to apply neo-restorationism is to
practice the “pre-neo” hiring of Catholic faculty. They know the faith, they practice the
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faith, and they teach the faith. These are men and women striving to follow Jesus Christ
in all ways in accords with Church teaching. Who better to model the pursuit of wisdom
over one’s life than people living it? They respect the magisterium as per normal day-today activities and would never intentionally lead a student away from an unfaithful,
unhealthy lifestyle. Ordinary disagreement is part of human life, and Catholic faculty
have an inherent boundary (if practiced correctly) to respect where others begin and end.
Students are free to make up their own minds as accords human nature and freedom, but
need to respect the Catholicity of the faculty and school. What’s going on here is a
constant cycling and recycling of relationship, of consistent dialogue over time about
matters of universal concern to all people. The Church and her faculty take a position on
these matters to the benefit of the students, guiding them along their own paths in the
spirit of faith, hope, and charity.
The Culmination of the Student-Teacher Relationship
The student precedes the teacher in all ways in the university, not in life. Teachers
have lives outside of school, but in school, the student precedes the self of the teacher.543
The student is the vulnerable one, exposed to the expertise of the teacher, whose mercy
the student is at. This includes research and grant writing, even proposals from
administrators to work on external projects. Practical considerations must be considered
in the life of the teacher. Certainly spouses, children, and some external circumstances
will carry more weight than the student in a given moment, but there is a special bond
between student and teacher not easily found elsewhere. The student follows the teacher
543
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after class. Words said, thoughts expressed, emails exchanged. Letters of
recommendation need written, questions need answered, and tests need taken. But the
best way to go about preserving the pedagogical relationship is up for debate. The
pastoral concerns of the Church filtered into the schools, and the reason the bishops
forced parents to send their children to Catholic schools (on penalty of mortal sin) was on
the basis of getting those souls prepared for Heaven for the sake of the Kingdom with
good catechesis.
On this note, the Catholic intellectual tradition is necessary, but not sufficient. Any
secular school could base itself on the material because heretofore it has shaped Western
civilization. It is treated like any other set of books, except with more emphasis. The
institutional Church is necessary to sustain Catholic university identity because it is
necessary to have exterior authority to form a stable identity. Something outside the self
(Husserl, Heidegger) offers a jumping off point, a rock to base oneself. Having oneself
for a counselor is unwise as is one’s own authority. What happens when that authority is
challenged? Or circumvented? One could crumble under the weight of one’s wonton
inborn ignorance. I am referring to people like Thrasymachus who look only to
themselves for truth, not the average citizen with surety of him/herself on a daily basis.
The Church itself believes she will never perish because she has God’s promise.
The university may go under for reasons unrelated to spirituality and religion, but not the
Church, and being a branch of the Church the university ties itself to that spiritual reality
such that its identity and the Church’s identity are the same: Jesus Christ. Given my
argument above, a Catholic university could theoretically not teach any explicitly
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Catholic authors as long as the teachers instructed the students in authentic Catholic
values, morals, and conduct. Realistically, I would not recommend it on a regular basis,
but Stephen Lewis’s situation at Franciscan University of Steubenville is one example of
how non-Catholic material can be edifying in a competent Catholic teacher’s hands.
Lewis is not one to stray from the path of Catholic intellectualism. Both endeavor
to reach young people, and what we concretely teach Catholic values: individuality,
humility, trust. The student gains these values by participating with the professor in
classroom and office hour endeavors, as well as with one’s peers. Conversations,
debates, and all kinds of exchanges exemplify the kind of person the Catholic educator is
and who he/she wants the student to become. The content, the material, is the means by
which such values are communicated and student character is built. Students get more
out of the course and overall classroom experience the more they put into it, and so, the
values are all the more reinforced. Their individuality is shaped in pursuing their own
interests. Humility is forged in recognizing how much knowledge there is and the
impossibility of knowing it all. Trust is engendered in being dependable—not refusing
help when it is asked. These aspects are what students want more than anything.
The evidence thereof is students most often remember us as we are. Multiple times
I received an end-of-semester email thanking me for my personality and what I offered.
Teachers have a tendency to go beyond obligation in care for students, offering help
outside of office hours in the hopes their students might benefit. The curriculum matters,
albeit not in the way we think it does. It matters because the personality of teacher comes
on, out, and about in the teaching. Teachers who cannot teach what they are passionate
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about—within reason of the Catholic intellectual tradition (CIT)—are in a worse position
than secular professors who just want to teach because they need work. The “layers” of
CIT and ethics are a simplified version of what Catholic universities have complicated in
the years since the Land O’Lakes Statement. These measures were there to make
teaching easier, not more difficult, by offering a parameter to work within according to
one’s specialization. For example, a philosopher working in 20th century philosophy
with a choice of whom to teach in any course need not choose Maritain because he is a
Thomist when choosing Levinas because of his compatibility with Catholicism works
just as well. There are lessons to be had anywhere. The difference between a Catholic
and non-Catholic (other Christian or secular) teacher is the spirit in which they teach.
To clarify, on the question of Catholic identity, I am siding with Pope St. John Paul
II in saying the situation of non-Catholic teachers at Catholic universities is not
inherently problematic.544 What’s problematic is what is sacrificed in the process.
Oftentimes secular teachers are offered work because of their research abilities going
hand-in-hand with the universities’ desires for power and prestige. Now, there are nonCatholic teachers who go above and beyond their teaching duties for the reasons laid out
above, the same as Catholic teachers. They are invaluable resources insofar as they fulfill
Maritain’s regimen of the moral exemplar, except that’s the problem: being a moral
exemplar at a Catholic school means one presumably ought to be Catholic in order to
exemplify Catholic faith, morals, and values. In light of this predicament, the
awkwardness of the Holy Father’s position is made up for by the ecumenism of all the
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major documents treated in chapter one of which he is privy. Each one specifies
ecumenism as a pillar to the Catholic university. Whether that ecumenism includes
secularism I doubt because the latter does not concern Christian unity. All the more
reason for controversy—what is the secular professor’s place in Catholic schools? The
Catholic professor teaches with an eye to the students’ inner development, which is not at
all unethical or undesirable for the secular professor. Many a secular professor care for
students as any Catholic. The issue, again, is the professor’s character and faith because
course material, important in its own way, can be taught in Ignatian “bad spirit”.
Catholic teachers move past the ethical sphere into the religious. Kierkegaard
argues throughout his corpus Christianity is not reducible to the ethical, but elevates us
into religious life (a direct one-on-one personal relationship with God). If all teachers
need to be are ethical, then most anyone will do at fulfilling any open job. Except what
Catholic teachers do is not a “job,” but a vocation, a personal calling from on high that
can only be responded to and fulfilled with the cooperation of grace. Teaching is more
than earning a paycheck, it is a lifestyle. When that lifestyle is to represent a model for
how to live in general (ECE), it takes more than “being good” to teach at a Catholic
school.
To elaborate on an example in chapter four, a Catholic professor would be inclined
to teach the chemical elements in a spirit of purpose—they are given us by God for our
use. We glorify His creation when we use His chemicals, etc. for His glory in building
and amassing goods for His people. A secular professor, in a similar lesson, might be
inclined to say the universe is random, without purpose, and without meaning. Why
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bother creating goods except for your pleasure? Maybe some form of Otherness or Other
can benefit from it, but really, everyone is going to die and rot so why bother? A Catholic
professor, again in similar situations, might gesture to how creation is a lover’s paradise
because God’s presence permeates His physical creation, which is actually made up of
materials knowns as chemical elements. I think the reader can understand the point I am
making—Catholic professors have an inherently different take on how to approach course
material and a confidence to teach it with grandeur. Of course, water molecules are
always “H20” and neither type of professor will teach any differently. But the spirit in
which it is taught matters greatly, whether the teacher is strict, “mean,” or otherwise
difficult to get along with. Meanness is not a prerequisite to holiness.545 An upright will
in a spirit of compassion is.
The outline of the problem in chapter one reveals an ongoing dilemma in how to
approach Catholic higher education’s evolution, whether as primarily pastoral or
academic, carrying into the post-Vatican II debates surrounding the Land O’Lakes
Statement, its successors, and the Church’s official decree in Ex Corde Ecclesiae. As it
applies to this dissertation, Levinas gives us the base structure necessary to make
personal- and institutional relationships work. Maritain puts content into the relationship
to make it real. The crucial overlap is how they characterize the student-teacher
relationship, both describing it as responsibility. As I laid out in chapter two, Levinas’s
self-Other relationship is too bare to stand on its own, and Maritain’s philosophy provides
said content whilst being compatible with Catholic theology, philosophy, and
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anthropology. In combining them, we see the student does not have a relationship with
“the university” per se. What does it matter that the university is nominally Catholic?
The student still has individual relationships with professors, and even then only a certain
kind of student will flourish.
The kind of student who is docile enough to receive instruction whilst pursuing
one’s own interests and remaining open to offering assistance to one’s neighbor. This
student is not the Hesburghian self in the Land O’Lakes Statement, rather the Wojtyłian546
self of Ex Corde Ecclesiae and Levinas. One major difference between them is the
manner in which this student relates to others.
The autonomous self in Heidegger, and to a lesser extent Husserl, does not engage
in the kind of “letting exist” that Levinas encourages. These facts are important because
they are same philosophies present in contemporary Catholic higher education today.
Husserl and Heidegger parallel the early debates and Fr. Hesburgh quite well, while
Levinas pairs with St. John Paul II and, as I will later show, Jacques Maritain. Husserl
and Heidegger are needed not only to explain Levinas, or help to explain Levinas, but
also to give ground for my argumentation as to the history and elaboration of Catholic
higher education. Their phenomenologies are present in the history of Catholic education
and philosophies of Catholic educators and institutions without full consciousness
because these philosophies are used indiscriminately. They underlie what Catholic
institutions of higher learning are trying to do, and I argue it is inherently selfish like the
Heideggerian self. Levinas offers a reclamation of the self in recognition of the Other,
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similar to the student-teacher relationship, but he needs help because the I-Other
relationship by itself is not developed enough in his work to stand alone in institutional
education. Hence my inclusion of Maritain. On this note, this dissertation was borne of
years of observation and struggle to understand why Catholic education is increasingly
anti- and not Catholic at all. Personal experience plays a major role, but it is subjugated
to the facts of history. Catholic education has (d)evolved to the point of embracing the
ethics, vocabulary, and practices of consumerist business. Even business discuss wanting
to serve the customer, but the person is more than a customer, and are students are
definitely people.
The problem, however, with a well-rounded person argument for education with the
understanding that we are talking about universals—things that apply to all people, in all
places, and at all times—is that people do not understand what that means. Minimally it
means they are embedded in something bigger than themselves. There is something
universal about being human, and the liberal arts are directed at forming that person. The
theory of music, for example, is applicable to everyone. Why do we listen to music?
How does it work? These kinds of questions aim to shape the whole person, and the
primary means of doing that in the university is through independent thought.
All Roads Lead to Rome
Young people have to learn how to think for themselves. The problem is, to do that
well one needs many humanities courses. In learning how to think, one learns how to
making a living. All the emphasis on courses designed to help students form a career
places an extreme limitation on their ability to creatively pursue solutions to real world
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problems, something St. Ignatius espoused in his principle “contemplatives in action”.
Here, people find God in their day-to-day activities, noticing that the Lord speaks to- and
interacts with us in ordinary activities, thus dignifying us and them in the process.
Students focusing only on the “outcome” of [take Noe’s research and use it for my own]
their college careers for longevity in another are missing the point of what it means to be
human. We are not made just to work or even mostly to work, though work is part and
parcel of human existence. We are made to worship God and live in as much peaceable
happiness as we can with our neighbor. Career-prep schools, of which many Catholic
universities already are, do nothing but add to the already cut-and-paste niche of higher
education, and the dignity of Catholic higher education is anything but copycat when its
professoriate are, essentially, the Good Samaritan for their students and their peers.
What makes the Good Samaritan good is not just that he went through the motions,
but his interior disposition was that of compassion. A perfectly average college or
university can respect its students in ways identical or akin to the ethics presented here
and still not be Catholic for the same reasons as the Catholic intellectual tradition
discussion above—the relationship to the Church matters. The Incarnation, philosophical
anthropology, matters. The act of mercy only goes “halfway” when done for the wrong
reasons. The intention behind it matters because it shows the disposition of the heart, and
the heart of the Church is Jesus Christ.
We now begin to see why St. John Paul II places such a strong emphasis on the
student-teacher relationship. Not just for reasons of exemplarity, but because it is an
imitation of Jesus Himself. The compassion the teacher demonstrates both in and outside
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the classroom is akin to the Good Samaritan: the latter responds indiscriminately to the
material poverty of the beggar, the former to the spiritual poverty of the beggar-student.
The teacher concretely lives the Christian life in being the Good Samaritan for the student
(the Other), which includes the possibility of—as we have discussed—teaching
“forbidden” texts.
But the responsibility the teacher has for the student has its limits. The teacher is
not responsible for the quality of work, plagiarism, or lateness. Students have, as
demonstrated with Maritain, their own business to tend to, and the teacher is the model.
These kinds of distinctions blur and grow further apart in graduate education because
students are expected to be more independent, but the principle is the same: teachers
provide the “food” for the soul necessary to sustain a healthy pedagogical relationship,
and that includes assistance at the professional as well as the personal levels where
appropriate.547 Again, “forbidden” texts might cause some discomfort students want to
discuss outside of class.
Returning to St. John Paul II, his point is that to be religiously free one must not be
forced into faith. It would be freely chosen or not chosen at all. He draws that kind of
freedom out into academic freedom: who can say an academic institution is truly free
unless it is free to make its own choices outside external authority? The problem here is
that to call oneself religious implies a surrender of freedom. When one converts, one
gives oneself over to the religious belief in the sense that it is adopted it as one’s own.
547
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Freedom itself isn’t lost completely because one can always choose again, but in
surrender I am obligated to follow specific norms, else there is no difference between my
previous and current ways of life. Academic freedom mirrors religious freedom in the
same way. Both freedoms are a surrendering to the truth, one personal, one institutional.
The confession of faith in an academic institution mirrors religious freedom in the sense
that one will not condone or confess anything contrary to the truth one professes.
Religious freedom would not want anything against the truth, so why would academic
freedom have a problem with “limiting” academic speech on a Catholic campus? It is
religious freedom’s right to establish boundary lines because, while freedom itself may be
libertarian, academic freedom certainly would not say there is unlimited action. Even
secular schools teach ethics, albeit a usually very faint one. Religious schools all the
more whether adopting secular notions of freedom and morals or not. One idea that tests
the notion of freedom is the Index Librorum Prohibitorum.
The Index was a list of banned books to safeguard the faithful from error in faith
and morals. Pope St. Paul VI eliminated it during Vatican II to the trust of the faithful
judging for themselves right from wrong. The spirit of the matter was the faithful ought
not be “forced” to follow the faith, especially out of fear, but to follow it freely and out of
love. Hence, they ought to be able to decide how and whether something was or was not
appropriate to heed for themselves or their children. The problem was people were not as
well educated as they ought to have been in order to discern such things. The then newly
founded Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith’s job was to “safeguard doctrine on
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faith and morals in the whole Catholic world.”548 Its purpose is to officially discern what
is true Catholic teaching and what is not to help the faithful lead Christian lives. The
more educated people became, however, the more complicated matters arose in Church
teaching. For instance, contraceptive use. Lay people incorporated their own ideas and
experiences (as evidenced by the rejection of neo-Thomism laid out in chapter one) to
understand, explain, and critique Church doctrine. The times were no longer the case
where the laity adopted whatever the Church said. A much more dialogical character was
formed in the Church herself.
Pope Paul even permits said authors the right to defend themselves before possible
condemnation of their views.549 The elimination of the Index is not an “anything goes”
relativism, but an opportunity for authors to explain themselves. There may be specific
reasons why the authors wrote what they did beyond simple nose-thumbing or hatred of
the faith. Of course, such authors would presumably not be Catholic and in need of a
hearing, but the point is there is a greater spread in how and what parents, teachers, and
now universities can teach.
The material, again, is constantly changing insofar the Catholic intellectual tradition
is not consistently adopted. The contemporary university is a business model throughout,
but as stated above customers are people, too. They have a humanity beneath the role
they play as consumer. That’s the humanity I want to reach through Levinas who—in his
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ethical phenomenology—treats the Other (the one who is not me) as a human in her
vulnerability to violence. We do a violence to our students when we don’t care for their
souls. When we give them what they want, not what they need,550 they suffer from want
of knowledge and spiritual nourishment. The job of the faculty is to train students to
become good citizens contributing to the common good.551 No better place do faculty
have the ability and opportunity to do this than at Jesuit schools which are made for
social justice.552
If universities really want to entertain business models, they would reorganize their
entire administrative staffs. The essence of a university is instructing students—it only
needs faculty and students. Everything else is optional, including dorms, dining halls,
and counseling centers. Dining halls are (always?) outsourced: another company comes
in to provide the needed resource for the university so it can focus its energy elsewhere.
Suppose that logic was applied to everything except faculty, students, and those things
essential for academic success (e.g., libraries and research centers). All the niceties
would go away and a university dedicated solely to the build-up of knowledge would
proceed.
In this way, administrators would relate to faculty in new ways. Instead of
understanding them as grant machines or fillers for necessary courses, they become
people with families and interesting ideas shaping a campus community towards
550
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flourishing and moral responsibility. Money would not matter the way it did before.
These are people with livelihoods needing a support system, and given their current
power, administrators are in a unique position to provide a chunk of that support as per
university employment. With such support, faculty are less anxious and can thereby
focus more energy on their courses and students. Whether researching or not, there is a
kind of peace knowing one has one’s ducks in order. Lesson plans flow (hopefully!), and
grading takes up time, yet has a certain calm about it. The effects of the above are more
behind-the-scenes, but students notice how we are in the classroom, and how such things
effect our delivery and content.
Speaking of content, I did not deal with Gravissimum educationis and similar
documents because, short of space, they do not deal directly with the American Catholic
university. There is a line of thought, a genealogy if one will, in Rome, Kinshasa, and
Catholic University in the Modern World because all directly lead into Ex Corde
Ecclesiae (ECE), which is a direct response from the Vatican to the Land O’Lakes
Statement (LOL), an American Catholic document.
On whether schools follow ECE or LOL, the major difference between schools
already doing what I am arguing (or are close) and the ones not is that the latter are
predicated on economic models of the university, not ethical ones. Franciscan University
of Steubenville (FUS) is not perfect, nor do I think any university could be. Yet, FUS has
an ethical spirit: it respects student individuality, encourages humility, and is known for
having dependable professors. It is the most important and basic necessity for anything
considered in this dissertation. Many other universities, no question, have similar setups
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and faculty, except they aren’t necessarily Catholic. The Catholic spirit matters because
it is an ethical-religious one embodying all the Truth of the Gospel coupled with all the
morally-upright secular values (e.g., justice) of the Academy. But Catholic universities
need to be themselves.
Duquesne will never be Harvard. Or the University of California. Or Stanford,
Yale, Princeton, or any of the other major American universities. It is like a lynx trying
to be a lion. The lynx is not the king of the jungle, nor can it be. But like a lynx,
Duquesne can hold its own in its own place and part of the jungle. Because of its size, it
can contribute to things larger “animals” may not be equipped because of size and need
“in the jungle” for other things. When keeping to its business, the lynx is a force to
reckoned with, even for a lion. Duquesne merely needs to do what it does best in
whatever it wants to recognize itself within the boundaries of what is laid out here, which
certainly includes educating the whole person
The problem, however, is education refers to more than just people. When we
discuss educating the “whole person” we are really referring to making the university a
half academic, half monastery institution. The University of Paris, where St. Thomas
Aquinas taught, did not permit him and his Dominican brothers to develop their
spirituality. Rather, it afforded them the opportunity to express themselves academically
in the teaching and proliferation of the Scholastic method. They did proofs and worked
out logic, something any secular person can do. They neither instructed the students nor
themselves in the religious life. That was reserved for the monastery, the “proper place”
for religious life. Students today are expected to combine both into one. But how can
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they manage the effort to find a Catholic education at institutions where such an
education should be taken for granted and perform at a level to maintain high academic
standards? Students are only human and something has to give. Many times it is
personality.
One might say a kind of violence is done to the student in being ignored of all her
attributes in her quest for both of the above and the individual attention often required for
students at numerous points in their academic careers. Anytime I relate an individual
student to a whole or an institution, the uniqueness is lost in the group by a “comparison
between incomparables.” The complete uniqueness of one student is incomparable to any
other, yet they are compared with each other in situations where one can only help one
student at a time (e.g., this email before that one). More specifically, how do I decide
which student to respond to first? What best helps this student? And comparing Others
is true even for Catholic universities whose underlying metaphysic is tied to the dignity
of the human person: All people (here, students) must be respected as made in God’s
image. The problem presented to us is just that—how to respect all of God’s children in
the classroom and the university at large. It requires a certain kind of “revolution” in
university structures.
Vatican II was the Church’s own “revolution” amidst the turmoil of the 1960s—
racial tension, Vietnam, and assassinations in America reinforced LOL’s message. The
revolutionary spirit was attempting to overturn long established institutions and positions
in American politics and abroad, including Catholic universities. These are places for all
these disparate voices to find a voice because Catholic schools care for the humanities
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and human person without regard to class, race, or sex. Such things are at the forefront of
radical left agendaism, so these forces find a “home” in Catholic schools because the
social justice (really, ethics) of the Catholic university has serious overlap with its
interests. I will not be going into detail about such things as they are about topics outside
this dissertation, but LOL is the educational pretense for such action.
Noted in chapter one, Pope Leo XIII was worried about Catholic schools becoming
too Protestant in the adoption of American values. He feared the intermingling of such
forces would water down Catholic teaching into a kind of liberalism that undid years of
Catholic doctrine. In the coming years, the warning signals he observed would come to
fruition in the form of a document expressing a complete break with Vatican authority:
the Land O’Lakes Statement (LOL). With its desired freedom to do as it pleased, there
were no limits for its implementation however one wanted to interpret it. It was only
until Ex Corde Ecclesiae comes about does the Vatican have a solid “answer” to LOL.
American bishops today, however, have an air of “don’t touch our schools” towards the
Vatican because they are “ours” not yours, and they tend not to obey or take seriously Ex
Corde Ecclesiae because it is too conservative for their taste. That attitude is extremely
problematic for the following reason.
Suppose there is a Catholic who wants to get in touch with his faith after being
away from it for a while. He looks to church pamphlets, spiritual writers, and Vatican
documents (papal encyclicals, et al.) for inspiration. He finds contradictions553 in them
on important theological matters and wants to understand why this is the case. Did he
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Or apparent ones making it difficult to discern the truth.
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misunderstand? Was there a translation error? Maybe something was misprinted.
Whatever the reason, he begins to dig into more material to sort things out. He then
considers American Catholic scholars for guidance, but finds there are few at Catholic
universities. Finding out it is the bishopric who dismisses them, he becomes disgusted
and leaves once more.554 I want to apply this same spirit to a final thought experiment
explaining Catholic university hiring processes, the seventh suggestion in applying neorestorationism.
Let us say there is a university “Immanuel Kant State” (IKS). All of the
departments teach a commitment to Kantian positions and ideals in all of their known and
logically probable forms. Every single professor, department head, staff member, and
administrator is a Kantian in all ways, observing their own categorical imperatives day-in
and day-out as they go about their lives and jobs. They do not think lowly of anyone
else, but they are firm in their beliefs and welcome anyone who wants to debate them in
an intelligent, respectable manner. All of their hires are educated by the local Liberal
Arts University (LAU) in various doctoral and master’s programs. While disagreeing on
minutiae, they hold the core tenets of Kantianism to the bone. A recent lapse in output of
Kantians from LAU has forced the IKS to hire, for the first time in their 120-year history,
a non-Kantian. After some deliberation, they decide it is best to hire an Aristotelian, for
at least they have responses to all things Aristotle, they conclude.
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This example is not entirely unfounded as there are many Catholics who do not have (many) issues with
Church theology itself, rather, they take issue with the inner workings and political decision-making of its
leaders.
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The Aristotelian begins her tenure as a temporary hire, teaching three classes a
semester and attending various faculty events at the risk of social suicide. Our Kantians
do not ridicule our Aristotelian friend, nor do they hold any grudges. They simply just
want one of their own. It comes to pass, however, that some Kantians warm up to the
Aristotelian. They actually like her personality and find some of her positions on
Aristotle fresh and worthy of consideration. She even backs several of them up at faculty
events on touchy subjects. When put to a vote, the Aristotelian is granted tenure track,
and a few years later heads the department much to the dismay of the old-school
Kantians. The new department head goes so far as to hire other non-Kantians—
Platonists, Thomists, and Heideggerians, all with varying degrees of disgust for Kant.
The positive response from the public moves the administration to turn around their
policies. From now on, anyone can insult Kant without question at anytime, and those
who challenge such insults are sent to the local magistrate to pay a fine. Or they are
simply fired. Kantianism’s mission is displayed proudly on the university’s grounds, but
its message is lost in all meaningful interaction.
The old Kantians do not understand what happened to their school. Everyone was
performing their duties. Everything was in order. The moral law was in them, and the
starry skies above. Everything was as it was supposed to be. Until the Aristotelian came
along. What are the Kantians supposed to do? And why would an Aristotelian be chosen
to lead a university department so antithetical to her beliefs?
The thought experiment shows, by analogy, what happens to Catholic universities
that do not take Catholic identity and mission seriously. Over time, they slowly begin to
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break down—it is rarely anything noticeable until it is too late. IKS is the Catholic
university, the Kantians the faithful Catholics, and the insulting of Kant the disrespect of
any and all things Catholic. The lapse in Kantians from LAU is the lack of religious
fidelity in Catholic higher education around the 1960s, and the hiring an Aristotelian to a
prominent position representative of a change in institutions of Catholic higher learning
towards non-Catholics and leadership.
The loyal Kantians (the faithful Catholics) are slowly outnumbered and their
views dismissed as out of touch with reality and the times. “No one believes that
deontology anymore!” it is said. And so with Catholics, their faith is put to the test and
challenged in ways it otherwise would not be. It is not to say that faith should go
unquestioned or unthought, but it does suggest that Catholic universities have some
special role in cultivating it, engaging it seriously, much like education in general and not
unlike our IKS faculty who instruct their students in Kantian ways.
To carry the analogy further, how an Aristotelian can directly contribute to a
Kantian mission is puzzling. Aristotelians actively dislike Kant because he
systematically destroyed Aristotelian science.555 Why would an Aristotelian seek
employment at a Kantian school? Granted there are more to people than their
philosophical positions, but when philosophy is built into your job description, it matters
for one’s own sake, the integrity of the department, and that of university. And like
Kantians, Aristotelians have to eat, so the reasons may be financial. I do not have any
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out the comparison for further explication.

265
problem with this situation. But Kantians need and have a right to their identity, and so
the promotion of an Aristotelian philosophy seems counterproductive.
We are now seeing how this analogy plays out: Non-Catholics without any
respect for the Church seek employment at her institutions, possibly to simply make a
living. Yet, the very nature of the position requires some kind of readily available reason
why that person should be hired over a committed Catholic. Catholic universities and
departments have a mission that Catholics can best fill and promote—not unlike Kantians
at a Kantian university. An Aristotelian may function well in an office, but that does not
mean it is the Aristotelian’s telos to be in the office. Likewise non-Catholics can serve in
the same positions as Catholics, just as well and even better,556 but the uniqueness of the
vocation (telos) Catholic universities have requires Catholics to be preferred in hiring for
mission. I am not suggesting non-Catholics do not have a place at Catholic universities,
nor am I suggesting non-Catholics are not welcome.557 I am saying that, like the
Kantians at IKS promoting and defending the Kantian mission,558 Catholic universities
have an obligation to fulfill their missions to the Church, the faithful, the students and
faculty, and above all to God to the effect that too many non-Catholics interfere with the
cultivation of faith and responsible citizenship in the eyes of the Church.559 When people
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An ability to perform the demands of a job is not based on one’s faith.
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Ex Corde Ecclesiae makes this point abundantly clear.
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Parents and grandparents pay their (grand)children’s tuition expecting them to gain a Catholic
education, which is a related issued taken up somewhat in chapter four during the discussion of curriculum
and intentionalities.
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in power who decide the future of the university in small ways abuse their positions, over
time the mission, identity, and faith start to erode. It is our children who pay the penalty.
Conclusion
We have traversed the major history of 20th century American Catholic higher
education into an ethical metaphysics (Levinas) forming the basis of a deeper philosophy
of education prioritizing the student-teacher relationship (Maritain). I combined these
philosophies with the teaching of apostolic constitution Ex Corde Ecclesiae over-against
the impersonal Heideggerianism of the Land O’Lakes Statement. These conclusions lead
me to forming a new approach to Catholic higher education in neo-restorationism,
whereby one can successfully combine the (controversial) insights of secular culture with
the theological-intellectual orthodoxy of the Catholic intellectual tradition. Amidst these
discussions was the primary aim of the dissertation to argue for the foundation of the
student-teacher relationship as forming the basis of all major institutional decisionmaking both inside- and outside the classroom. The final analysis analyzed some
common objections and my responses, placing my project in the larger schema of all
higher education. I concluded with an analogy explaining that should we not deal with
this problem now, our future—our children—will suffer the consequences.
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